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ABSTRACT
Wilderness Handrails: The Evolution of Search and Rescue
in Yosemite National Park
by
Christopher Edward Johnson
Dr. Andrew Kirk, Examination Committee Chair
Professor of History
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
The evolution of seareh and reseue in Yosemite after World War II highlighted the
ways in whieh park users and administrators negotiated the contentious discourses of
teehnology, tourism, and wilderness in the modem national parks movement. The
establishment of a teehnologieally sophistieated seareh and rescue force provided free by
the federal government blurred the lines between preservation and use in national park
policy by allowing administrators to resist development and support wilderness while still
providing a safe environment for recreation. The co-evolution of rock climbing and
rescue also illuminated the resulting tensions between individual freedom, social
responsibility, and class in environmental culture. Drawing from incident reports,
administrative correspondence, and climbing literature, this thesis demonstrates that the
professionalization of search and rescue enabled the Park Service to accommodate
visitors seeking to both preserve nature and consume it through rock climbing and other
wilderness activities in the nation’s premier national park.
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INTRODUCTION
Let them take risks, for Godsake, let them get lost, sunburnt, stranded, drowned, eaten by
bears, buried alive under avalanches - that is the right and privilege of any free American.
Edward Abbey, Desert Solitaire, 1968
Today rescue in America is pragmatic. It is a classic American expression of the denial of
death by means of technology and motion.
Kenneth Andrasko, “Editor’s Note” in Wilderness Search and Rescue, 1980

October storms are frequent catalysts of search and rescue (SAR) missions in
Yosemite National Park. Though not uncommon and typically less severe than similar
meteorological events in other major mountain ranges around the world, these first
storms of the winter season can be devastating to unaware visitors in Yosemite’s more
than 700,000 acres of undeveloped terrain beyond, and high above, the relative safety and
security of the urbanized Valley. SAR specialist and expert rock climber Lincoln Else
recalled spending the first two weeks of October 2004 hiking along the Valley rim in a tshirt and shorts, “sweating in the hot sun.” Just days later, on the morning of the
nineteenth after two straight nights of freezing rain and snow, he found himself breaking
trail through knee-deep snow drifts in blizzard conditions, marking trees with bright pink
“flags” so that a support crew of thirty SAR experts could follow with climbing ropes,
medical supplies, and other tools of rescue. Their destination: the rim of El Capitan, one
of the park’s premier tourist sights and the most famous rock climbing wall in the world.
The storm continued for two days as Else and Yosemite’s team of professional rescuers
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struggled to carry out one of the most technically difficult, dangerous, and ultimately
tragic SAR operations in the park’s recent history.*
When the storm hit on the seventeenth, four parties including seven total climbers
became trapped on four different routes high on El Capitan’s 3,000 foot vertical face.
After enduring three days of fifty mile-per-hour winds and rain mixed with snow, five
climbers survived to be pulled from the rock by the park’s crack SAR team while two
Japanese climbers perished from hypothermia and prolonged exposure only 600 feet
short of the summit. Though experienced and well-stocked for the five-day climb of the
“Nose” route on El Capitan, Ryoichi Yamamoto and Moriko Ryugo did not anticipate the
dire straights an October storm could bring. After two days of huddling against the cold
on the same tiny ledge, the pair jettisoned much of their gear in a last ditch effort to make
the summit during a lull in the storm. Unfortunately, good weather lasted only an hour,
and on the night of the nineteenth, the climbers died hanging in slings, wrapped together
under a flimsy nylon tarp. “Parties can steel themselves to the misery and boredom of
riding out a storm on the wall,” explained Ed Visnovski in his analysis of the climbers’
actions, “but the physical and mental debilitation of hypothermia is a slippery slope that
is hard to prepare for and harder to resist.”^ Requiring 110 rescuers, thousands of feet of
climbing rope, a contract helicopter, and more than $110,000 of the park’s emergency
appropriation funds, the rescue of the surviving climbers and the recovery of the bodies

' Lincoln Else, “Flagging,” in Friends o f YOSAR, “El Capitan Rescues, 10-19-04 to 10-22-04.”
http://w'ww.friendsofvosar.org/rescues/niissions/10-19-04 ElseFlagging.html (accessed July 23, 2007).
^ Ed Visnovske, “Double Climber Fatality on the Nose,” in Friends o f YOSAR, “El Capitan Rescue,
10-19-04 to 10-22-04.” http://www.ffiendsofVosar.org/rescues/missions/10-19-04 Nose Fatalities.html
(accessed July 23,2007).
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of Yamamoto and Ryugo underscored the vital importance of search and rescue to the
administration of Yosemite National Park.^
By 2004, Yosemite’s elite SAR team had amassed nearly forty years experience
carrying out some of the most improbable climbing rescues ever performed. In fact, the
dramatic rescue and body recovery from El Capitan in October of 2004 shared an eerie
connection with another SAR incident in exactly the same location twenty years earlier,
almost to the day. On the night of October 15,1984, an unseasonable winter storm
inundated the Yosemite region, stranding five climbers in three parties on the granite
flanks of El Capitan. After three days of battling poor visibility, freezing temperatures,
and violent winds, rescuers managed to save the lives of three of the five climbers. The
other two, Keiso Sadamoto and Kenji Yatsuhashi of Hiroshima, Japan, lost their lives to
hypothermia in a vain attempt to climb through the storm.'*
Such stories are reminders of the power of nature, yet they are perhaps even more
valuable for what they reveal about culture and the ways in which Americans, and other
visitors from around the world, have known nature through recreation in Yosemite and
the national parks. The striking and oddly unsettling parallels between these two
incidents on El Capitan suggest more than cosmic coincidence; they also illustrate in high
relief the persistent administrative challenges arising from the transformation of rock
climbing and other wilderness-oriented activities into mainstream recreational pursuits in

^Friends o f YOSAR, “El Capitan Rescues, 10-19-04 to 10-22-04.”
http://www.tfiendsofvosar.org/rescues/missions/10-19-04.html (accessed on July 23, 2007); for additional
accounts o f this rescue and recovery see Daniel Duane, “Six Nights on the Dark Tower,” National
Geographic Adventure 7 (February, 2005); and Michael P. Ghiglieri and Charles R. “Butch” Farabee, Jr.,
O jf the Wall: Death in Yosemite (Flagstaff: Puma Press, 2007), 336-339.
Michael Mayer, “Case Incident Record,” October 18, 1984, YOSE SAR files, 1984.; also see
Ghiglieri and Farabee, DeatA in Yosemite, 331-332.
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Yosemite and other national parks in the second half of the twentieth century. As park
goers in this period created new ways to experience nature through recreation in
America’s iconic landscapes, search and rescue became routine, serving as a marker of
profound changes in environmental culture.
Sociologist Joseph Sax, in his 1980 study of recreation in the national parks.
Mountains without Handrails, asked how a minority of “preservationists” could justify
their demands that the National Park Service (NFS) prioritize rock climbing, backpacking,
ski mountaineering, and other wilderness-oriented activities which, by the level of risk,
technical skill, and physicality involved, effectively excluded the majority of visitors
seeking only “an experience that will provide the essential qualities of a resort vacation.”^
Sax made no mention of the function of visitor protection in justifying this recreational
hierarchy. Yet the NFS’s institutionalization of search and rescue in Yosemite in the
decades following World War II represented a significant devotion of human and
financial resources towards privileging the park’s most active visitors, specifically those
seeking a wilderness experience sans “handrails.”
Even with serious budget concerns, annual increases in accidents, and objections from
taxpayers, rescuers, and some wilderness advocates, the promise of free rescue remained
embedded in Yosemite’s visitor protection apparatus. Established in 1970, Yosemite
Search and Rescue or YOSAR - a technologically sophisticated, professional
organization composed of park rangers, expert rock climbers, medical technicians, and
helicopter support teams - provided a psychic safety net for even the most inexperienced
visitors wishing to encounter the park through rock climbing, backpacking, cross-country

^Joseph L. Sax, Mountains Without Handrails: Reflections on the National Parks (Ann Arbor: The
University o f Michigan Press, 1980), 2,95.
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skiing, or other forms of recreation consistent with what Sax called “the preservationist
tradition in the national parks movement.”^ As a tool for the NFS to accommodate the
changing recreational expectations of park goers in the age of environmentalism, YOSAR
became the “handrails” of Yosemite’s wilderness.
For most tourists in Yosemite since the 1970s, YOSAR’s “wilderness handrails”
functioned as far more acceptable safeguards than the roads, hotels, metal railings, and
other explicit “handrails” that Sax feared would pervade the parks and spoil the
interaction with wild nature central to what he and millions of park lovers perceived as an
appropriate wilderness experience. For many outdoor enthusiasts, YOSAR’s use of
helicopters, rigging systems, high powered spotlights, and other conspicuous tools of
rescue seemed an intangible sideshow, existing as a reactive safeguard to be effected in
the off-chance that an emergency cut short their wilderness fantasy. YOSAR’s technical
sophistication - though viewed by some preservationists as running counter to the
technological skepticism of the wilderness ideal - enabled the individualized recreational
experience sought by the park’s most active visitors to remain functionally self-sufficient
without becoming unjustifiably dangerous. In an urban industrial/ post-industrial society
in which few visitors to the national parks possessed the skills to extricate themselves
from life-or-death scenarios in a wilderness setting, a technologically proficient SAR
apparatus became not only an acceptable presence in the outdoors but a vital requirement
of the much sought-after wilderness experience.
The wilderness handrails of SAR occupied what Leo Marx called a “middle
landscape” in America’s ongoing reconciliation of technology and nature since the start

* Ibid., 42.
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of the industrial age. In Marx’s analysis, Americans created a new understanding of their
relationship to nature as the “machine” of industrial technology crept into the idealized
“garden” of the pre-industrial landscape. While Marx’s pastoral nature differed from the
notion of a recreational wilderness that gained currency in twentieth century
environmental thought, the process of redefining the human place in nature through
technology remained central to both constructions. Outdoor enthusiasts from the early
twentieth through to the twenty first century have continually modified the technological
imperative described by Marx in order to define the limits of authenticity in the
wilderness experiences. Despite the anti-technology bias of the wilderness ideal, for
consumers of outdoor recreation, this search for authenticity has not always required a
tangible nature unaffected by human agency, but more often has involved locating an
appropriate role for technology in providing safe access to the landscapes defined as
wilderness in environmental discourse.^ The history of search and rescue in the national
parks reveals how park enthusiasts in the second half of the twentieth century constructed
new rationales for the inclusion of technology and consumer desire into a wilderness
ideal that did not explicitly contain a place for either.
As environmental historians have long argued, the wilderness movement and its
outgrowth, environmentalism, emerged as critiques of the nation’s religious zeal for the
technological domination of nature in the industrial age.* Preservationists from John

’ Leo Marx, The Machine in the Garden:Technology and the Pastoral Ideal in America (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1964, 23, 71,113-115, 139-144; For these intersections between technology,
consumer-oriented recreation, and wilderness in the twentieth century consider the essays in Liza Nicholas
with Elaine M. Bapis and Thomas J. Harvey, eds.. Imagining the Big Open: Nature, Identity, and Play in
the New West (Salt Lake City: University o f Utah Press, 2003); Also see James Morton Turner, “From
Woodcraft to ‘Leave no Trace:’ Wilderness, Consumerism, and Environmentalism in Twentieth Century
America,” Environmental History 7, no. 3 (2002): 462-484.
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Muir to Aide Leopold to Edward Abbey presented wilderness as an ideal state of nature
existing apart from the technological imperatives and commercialism infiltrating urban
industrial society. Yet by dividing the physical world into sacred wilderness and profane
civilization, these “prophets” of environmental thinking constructed a rhetorical dualism
that did not necessarily reflect the practices and expectations of modem Americans.
Richard White deconstructs this dualism by positing a third path in which Americans
schooled in the rationality of the enlightenment cut through the romantic critique of
industrialism to discover a place for technological innovation in environmental discourse.
White traces this line of thinking from Thomas Jefferson to Ralph Waldo Emerson and
finally to social critic Lewis Mumford who viewed great projects such as the Grand
Coulee Dam on the Columbia River as opportunities for Americans to develop functional
relationships to the natural world.^ Andrew Kirk goes a step further by explaining the
significance of Stewart Brand’s Whole Earth Catalogue in shaping environmentalism in
the late 1960s and 1970s. Kirk demonstrates that discussions of alternative technology

®Hal K. Rothman, Saving the Planet: The American Response to the Environment in the Twentieth
Century (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2000), 3, 7, 91-96, 109-112; Stephen R. Fox, John Muir and His Legacy:
The American Conservation Movement (Boston: Little Brown, 1981); Robert Gottleib, Forcing the Spring:
The Transformation o f the American Environmental Movement (Washington: Island Press, 1993), 34-41;
Samuel P. Hays, Beauty, Health, and Permanence: Environmental Politics in the United States, 7955-1985
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987); From an environmentalist perspective see, Philip
Shabecof, A Fierce Green Fire: The American Environmental Movement (New York: Hill and Wang,
1993), 111-128; and Barry Commoner, The Closing Circle: Nature, Man, and Technology (New York:
Alfred K. Knopf, 1971); For technology in American culture see especially David E. Nye, American
Technological Sublime (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994); Carl Mitcham, Thinking Through Technology: The
Path Between Engineering and Philosophy (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1994); David F. Noble,
America by Design: Science, Technology, and the Rise o f Corporate Capitalism (New York: Alfred K.
Knopf, 1977); and Noble, The Religion o f Technology: The Divinity o f Man and the Spirit o f Invention
(New York: Random House, 1997).
’ Richard White, “Tempered Dreams” in Inventing fo r the Environment, Arthur Molella and Joyce
Bedi, eds. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003), 3-11; For Lewis Mumford and the Grand Coulee Dam see White,
The Organic Machine (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995), 55-56.
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and human ingenuity in mediating relationships to nature pervaded environmental
thinking well into the late twentieth century.***
The changing role of technology in shaping human interactions with nature has
occupied center stage in the co-evolution of recreation and rescue in Yosemite and other
nature tourism destinations around the world. YOSAR’s wilderness handrails enabled
park lovers to experience the freedom of unencumbered risk that Edward Abbey and
other wilderness luminaries valued in the national park experience while mitigating
through technology the very real possibility of serious injury or death this “right and
privilege of any free American” could bring.* * The history of SAR in Yosemite
illustrates how this interplay between technology, tourism, and wilderness influenced the
National Park Service’s efforts to preserve nature as a recreational resource in the
national parks in the decades following World War II.
A definition of wilderness that moves beyond the traditional analysis of the 1964
Wilderness Act as the culmination of preservationist thought is vital to understanding the
evolution of SAR in Yosemite.*^ Yet, as perhaps the most complicated and fiercely
debated concept in recent environmental history, wilderness defies easy categorization.

Andrew Kirk, "Machines o f Loving Grace: Appropriate Technology, Environment, and the
Counterculture" in Imagine Nation: The American Counterculture o f the 1960s and 1970s, Michael Doyle
and Peter Braunstein, eds. (New York: Routledge, 2001), 353-378; Kirk, “Appropriating Technology: The
Whole Earth Catalogue and Counterculture Environmental Politics,” Environmental History 6 (July 2001):
374-394; For further reading on the role o f technology in recent environmental politics and culture see
Braden R, Allenby, Reconstructing Earth: Technology and Environment in the Age o f Humans
(Washington D.C.: Island Press, 2005); For an overview o f literature see Jeffrey K. Stein and Joel A. Tarr,
“At the Intersection o f Histories: Technology and the Environment,” Technology and Culture, Volume 39,
Number 4 (October 1998), 601-640.
'' Edward Abbey, D esert Solitaire: A Season in the Wilderness (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), 5556.
For the Wilderness Act as a starting point for analysis o f wilderness as an important theme in
environmental culture and politics see James Morton Turner, The Promise o f Wilderness: A History o f
Environmental Politics, 1964-1994 (PhD. diss.: Princeton University, 2004), 1-3.
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As the aesthetic conservation of John Muir evolved into the broad-based
environmentalism of the late twentieth century, the wilderness idea signified an idealized
escape from the stresses of technological modernity; a reiteration of lost frontier
masculinity; a roadless, “untrammeled” nature lacking signs of human agency; an
ecologically sound “vignette of primitive America;” and finally, an elitist social
constmction that arguably devalued environments appearing less “natural.”'^ Central to
all of these interpretations has been the notion that an area designated as wilderness,
whether politically or culturally, harbored a desirable recreational experience for
privileged individuals in an urban industrial/ post-industrial consumer society. While
preservationists often maintained a distinction between what Wallace Stegner called the
“spiritual refreshment” of an engagement with wilderness and “recreation” as an
exploitative consumer-oriented activity, NFS administrators typically saw no such clear
separation. From an administrative point of view, the “wilderness experience” was one
form of recreation along what Director George Hartzog described in 1966 as a “spectrum
of use from the developed areas.. .to the wilderness threshold.. .and beyond to the
wilderness.”*"* From the perspective of SAR operators, and for the purposes of this thesis,
wilderness can best be understood as a malleable, hierarchical, and often ambivalent
consumer ideal defined in recreational terms.

For the meaning o f wilderness in American history see especially Roderick Frazier Nash, Wilderness
and the American Mind, 4* edition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001); Max Oelschlaeger, The
Idea o f Wilderness from Prehistory to the Age o f Ecology (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991); Paul
Sutter, Driven Wild: How the Fight against Automobiles Launched the Modern Wilderness Movement
(Seattle: University o f Washington Press, 2002); William Cronon, “The Trouble with Wilderness; or.
Getting Back to the Wrong Nature,” in Uncommon Ground: Toward Reinventing Nature, Cronon, ed. (New
York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1995), 69-90; and Baird Callicott and Michael P. Nelson, eds.. The
Great New Wilderness Debate (Athens: University o f Georgia Press, 1998).
George Hartzog, “National Park Wilderness Planning Procedures,” August 8, 1966, Yosemite
National Park Central Files, Wilderness Planning L3423-L 48,1955-1976.
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This ambivalence has not been a contradiction in values, nor has it represented the
selling out of an altruistic regard for nature since wilderness has always been contingent
to changes in the culture and politics of modernity. The wilderness idea emerged in mid
nineteenth century thought as a product of the very same romantic critique of industrial
age materialism that historian Colin Campbell identifies as the root impulse of modem
consumer culture. As it gained cache over time, the wilderness ideal became indicative
of what Campbell calls a “hedonistic” consumer response to modernity in which “the
individual’s interest is primarily focused on the meanings and images which can be
imputed to [a] product” rather than on its (in this case nature’s) elusive objective
qualities.*^ In other words, the self-actualizing sensation of wilderness trumped the idea
of wilderness itself, enabling Americans to continually reinvent their relationship to
nature. From Henry David Thoreau’s terror-filled ascent of Mount Katahdin in 1846 to
Edward Abbey’s critique of “industrial tourism” in the 1960s to the emergence of
Gortex-garbed “Bobos” (Bourgeois Bohemians) in the 1990s, the wilderness experience
has always been a driving force in the commoditization and politicization of nature.*^
For this reason, wilderness advocacy has never tmly succeeded in divorcing nature from
culture in environmental thought, but has instead brought nature into the folds of modem

Colin Campbell, The Romantic Ethic and the Spirit o f Modern Consumption (Cambridge: Basil
Blackwell, 1990), 2-3, 7,203.
For Thoreau see Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind, 84-95; Abbey, Desert Solitaire, 45-59.;
For Abbey’s influence on the culture and politics o f wilderness recreation see Jared Farmer, Glen Canyon
Dammed: Inventing Lake Powell and the Canyon Country (Tucson: University o f Arizona Press, 1999),
xxv; For “Bobos” see David Brooks, Bobos in Paradise: The New Upper Class and How They got There
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001), 211-215; For the way in which critiques o f consumerism,
including the counterculture and environmentalism, actually became the driving forces in consumer culture
see Joseph Heath and Andrew Potter, Nation o f Rebels: Why Counterculture Became Consumer Culture
(New York: Harper Collins, 2004), 2-5, 286-318; Also see Thomas Frank, The Conquest o f Cool: Business
Culture, Counterculture, and the Rise o f Hip Consumerism (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1997).

10
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culture and politics. This reconciliation of wilderness, technology, and consumerism
forms a crucial yet unexplored aspect of national park history.
Environmental historians have typically framed their analysis of Yosemite and the
national parks with a critique of the so-called “dual mandate” of the National Park
Service to “provide for the enjoyment” of the parks “by such a means as will leave them
unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.”*^ A number of historians, most
notably Alfred Runte and Richard Sellers, contend that this ambiguous directive - spelled
out by the United States Congress in the 1916 Organic Act - had, by the 1960s, become
hopelessly contradictory and out of touch with the objectives of modem, science-based
environmentalism. A suitable standard of ecological integrity, these authors assert, could
not be preserved for future generations if the NFS remained committed to eaming profits
and accommodating mass-tourism in the present.** While offering a valuable critique of
the modem NFS from a natural resource perspective, this activist argument overstates the
preservation/ use dichotomy in national park policy and obscures the gradient of
appropriate recreation that Joseph Sax and a number of recent historians have recognized
as the primary concem of NFS administrators at both the national and local levels since
the beginning of the national parks movement.*^

Cited in Alfred Runte, National Parks: The American Experience, third edition (Lincoln: University
o f Nebraska Press, 1997), 104.
See especially Runte, The National Parks, 1-2, 104; Runte, Yosemite: The Embattled Wilderness
(Lincoln: University o f Nebraska Press, 1990), 1-2; and Richard West Sellars, Preserving Nature in the
National Parks: A History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 4-5.
Sax, Mountains Without Handrails, 12-19, 103; Also see Richard Grusin, Culture, Technology, and
the Creation o f Am erica’s National YaxVs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), xiv, 17-18,4344; David Louter, Windshield Wilderness: Cars, Roads, and Nature in Washington’s National Parks
(Seattle: University o f Washington Press, 2006), 7-10; Theodore Caiion, National Park, City Playground:
Mount Rainier in the Twentieth Century (Seattle: University o f Washington Press, 2006), 4, 174-176; Hal

11
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Indeed, the emergence of ecology-based natural resource protection in the 1960s and
1970s, while altering the scientifie basis for conservation in the national parks, did little
to change Americans’ fiindamental understanding of the parks as places where wild
nature eould be enjoyed in relative safety through recreation. As Hal Rothman argues,
national parks have never in their history been “vehicles for preservation;” instead, the
NFS has functioned as a political institution charged with negotiating the eomplex web of
narratives that conneet, rather than divide, nature and culture in environmental
discourse.^** Far more complex than a simple conflict between preserving nature and
aceommodating use, national park management in the twentieth century involved a
highly contested political process in which the NFS negotiated numerous eonceptions of
what nature in a national park should look like, how it should be experienced, and who
should have aecess to it. The ecological perspective advanced by Runte and Sellars
comprised only one aspect of this dialogue and eould never truly be separated from
recreational discourses. Seareh and rescue, as a pragmatic response to these debates,
blurred the lines between preservation and use in NFS policy by offering an
administrative means to reconcile the contentious discourses of recreation, technology,
and wilderness in the national parks movement.
Seareh and rescue serves as a lens through which to trace broad shifts in attitudes
towards nature and appropriate reereation in Ameriean culture. Following the federal
government’s 1864 decision to grant the Yosemite Valley to the state of California “for
public use, resort, and recreation,” only a small number of visitors could make the
K. Rothman, The New Urban Park: Golden Gate National Recreation Area and Civic Environmentalism
(Lawrence: The University Press o f Kansas, 2004), ix, 76-98.
Quoted in “Interview: Hal K. Rothman,” Environmental History 12 (January 2007): 23; Also see
Rothman, The New Urban Park, ix.
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arduous journey to the “Incomparable Valley.” Moreover, with the exception of a few
extraordinary individuals including the enigmatic John Muir whose romantic depictions
of “saimtering” in the mountains of California inspired Congress to designate Yosemite
as a national park in 1890, early visitors typically had neither the inclination nor the skills
to venture beyond the meandering trails, scenic viewpoints, and rustic lodges lining the
Valley f l o o r . T h o s e that did travel into the baekcountry, including members of the
Sierra Club, a hiking and conservation elub organized by Muir and a eohort of influential
San Francisco businessmen in 1892, were usually adequately self-reliant to handle safety
coneems on their own. As such, serious accidents requiring park administrators to carry
out complex search and rescue operations remained few and far between. The limited
numbers of rescues that early guardians and park rangers did carry out were typieally
regarded as selfless acts of heroism that reflected the frontier masculinity and
nationalistic virtue associated with Western nature tourism.
As the park became aecessible to a larger démographie in subsequent decades,
administrators could no longer sustain their impeceable safety record. Formalized
emergency response policies became necessary to accommodate rapidly changing
patterns of recreation in Yosemite and other parks. From the creation of the National
Park Service in 1916 as the agency responsible for administering the parks, through to the
outdoor recreation boom of the late 1950s, visitation rose consistently as Steven Mather,
Horace Albright, and other first generation NFS directors initiated expansive road
construction projects and other accommodative policies to attract a larger national park
eonstituency and meet a growing demand for outdoor recreation among the nation’s

Stanford E. Demars, The Tourist in Yosemite, 1855-1985 (Salt Lake City: University o f Utah Press,
1991), 31-41.
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expanding and increasingly mobile middle class?^ Rangers charged with responding to
accidents were ill-prepared to handle the diversity of complex and dangerous
predieaments that inexperieneed or careless visitors encountered in Yosemite’s vast
baekcountry, and on its precipitous granite cliffs. The park’s fledgling visitor protection
division, in order to act on its authority to “aide and assist visitors to the national
parks...in emergencies,” became increasingly reliant on wartime innovations in SAR
technologies, the ad-hoe efforts of a few exceptionally skilled rangers, and occasional
assistance from a Sierra Club volunteer reseue force.^^
By the late 1960s, as the environmental movement exploded into a mainstream
cultural phenomenon, a spike in accidents related to increasingly popular forms of
wilderness recreation including backpacking, ski-mountaineering, and especially rock
climbing, demanded a level of vigilanee, organization, and technological competency
unprecedented in the NFS’s long history of protecting visitors. In this period of diverse
environmental concerns and increasingly democratized recreation, the Sierra Club could
no longer maintain its primacy as the overseer of safety standards in roek climbing and
other wilderness activities in Yosemite. At the same time, the emergence of the
wilderness experience as a requirement of what Samuel Hayes and Hal Rothman call
“quality-of-life environmentalism” motivated legions of newly affluent middle class
consumers to flock to Yosemite and other iconic wilderness destinations in search of

^ John Ise, Our National Park Policy, reprint edition (New York: Amo Press, 1979), 185-569; Ronald
A. Foresta, Am erica’s National Parks and their Keepers (Washington D.C.: Resourees for the Future,
1984), 9-57; Robert Shankland, Steve Mather o f the National Parks, third edition (New York: Alfred K.
Knopf, 1970), 211-224; Horace M. Albright and Marian Albright Schenk, Creating the National Park
Service: The Missing Years (Norman: University o f Oklahoma Press, 1999), 276-277.
^ Cited in Mike Gautier, et al.. Report to Congress: Analysis o f Cost Recovery fo r High Altitude
Rescues on Mt. McKinley, Denali National Park and Preserve, Alaska (Washington D C.; National Park
Service, 2001), 2.
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solitude, physical exertion, and the opportunity to come in contact with wild nature?"*
The formalization of YOSAR, culminating in the 1970 decision to employ a cohort of
independent rock climbers to supplement the limited capabilities of the ranger force,
represented a concerted effort by administrators to accommodate rather than regulate this
new generation of visitors seeking an individualized encounter with wilderness in the
crown jewel of America’s national park system.
While the majority of SAR operations in Yosemite involved lost or injured hikers,
developments in the culture of technical rock climbing in the decades following World
War II brought about the most significant changes in the park’s visitor protection policy.
From modest beginnings as a pet project of David Brower, Richard Leonard, and other
up-and-coming Sierra Club leaders in the 1930s, rock climbing became a fundamental
component of the cultural geography of recreation in postwar Yosemite. Beginning in
the late 1950s, Camp 4, a sprawling encampment of ragged tents and communal picnic
tables situated under the sunny north wall of the Valley, served as the semi-permanent
home for a cohort of self-styled “climbing bums” who, as Steve Roper explained, “took
the word ‘impossible’ out of the American rock climbing v o c a b u l a r y . T h e original
“denizens of Camp 4” including Warren Harding, Royal Robbins, Chuck Pratt, Layton
Kor, Yvon Chouinard, Steve Roper, and others devised sets of new techniques,
equipment, and philosophies that transformed Yosemite into the most important locus of
modem rock climbing in the world by the mid-1960s.^^

Rothman, Saving the Planet, 4, 7,134-138; Hays, Beauty, Health, and Permanence', Also see Nash,
Wilderness and the American Mind, 316-342.
Steve Roper, Camp 4: Recollections o f a Yosemite Rockclimber (Seattle: The Mountaineers, 1994),
12 .
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Camp 4 produced not only the world’s best climbers, but also some of the most
innovative minds in modem business. By the 1970s, Yvon Chouinard, Tom Frost, Royal
Robbins, and several other prominent climbers had moved on to successful careers as
gear manufacturers and retailers in the growing specialty outdoor recreation industry.
These entrepreneurial climbing bums modeled their corporate philosophies after a
hegemonic, experience-based wildemess aesthetic constmcted high on Yosemite’s
distinctive granite walls. The “enabling technologies” climbers developed, manufactured,
and marketed to the public served to both expand the possibilities of their sport and
protect the physical features of the climbing landscape against an inevitable wave of
outdoor enthusiasts seeking to experience nature in national parks and other public
l a n d s . T h o u g h they had facilitated this transition of climbing into a mainstream activity,
Chouinard, Frost, and others also resisted the influx of “thousands of average Joes” that
seemed to compromise the spirit of adventure that the climbers of the so-called “golden
age of Yosemite rock climbing” had enjoyed in previous decades.^* Through their
connections to the commercial marketplace, and their promotion of an ethic Chouinard
called “clean climbing,” Camp 4 climbers sought to instill climbing culture with a regard
for the impact of their sport on the environment. Through their advertising. Camp 4
^ For Yosemite rock climbing and Camp 4, in addition to Roper, also see Chris Jones, Climbing in
North America (Seattle: The Mountaineers, 1975); Galen Rowell, ed.. The Vertical World o f Yosemite
(Berkeley: Wildemess Press, 1979); Roper, ed.. Ordeal by Piton: Writings from the Golden Age o f
Yosemite Rock Climbing (Stanford: Stanford University Libraries, 2003); Andrew Kirk and Charles Palmer,
“When Nature Becomes Culture: The National Register and Yosemite's Camp 4, a Case Study,” The
Western Historical Quarterly 37 (Winter, 2006): 497-506.
David Louter, “Remarks for the Camp 4 National Register Ceremony, Yosemite National Park, May
17, 2003.” Unpublished manuscript; For Louter, the automobile was the enabling technology that allowed
the majority o f tourists to access the nation’s parks. He considers pitons and expansion bolts the primary
“enabling technologies” for rock climbers. For a history o f technology in climbing see John Middendorf,
“The Mechanical Advantage,” Ascent (1999). http://www.bigwalls.net/climb/mechadv/index.html
(accessed on July 24,2007).
^ Yvon Chouinard, “Coonyard Mouths O îî,” Ascent 1, no. 6 (June 1972): 51.
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climbers popularized strict standards of equipment use and risk that established rock
climbing as an appropriate wildemess experience.
Still, neophyte climbers did not always adhere to safety standards as uniformly as elite
climbers and park administrators hoped. As climbing became a mainstream activity in
the 1970s and 1980s, a corresponding spike in accidents produced serious apprehension
among over-burdened and under-funded NFS administrators. SAR evacuations from the
massive glacier-polished granite walls of Yosemite demanded not only high levels
technical competency, specialized planning, and considerable physical talent; they also
posed greater risks to rescuers than any other search, rescue, or recovery scenarios facing
the park’s ranger force in this period. Concem for the safety of visitors and rangers
contributed to a fragile consensus between NFS administrators and the Camp 4
counterculture over the position of rock climbing as a legitimate use of the park. The
resulting dialogue exemplified a process within late twentieth century environmental
culture of negotiating limits on the infusion of technology and consumer desire into the
wildemess ideal. Since most accidents could be attributed to the inexperience or poor
judgment of visitors engaging in activities for which they were ill-prepared, climbers and
administrators had reason to debate placing limits on who should and who should not be
allowed access to the wildemess experience in Yosemite. Search and rescue became the
most tangible administrative issue by which climbers, environmentalists, and the NFS
could negotiate the strict class hierarchies and technological imperatives embedded in the
culture of wildemess recreation in the national parks.
Through this period, the NFS used its long-standing obligation to provide for the
safety of visitors as an administrative tool to support the recreational preferences of an
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increasingly individualistic and environmentally conscious park-going public. With the
establishment of YOSAR, park officials could allow for, and actively encourage, nextgeneration outdoor enthusiasts to not only view “untrammeled” nature in the parks
through their windshields, a practice historian David Louter identifies as a perennially
popular means to experience wilderness in the parks, but also to leave their cars behind
and engage physically with the dramatic and, at times, hazardous environments beyond
the road-head.^^ Faced with a choice of either limiting access to appease an increasingly
adversarial wilderness lobby or expanding the park’s tourism infrastructure to facilitate
greater access, administrators chose a middle route: limit development and prioritize
wilderness recreation without explicitly excluding the majority of visitors or
unreasonably compromising their safety. The presence of a professional SAR service
provided free of charge by the federal government enabled visitors, even those unfamiliar
with wilderness-oriented activities, to explore Yosemite’s vast network of hiking trails,
cross country ski tours, and rock climbing routes with the psychic assurance that a park
helicopter or a team of expert climbers and medical technicians would be called in on a
moment’s notice if an accident occurred.
However, as park officials and many outdoor enthusiasts soon discovered, the
boundaries separating an invigorating wilderness experience from serious injury or even
death were often all too easy to cross. Even under the watchful eye of YOSAR, the
number of accidents and mishaps related to wilderness recreation in Yosemite rose

^ For wilderness as a place “untrammeled by man,” as defined by Howard Zahniser o f the Wilderness
Society and included in the 1964 Wilderness Act, see Mark Harvey, Wilderness Forever: H oward Zahniser
and the Path to the Wilderness Act (Seattle: University o f Washington Press, 2006), 202-203; Also see
Louter, Windshield Wilderness, 4, 6-7, 105-109.
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alarmingly from the 1970s through the late 1990s when visitation finally leveled off and
NFS administrators streamlined safety procedures. In this period, thousands of
backpackers became lost, injured, or killed in remote locales; countless hikers fell on
steep trails, collapsed from exhaustion, or suffered medical emergencies ranging from
heart attacks to epileptic seizures to morning sickness far from the medical clinic and
other urban facilities in the Valley. Swimmers, rafters, and fishermen frequently found
themselves overwhelmed by powerful currents or swept over waterfalls; ski mountaineers
routinely suffered frostbite, hypothermia, and high altitude pulmonary edema in the
park’s backcountry; and most characteristic of Yosemite, rock climbers in ever increasing
numbers became stranded, incapacitated, or fatally injured in improbable locations high
on the park’s imposing granite walls.^*^
By the 1980s, “rescues so ghastly, no Hollywood ‘Latex and Catsup’ movie could
duplicate the sheer horror of the experience” had become commonplace in Yosemite.^’
Not only had traumatic accidents become epidemic, the high cost of numerous annual
searches, rescues, and body recoveries began to strain the park’s already limited
emergency appropriations. With costs exceeding $100 thousand annually by 1974 and
more than $400 thousand only a decade later, the question of who should pay for rescues
motivated administrators, rescuers, and national park constituencies to critically examine
NFS policies which arguably encouraged inexperienced and ill-prepared visitors to

A number o f excellent cautionary works detail the innumerable deaths and rescues occurring in
Yosemite and other parks over the years. Ghiglieri and Farabee, O jf the Wall: Death in Yosemite.', Farabee,
Death, Daring, and Disaster: Search and Rescue in the National Parks, revised edition (Lanham: Taylor
Trade Publishing, 2005); Bob Madgic, Shattered Air: A True Account o f Catastrophe and Courage on
Yosemite’s H alf Doras. (Short Hills; Burford Books, 2005); For comparisons with other parks see Ghiglieri,
Over the Edge: Death in Grand Canyon (Flagstaff: Puma Press, 2001); and Lee Whittlesey, Death in
Yellowstone: Accidents and Foolhardiness in the First National Park (Roberts Rinehart Publishers, 1995).
Russ Walling, “Death Valley Days,” Rock and Ice, 46 (November and December, 1991): 48.
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engage in dangerous activities. Discussions over the high cost of rescue underseored the
elitist class distinctions underlying the culture of wilderness recreation and highlighted
the tensions between nature, technology, and consumerism shaping both cultural and
administrative definitions of wilderness in the national parks.
Ultimately, the skyrocketing costs of visitor protection could not outweigh the
immediaey of the life-or-death seenarios facing YOSAR on almost a daily basis. Nor
could the NFS significantly change safety policies without inviting legal problems and a
serious public relations nightmare. As these debates continued through the 1980s and
1990s, the rangers, medies, rock climbers, helicopter pilots, law enforcement offieials,
and military personnel involved with YOSAR saved thousands of lives, performing at a
level of technical competency and organizational skill unmatched by any wilderness
search and rescue network in the United States and arguably around the world. The
techniques that rescuers in Yosemite developed, especially those for evaeuating stranded
rock climbers fi"om high on the Valley’s distinctive cliffs, became the industry standards
for mountain rescue operations worldwide. For better or worse, YOSAR became the
mechanism by which NFS administrators could accommodate the changing preferences,
however reckless, of a new generation of outdoor enthusiasts seeking to both preserve
wild nature and consume it through recreation in Yosemite and in other wilderness
destinations in the national park system.
Yosemite’s sophisticated visitor protection infrastructure derived fi'om a long history
of accidents, mishaps, tragedies, and triumphs occurring since the earliest days of the
park. Chapter One follows the progression of search and rescue fi'om a non-specific
obligation of early administrators into a systematie but still fragmented funetion of
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Yosemite’s ranger force in the immediate postwar years. Chapter Two demonstrates that
even with vast improvements in SAR capabilities in the 1950s and a system-wide
overhaul of rescue procedures in 1959, the park’s protection division struggled to keep
pace with the rising popularity, cultural imperatives, and evolving teehnological
sophistication of rock climbing activities. Chapter Three details the maturation of a
“SAR culture” in Yosemite following administrators’ controversial decision to establish
the “rescue site” in Camp 4 where a cadre of highly skilled climbing bums could reside
for free and receive on-call wages as the park’s first internal rescue force. Lastly,
Chapter Four discusses the cultural context in which recent debates over legal liability
and the high cost of rescue emerged and explores the implications of the National Park
Service’s decision to support free SAR as a eritical element of the park’s management
philosophy to this day. The evolution of search and rescue, as detailed in these chapters,
illustrates a characteristic struggle within the modem NFS to maintain a safe visitor
experience that functioned within budget constraints while still satisfying the
expectations of the numerous diverse constituencies vying for access to the wilderness
experienee in America’s most revered national park.
Today, YOSAR responds to between 150 and 250 ineidents each year, making it
among the busiest emergency call centers in the national park system. Operators can
mobilize a search party of rangers, medical respondents, on-call volunteers, and even
trained bloodhounds on a moment’s notice to locate a lost hiker or assist in the
evacuation of an accident victim. Rangers can send into the field a team of skilled roek
climbers from Camp 4 to reach an injured elimber or a hiker stranded on an inaccessible
cliff face. Helieopters can be dispatched within minutes to eomb the backcountry for lost
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backpackers, locate a plane crash, or pluck stranded big wall climbers from high on the
3,000 foot face of El Capitan. Certified scuba divers and river runners are frequently
called upon to search the rivers and lakes of the park for hikers, fishermen, and boaters
who eapsize or are swept into treacherous waterways. In winter, snowmobile operators
can motor into the backeountry to reach cross-country skiers or snowshoers trapped in
bad weather. YOSAR has also established a number of accident prevention measures
specific to Yosemite’s hazards. Park officials routinely eommunieate warnings to
participants in wilderness-oriented activities through ranger-led education programs,
Internet sites, signs posted near dangerous areas, backcountry permit processes, and
contributions to the American Alpine Club’s annual publication o ïAccidents in North
American Mountaineering. As a pragmatic means to enable a standard of safety in the
forms of recreation that park officials, environmentalists, and the visiting public have
historically considered appropriate in a national park setting, YOSAR continues to
function as Yosemite’s wilderness handrails.
As this history shows, from a cultural and an administrative perspective, Yosemite
and other national parks could be both symbols of elemental nature to be held inviolate
for future generations and recreational spaces in which a tempered construction of
wilderness could be experienced first hand. The parks funetioned not as cordoned off
remnants of pure, unspoiled nature, but as sites of individual self-diseovery where middle
class Americans, emboldened by affluenee and outfitted with specialized recreational
technologies, could supplement their lifestyles of leisure by acting out a fantasy of
strenuous engagement with a simulacrum of uncorrupted nature.^^ Differing from both

Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, translated by Shiela Faria Glazer. (Ann Arbor:
University o f Michigan Press, 1994); Baurillard explains “simulacra” as a copy o f an original that does not
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the rigidly class-based “tourism of hegemony” in tum-of-the-century nature appreciation,
and the ecologieally-informed eonstruction of wilderness embedded in the 1964
Wilderness Act, this consumer-driven wilderness ideal had its own logie, its own
technological hierarchies, and its own standards of risk which officials in Yosemite
aecommodated through the maintenance of a professional search and rescue apparatus.^^
The history of YOSAR offers a means to trace the complex route by which postwar
environmental culture operated in dialogue with the National Park Serviee to isolate and
define the boundaries of a safe and accessible yet still fundamentally self-sufficient
wilderness experienee in the nation’s parks.

exist. Though he does not use this term, William Cronon applies Baudrillard’s model in his eritique o f
wilderness as a cultural construction. See Cronon, “The Trouble with Wilderness,” 69-70.
For “tourism o f hegemony” see Hal K. Rothman, D ev il’s Bargains: Tourism in the American West
(Lawrenee: University Press o f Kansas, 1998), 111-112; For the Wilderness Act see espeeially Nash,
Wilderness and the American Mind, 225-226; and Harvey, Wilderness Forever, 3-6, 240-244.
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CHAPTER 1

THE ORIGINS OF VISITOR PROTECTION
The history of rescue extends back as long as humans have encountered mishap, trial,
and tragedy in perilous locales. From the good Samaritans of the Old Testament to Helen
of Troy to the tenth century monk Saint Bernard whose hardy dogs were for generations
dispatched from their Alpine hospice to locate travelers trapped in hazardous weather,
search and rescue tales have long been fixtures in Western tradition.^'^ Romantics steeped
in these heroic narratives considered rescue a selfless act of duty, a masculine obligation
to put one’s own security in jeopardy for the sake of an often anonymous other. In
Western Europe through the nineteenth century, cultural perceptions of rescue evolved
contingent to the exploits of Edward Whymper, Jeanne Antoine Carrel, and other
“gentlemen mountaineers” who willingly distanced themselves from the possibility of
rescue through their audacious explorations of the highest unclimbed peaks in the Alps.
As a corollary to the risk and self-reliance implicit in Victorian-era alpinism, selfless acts
of rescue attained as valorous a stature in the popular imagination as even the most daring
mountaineering accomplishments. Rescue became, in Kenneth Andrasko’s words, “a
heroic adventure against predestination and a victory for the advancing idea of rugged

Tim J. Setnicka, Wilderness Search and Rescue (Boston: Appalachian Mountain Club, 1980), 14, 15.
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individualism.”^^ Rescuers, as Alpine climbing historian Charles Gos explained in 1948,
were “obscure men [always men] who, completely scornful of danger, obey only their
consciences in attempting to rescue parties in distress.”^^
As Alpine climbing grew in popularity through the nineteenth century, search and
rescue evolved into an organized function of the numerous mountaineering clubs and
guide services cropping up throughout Western Europe. In 1823, the King of Sardinia,
who in this period ruled over the Chamonix region in the French Alps, established the
Sydicat des Guides de Chamonix, charging his expert mountain guides with safeguarding
their clients and other mountain travelers. Yosemite rescue specialist Tim Setnicka later
recorded this decree as among the earliest “delineation[s] of professional and moral
obligations of rescuers toward all those in danger.”^^ In 1896, the Austrian Alpine
Association established the first volunteer rescue service in the eastern Alps with the
belief that “it could not encourage the sport of alpinism without preparing, in advance, for
alpine misfortunes.”^* Though founded on such pragmatic grounds, organized search and
rescue retained its heroic connotations as it developed into a necessary duty of
administrators assigned to the newly created national parks of the American West in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Yosemite Guardian Galen Clark, by responding to a father’s plea to find his son,
performed the first documented successful search and rescue mission in the park’s history.

Kenneth Andrasko, “Editor’s Note,” in Setnicka, Wilderness Search and Rescue, iii.
^ Charles Gos, Alpine Tragedy (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1948), 3.
Setnicka, Wilderness Search and Rescue, 16.
Hans Kinzl, “Forward to the Second German Language Edition” in Wastl Mariner, Mountain Rescue
Techniques, first English language edition (Innsbruck: Oesterreichischer Alpenverein, 1963), 5.
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On July 12,1880, after a full-day search on horseback involving several volunteers, Clark
located twelve year old Don E. Tripp lying unconscious on the porch of the abandoned
Wharton house on the banks of the Merced River. The previous afternoon, one mile
north of Inspiration Point, Tripp had disembarked from the freight carriage he and his
father had been traveling on and decided to hike on foot to the Valley. He became
confused at a crossroad, venturing off the path and down a hillside where he mistakenly
thought he would find the correct route. The boy then lost his footing and slid down a
steep slope which he could not ascend. He headed towards the Merced River below but
stumbled down several more bluffs, falling unconscious each time. Finally making his
way to the river, Tripp spent an uncomfortable night on a sand bar. The next morning he
crawled to the Wharton building where he remained until Clark discovered him “in a
most pitiable state, being very thirsty, cut and bruised covered with sand.” The Yosemite
Tourist declared the ordeal a “remarkable escape” while Tripp’s caretakers at the
Stoneman Lodge commented “the young fellow is very gritty and we hope to soon see
him out.”^^ For Guardian Clark and the generation of superintendents and chief rangers
following in his footsteps, this noble act of protecting travelers in Yosemite remained less
an aspect of their jobs than an unwritten duty that affirmed the frontier individualism
their personas were to represent to the public.
The evolution of search and rescue in Yosemite and the national parks paralleled
changing patterns of tourism in the American West beginning in the late nineteenth
century. Set aside as sanctuaries of monumental scenery to rival the cultural treasures of
Europe, the great parks of the West became iconic sources of national pride for the

“The Lost Boy Found. The Terrible Experience o f Don E. Tripp,” Yosemite Tourist 1, no. 12 (July
18, 1880); 2.
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entrepreneurs, managers, attorneys, and other elites benefiting from the economic
reorganization of society in the industrial age. Excursions to Yosemite, Yellowstone, and
the Grand Canyon - first by carriage, then by rail, and finally by automobile - offered
intellectual stimulation and psychic regeneration in a natural setting for the touring elite.
Through the Progressive Era, the national parks affirmed and legitimated the narrative of
confrontation with a wilderness frontier that tum-of-the-century historian Frederick
Jackson Turner identified as the process by which Americans forged their particular
democratic traditions. Dispossessed of Native Americans and largely inaccessible to
workers in distant cities (though middle class professionals in nearby western cities
comprised a significant percentage of early visitors), the parks presented scenic nature as
a vision of frontier democracy and a refuge from the class strife and ethnic conflicts that
Progressive elites viewed as plaguing urban-industrial society."^*^
Despite the hardy frontier imagery national parks were to project, few visitors to
Yosemite in the early years were willing or able to explore beyond the genteel
accommodations and scenic viewpoints promoted by park concessionaires and
administrators."^’ Those that did seek recreation in the high mountains beyond the Valley
floor - including the hikers and mountaineers of the Sierra Club - were generally selfreliant in their ability to deal with emergencies. As such, early park administrators faced

Alan Trachtenberg, The Incorporation o f America: Culture and Society in the Gilded Age (New
York: Hill and Wang, 1982); Alfred Runte, National Parks: The American Experience, third edition
(Lincoln: University o f Nebraska Press, 1997); Margaret Shaffer, See America First: Tourism and National
Identity (Washington D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001); Hal K. Rothman, D e vil’s Bargains:
Tourism in the American West (Lawrence: University Press o f Kansas, 1998); Mark David Spence,
Dispossessing the Wilderness: Indian Removal and the Making o f the National Parks (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1999).
Stanford E. Demars, The Tourist in Yosemite, 1855-1985 (Salt Lake City: University o f Utah Press,
1991), 31-48.
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very few complex search and rescue seenarios. Given the relative infrequency of
accidents in Yosemite and the perception of rescue as a transcendent act of individual
valor, specific search and rescue procedures remained virtually absent from training
manuals or job descriptions for rangers even after the creation of the National Park
Service in 1916. Ansel Hall’s 1921 Handbook o f Yosemite National f arA: mentioned
only a nebulous duty on the part of rangers to “inform, assist, and instruct the park
visitor” in order to “g/ve to the public not merely what they pay for, but everything within
p o w e r . I n the period leading up to and immediately following the transfer of
management responsibilities from the United States Cavalry to the National Park Service
in 1916, the active maintenance of visitor safety remained little more than an infrequent,
anomalous responsibility of the park’s ranger force.
As such, most successful searches, rescues, and recoveries in the early years were
achieved through the vigilance and ingenuity of individuals rather than through any
formalized planning apparatus. In 1915, for example. Park Superintendent George V.
Bell engineered a homemade “rescue harness” which proved useful in a number of
incidents “caused by tourists leaving trails in trying to make short cuts or in climbing
about the face of cliffs.”'’^ Celebrating the larger-than-life heroism of rescue rangers,
Horace Albright and Frank Taylor described Yosemite’s first chief ranger, Forrest A.
Towsley, as “a giant in stature and a man of great courage who lowered himself dozens
of times down precipitous cliffs hand over hand to tie a lost hiker securely so that the

W.B. Lewis, “Administration o f Yosemite National Park,” in Handbook o f Yosemite National Park,
Ansel F. Hall, ed. (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1921), 92.; and Stephen T. Mather, “Ideals and Policy
o f The National Park Service,” in Hall, Handbook o f Yosemite, 86.
From the Annual Report to the Department o f the Interior, 1915, quoted in Charles R. “Butch”
Farabee, Jr., Death, Daring, and Disaster: Search and Rescue in the National Parks, revised edition
(Lanham: First Taylor Trade Publishing, 2005), 48, 49.
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rangers above could drag him to safety.”"’"’ Even with such phenomenal individual
exertions, as visitation increased and tourists ventured farther from the security of the
Valley’s accommodations, accounts of persons being lost, injured, or killed appeared
with greater frequency in the superintendent’s monthly reports. Relegated to a section
titled “other areas of interest,” however, descriptions of mishaps, deaths, and heroic
rescue efforts through the 1920s functioned as sensationalist fodder for newspapers as
much as for educational or preventative purposes.
While drawing attention to the rugged, frontier-like experience of a trip to Yosemite,
publicity generated by accidents and rescues also revealed shortcomings in the park’s
visitor protection capabilities. A case in point occurred on the night of April 7, 1928
when Edna Wilbur, daughter of Secretary of the Navy Curtis D. Wilbur, and her
companion Ona Ring, lost their way while descending the Ledge Trail, a treacherous
shortcut from Glacier Point to the Valley floor that claimed several lives before being
closed in 1954."’^ Responding to reports from campers in Camp Curry that cries for help
could be heard echoing off the cliffs below Glacier Point, rangers John Bingaman and
William Reymann, accompanied by three volunteers, started up the trail at 9:30 p.m.
finding “the going very difficult because of patches of snow on the trail.” The search
party eventually located faint footprints and skid marks in the snow leading off the path
to a precarious ledge where the young women “were stranded.. .above a sheer drop of

Horace M. Albright and Frank J. Taylor, Oh, Ranger! National Park Service Centennial Edition
(Riverside: Chatham Press, 1972), 20.
Despite being closed to the general public, the Ledge Trail has continued to see foot traffic largely
due to the novelty o f navigating a long overgrown, unmaintained shortcut to and from the valley rim.
Frequent accidents and deaths continue to occur on this dangerous system o f ledges and steep boulderchoked gullies. See for example, Pablo Lopez, “Bodies o f Yosemite Hikers are Recovered,” Fresno Bee
(July 9, 1998); In this incident, two young men fell to their deaths while trying to descend the trail late in
the evening.
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200 feet.” With Reymann stationed above, Bingaman lowered himself hand over hand
down one hundred feet of rope to the ledge, a risky endeavor considering the icy
conditions, the darkness, and the dubious integrity of the hemp ropes used at the time.
Despite these dangers, the rescue proceeded smoothly. After securing the rope,
Bingaman and Reymann pulled the girls to safety, finding them “cold, frightened,
scratched and bruised but not seriously hurt.”"’^
The daring rescue generated newspaper articles and commendations for Yosemite and
its rangers from California to Washington D.C., largely due to the notoriety of Edna
Wilbur’s father. The operation, though ultimately a success, also forced park officials to
take a closer look at the procedures, techniques, and qualifications, or lack thereof, in
place to deal with increasingly frequent search and rescue scenarios. Even as Stephen
Mather and Horace Albright showered praise on rangers Bingaman and Reymann in
public, the directors’ behind-the-scenes discussions revealed an undercurrent of concern
over the ability of rangers to consistently perform such harrowing rescues as increases in
visitation made medical emergencies and accidents, though predominantly minor, an
almost daily occurrence through the busy summer months. A few days after the rescue of
Wilbur and Ring, Acting Superintendent E.P. Leavitt wrote to Mather to convince him of
the need to enforce the mandatory retirement of rangers at the age of sixty two. In
correspondence to the Civil Service Commission in Washington, Leavitt and Mather

E.P. Leavitt, “Superintendent’s Monthly Report for April, 1928,” May 9, 1928, 8, Yosemite National
Park Library; Also see John Bingaman’s somewhat glorified account in John W. Bingaman, Guardians o f
the Yosemite: A Story o f the First Rangers (Palm Desert, Desert Printers, 1961), 31, 32; and Farabee, Death,
Daring, and Disaster, 86.
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stressed that “only men of youth, experience, and ability are qualified to participate in
such strenuous and dangerous work as this is.”"’^
Through the 1930s, problems of recruiting, training, and paying a sufficient ranger
force became increasingly apparent. In 1934, a Los Angles Times reporter elaimed that
hasty efforts to fill holes in the ranger force were “bringing into the service a lot of young
Democrats who may be deserving but who are totally inexperienced in the ways of the
woods, instead of forest-wise men who have heretofore been appointed to such posts.”
Many new reeruits, the author remarked, hailed from “eastern cities” and would “be a
burden to the regular force, which will have to look after them as well as the public.”"**
The article referenced an embarrassing ineident occurring a few months earlier in which a
“tenderfoot ranger,” William Corless Jr. from Kansas City, Missouri, wandered lost for
more than two and a half days in the rugged eountry near Tenaya Canyon. A search party
of forty park rangers, local law enforcement personnel, and volunteers spent more than
two days combing the area, finally loeating Corless safe but “hungry and exhausted...
having been without food or warm clothing.”"*^
While shortages of qualified rangers posed real problems for the park’s visitor
proteetion capabilities, park officials in the 1930s worried less about a diminishing
supply of frontier hardened, “forest-wise men” than the administrative implications of
rising participation in a set of new, potentially dangerous forms of recreation. Largely

Quoted in Farabee, Death, Daring, and Disaster, 86, 87: In a notable accident occurring in July o f
the same year, a hiker, Richard Ham from Burlingame California, fell to his death in nearly the same
location on the Ledge Trail from which the two girls had been rescued only four months earlier. See E.P.
Leavitt, “Superintendent’s Monthly Report for July, 1928,” August 9, 1928, 9.
^ Quoted in Farabee, Death, Daring, and Disaster, 123.
C.G. Thompson, “Superintendent’s Monthly Report for June, 1934,” July 4, 1934, 14, Yosemite
National Park Library.
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the exclusive provinee of the Sierra Club until after World War II, backpacking or
“knapsacking,” cross-country skiing, and especially rock climbing, while opening up new
ways to enjoy the Sierra wilderness in and around Yosemite, also created a long list of
real and hypothetical accident scenarios for which the park’s fledgling search and rescue
infrastructure simply would not be capable of responding to/**
As visitation to the national parks and other public lands increased through the
interwar years, leaders of the nascent wilderness movement began to challenge the idea
of nature-as-democratic-scenery informing the management philosophy of the NFS and
other federal land management agencies. As historian Paul Sutter argues, the founding
members of the Wilderness Society constructed the modem idea of wilderness in
opposition to an abmpt rise in tourism in the 1920s and the continuing expansion of
resort-style accommodations in public lands. Founders Robert Marshall, Aldo Leopold,
Robert Sterling Yard, and Benton MacKaye railed most adamantly against the rampant
construction of roads and the intrusion of automobiles into previously inaccessible areas
of undisturbed nature. The land managers, foresters, and lobbyists of the early
Wilderness Society conceived of wilderness as a condition of the landscape characterized
not principally by its monumental scenery or necessarily by its ecological integrity, but
by its “roadlessness.” Wilderness was a place where automobiles, buildings, and other
signs of human ageney were either non-existent or imperceptible; an area in Leopold’s
words, “big enough to absorb a two weeks pack trip, and kept devoid of roads, artificial
trails, cottages, or other works of man.”^’

Michael Cohen, History o f the Sierra Club, 1892-1970 (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1988),
77-82.
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Members of the Sierra Club and other hiking clubs cropping up across the nation at
this time furthered eontributed to the formulation of this recreationally-informed
wilderness ethic. The thousands of hikers, elimbers, and cross-country skiers joining
outdoor clubs in the 1920s and 1930s did not reject recreation altogether, but instead
formed a eritique of mass-recreation. While the Wilderness Society delineated eategories
of inappropriate activities in wilderness, a cohort of young Sierra Club leaders including
David Brower, Richard Leonard, and Bestor Robinson defined the spécifié recreational
behaviors and facilitating technologies appropriate to the wilderness experienee. The
club’s annual “High Trip,” a month-long trek into the High Sierra backcountry, typically
involving more than two hundred elub members and over fifty mules, served as a testing
ground for a number of new wilderness-oriented activities including technical rock
climbing, ski-mountaineering, and backcountry camping that formulated a gradient of
appropriate recreation in subsequent wilderness discourse. The Sierra Club’s strenuous
and often dangerous recreational preferences had significant implications not only for the
maturation of search and rescue in Yosemite, but also for the expansion of the modem
wildemess movement in the postwar years. These new activities provided an
appropriately self-sufficient and physically challenging recreational altemative to what
conservationists had begun to deery as the transformation of the parks into sanitized
playgrounds for an automobile-bound publie.^^

Paul Sutter, Driven Wild: How the Fight Against Automobiles Launched the M odem Wilderness
Movement (Seattle: University o f Washington Press, 2002), 9-10, 70.
Christopher E. Johnson, “Bom With Steel Spoons in their Mouths: Sierra Club High Trippers and
Wildemess Use, 1930-1941,” Clio 14 (2004): 89-110.
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A young David Brower, who in the postwar years would cement his plaee in the
modem wildemess movement by his leadership in the fight to block the Eeho Park Dam
in Dinosaur National Monument, forged his perceptions of nature and appropriate
recreation through his High Trip experienees in the 1930s. Brower emerged as one of the
most avid proponents of rock climbing and independent backcountry hiking, or
“knapsacking,” in the interwar Sierra Club. In 1935, Brower expressed the wildemess
ethic of knapsacking in his first article for the annual Sierra Club Bulletin. In “Far From
the Madding Mules: A Knapsacker’s Retrospect,” Brower artieulated the values of time
spent with minimal belongings far from established trails and the eonstant interaetion
with mules and people that had heretofore characterized the High Trip. Summing up the
benefits of this wildemess experience, he wrote: “Who, once having enjoyed it, does not
long for the deep satisfaetion of beholding a panorama from a vantage-point, access to
whieh has cost something in effort and training; of knowing that here is a frontier still; of
being aloof, and yet in elose communion; of being awed by the great, but remaining
proud of the success of the organized effort of the small?”^^ In subsequent years, Brower
and a young eohort of “high trippers” innovated teehniques and a number of improvised
technologies that vastly improved the safety and practicality of extended, independent
excursions into vast undeveloped mountain terrain.
Despite an almost obsessive emphasis on safety among the High Trip leadership in
this period, aeeidents remained a possibility. On July 30, 1934, Florence Hendra, a
participant on that summer’s outing, slipped on wet granite along the shore of remote
Benton Lake in the Yosemite high country. Superintendent Thompson, in his report for

David Brower, “Far From the Maddening Mules: A Knapsacker’s Retrospect,” Sierra Club Bulletin
{SCB) 20 (February, 1935): 72.
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that month, reported that Hendra “fell about 25 feet into the water, first striking her head
on a rock” before drowning minutes later. A group of Sierra Club members, assisted by a
ranger who had been stationed nearby, pulled Hendra from the lake and arranged for the
body to be repatriated to her family in San Francisco.^"* While complex rescue operations
requiring the NFS to take a leading role remained rare, the expanding opportunities for
wildemess recreation in Yosemite and the High Sierra suggested a need to rethink the
park’s informal management of search and rescue.
One year and a day before Hendra’s accident, Walter A. Starr, Jr., known by
acquaintances as Peter, set out to map the final sections of the recently completed John
Muir Trail that extended 250 miles from Mount Whitney to Yosemite. He never retumed.
On August 30, 1933, after the largest search conducted to date in the Sierra Nevada
Mountains, Norman Clyde - the “old man of the mountains” who completed more first
ascents in the High Sierra than anyone to this day - located Starr’s broken body on a
ledge on mgged Michael Minaret just outside the southeastem boundary of Yosemite
National Park. The search for Peter Starr required hundreds of searchers, countless
airplane passes over the high mountains, and a series of extended forays into the remote
Ritter Range by fi-iends, family, and Sierra Club volunteers. After zeroing in on the steep
Minarets just south of the 13,000 foot Mount Ritter by piecing together Starr’s entries in
the summit registers of nearby peaks, Clyde managed to trace a path to Michael Minaret
where he “intemed [Starr’s body] in a great caim of granite.”^^ Before his accident, Starr

C.G. Thompson, “Superintendent’s Monthly Report for July, 1934,” August 5, 1934, 16, Yosemite
National Park Library.
For a thoroughly
thoroughly researched account o f the search for Peter Starr see William Alsup, Missing in the
Minarets: The Search fo r Walter A. Starr, Jr. (El Portal: The Yosemite Association, 2001).; Quote from
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had been close to finishing his compilation of notes describing the John Muir Trail and its
innumerable side excursions. The Sierra Club posthumously published Starr’s Guide to
the John Muir Trail in 1934. The work became the authoritative guide to the High Sierra
region for generations of wildemess enthusiasts (most far less experienced than Starr)
who sought to climb and hike in the beautifully mgged, yet deceptively hazardous. High
Sierra environment that had claimed Starr’s life.^^
Though cognizant of the new challenges posed by participation in these emerging
forms of wildemess recreation, park officials remained slow to enact changes to the
park’s visitor protection inffastmcture. Administrators instead relied on the exclusive
expertise of the Sierra Club to maintain safety standards. In an often repeated but telling
example of the ill-preparedness of park authorities, San Francisco bay area attomey
Richard Leonard, the leading figure in the development of the Sierra Club’s Rock
Climbing Section, recalled Chief Ranger Forrest Towsley’s disconcertingly casual
response to a concemed visitor who dashed into ranger headquarters in September of
1933 to report that two people were “stuck on the face of Washington Column.” The
men in question tumed out to be a team of Sierra Club climbers attempting the first of a
number of forays into modem technical rock climbing on Yosemite’s challenging granite
walls. Grinning at the bewildered tourist, Towsley, who had been informed of the details
of the climb, responded “Hell, that’s Dick Leonard and Bestor Robinson, and if they can’t
get themselves down, nobody can get them down!”^’

Glen Dawson, “Recollections” in Norman Clyde, Norman Clyde: Close Ups o f the High Sierra (Bishop,
California: Spotted Dog Press, 1997), 24.
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Club, 1934); Alsup, Missing in the Minarets, 126.
Richard Leonard to John E. Williamson, November 5, 1984, YOSAR office files.
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With Towsley’s offhanded admission of the park’s lack of rescue capabilities, so
began a working relationship between expert wildemess users and NFS administrators
that continues to this day. Through the 1930s, park officials often called on Sierra Club
members to advise rangers of appropriate safety procedures and recommend possible
accident prevention measures. Leonard remembered being asked whether a cross
country skier and snowshoer could reasonably expect to make the twenty five mile, five
thousand foot elevation gain trek from the Valley to Tuolumne Meadows “in midwinter
without winter mountaineering equipment.” Leonard advised park officials that the
attempt would be impractical and exceptionally dangerous; he then recommended a far
easier course to the Ostrander Lake ski hut only nine miles from the Valley. The club
also volunteered Jules Eichom, the veteran of a number of ground-breaking first ascents
in Yosemite Valley and the High Sierra, to advise rangers of the proper techniques and
technologies a rock climber should have knowledge of before they could safely ascend
technical climbing routes in the Valley.^* At a 1939 conference with National Park
Service officials from around the country, Leonard recommended that parks with
extensive climbing potential “require registration with the park before a climb, but with
the understanding that no prohibition would result.”^^ Such cooperative efforts between
rangers and rock climbers became the hallmark of search and rescue operations in
Yosemite in the decades following World War II.
During the war, nationwide gas-rationing and travel restrictions caused visitation to
Yosemite and other parks to plummet to numbers not seen since the early 1920s. This

Ibid.
Ibid.
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lull proved to be a quiet before the storm. In the decade following the Japanese surrender
in August of 1945, the National Park Service struggled to accommodate a sudden,
unprecedented influx of tourists. Liberated from fifteen years of depression and war,
millions of middle class Americans - a majority of whom from California and the
growing cities of the urban West - took to the highways to enjoy their newfound financial
security and leisure time in the nation’s great parks. ^
In no other national park were the pressures of skyrocketing visitation more sharply
felt than in Yosemite. In 1944, the park reported less than 120,000 visits. One year later,
the number doubled to more than 250,000, only to spike again to 641,767 by 1946.
Visitation continued its meteoric rise over the next decade, exceeding the one million
mark by 1954. Roads, lodgings, campgrounds, trails, and concessions not upgraded since
the New Deal proved woefully inadequate to accommodate the abrupt surge in tourism.
With Congress sluggish in designating much needed appropriations to the parks,
conditions rapidly deteriorated, prompting Bernard DeVoto, in his plea to “close the
parks,” to declare: “The priceless heritage which the Service must safeguard for the
United States is beginning to go to hell.”^*
Rapid increases in visitation and changing patterns of recreation also overwhelmed
the park’s visitor protection capabilities. In this period of rising public interest in outdoor
recreation, Yosemite became not only an iconic destination for auto-touring, family
camping, fishing, skiing, and hiking; it also emerged as a globally significant site for the

“ John Ise, Our National Park Policy, reprint edition (New York: Amo Press, 1979), 455-459; Ronald
A. Foresta, A m erica’s National Parks and their Keepers (Washington D.C. : Resources for the Future,
1984), 49-50; Alfred Runte, National Parks: The American Experience, third edition (Lincoln: University
o f Nebraska Press, 1997), 171-173.
Visitation numbers from Demars, The Tourist in Yosemite, 123; Quote from Bernard DeVoto, “Let’s
Close the National Parks,” H arper’s Magazine (October 1953): 49-52.
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development of modem technical rock climbing. A small cohort of Sierra Club climbers
gathering in Yosemite in the late 1940s and early 1950s devised new techniques and
technologies that enabled groundbreaking first ascents of the Valley’s smooth granite
cracks and intimidating “big walls.”^^ Innovations in rock climbing techniques produced
serious apprehension among park rangers who remained ill-prepared to respond to
complex climbing-related aeeidents. Relying on wartime improvements in SAR
technologies, the expertise of local Sierra Club climbers, and the advice of the American
Alpine Club’s mountaineering safety committee, administrators and rangers pieced
together a set of mdimentary visitor protection measures that laid the groundwork for the
professionalization of search and rescue in the 1960s and 1970s.
World War II, in the words of former Yosemite rescue ranger Charles “Butch”
Farabee, “was the best thing ever to happen to search and rescue.”^* Farabee rightly
attributes the postwar modernization of search and rescue in the national parks to war
time innovations in helicopter capabilities, communication technologies, and especially
to the diverse array of outdoor equipment developed for the U.S. Army’s elite mountain
forces. Activated in November 1941, the C* Battalion, 87* Infantry Mountain Regiment,
later re-commissioned as the 10* Mountain Division, brought together the most
accomplished skiers, rock climbers, and mountaineers in the nation, including a number
of Yosemite park rangers and Sierra Club rock climbers. Funded by massive federal war
subsidies, these outdoorsmen-tumed-soldiers innovated a host of new outdoor equipment

Steve Roper, Camp 4: Recollections o f a Yosemite Rockclimber (Seattle: The Mountaineers, 1994),
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^ Farabee, Death, Daring, and Disaster, 139.
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including aluminum frame backpacks, dehydrated foods, lighter water resistant tents,
eiderdown sleeping bags, portable butane stoves, waterproof nylon jackets, laminated
skis, and quick release bindings, all designed to improve the safety and efficiency of
cross-country travel in remote, mountainous areas.^
The Army also began mass-producing improved versions of pitons, carabiners, ice
axes, crampons, and other previously imported European climbing devices. Sierra Club
leader and expert rock climber Richard Leonard, as an officer in the Quartermaster Corps,
oversaw the testing and development of perhaps the most significant of these
technological breakthroughs: the nylon climbing rope. Engineered from thick chords
used to drive sawmills, these durable, shock absorbent 7/16 inch diameter ropes could
withstand over one hundred and fifty test falls (the older hemp ropes failed after about a
dozen).^^ Such advances in outdoor equipment provided the technological foundations
for the postwar recreation boom; and, in combination with helicopters and improved
radio communication technology, also functioned as the technical infrastructure through
which administrators and rangers in Yosemite hoped to provide for the safety of a rising
tide of visitors seeking to engage physically with the roadless terrain beyond the
congestion of the increasingly urban Valley. Technological innovation, in this respect,
guided late twentieth century Americans’ understanding of wildemess as state of nature
to be experienced through commercial recreation.^^

“ Ibid., 140.
Chris Jones, Climbing in North America, second edition (Seattle: The Mountaineers), 170.
For this propensity to know nature through leisure rather than through work or other means, see
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Toward Reinventing Nature, William Cronon, ed. (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1995), 171-185.
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The end of the war and the accompanying economic recovery unleashed a recordbreaking flood of tourists on Yosemite, inundating the park’s protection division and
creating a pressing need for more formalized management of search and rescue
operations. In the month of September 1945, beginning less than two weeks after atomic
bombs exploded over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, approximately 60,000 visitors poured
through the park’s entrances, breaking an all-time record for that month and shattering
the previous September’s numbers by more than five hundred percent.^^ This trend
continued over the ensuing years, straining the park’s accommodation infrastructure and
severely testing the capacity of the shorthanded ranger force to respond to increasing
numbers of emergencies. In the month of July 1948 alone. Superintendent Carl P.
Russell reported receiving at least sixty one “messages of more or less urgency” from
visitors and park personnel concemed about lost or overdue hikers. Even with forty six
seasonal rangers and twenty one full-time rangers on staff, a more than fifty percent
increase from prewar numbers, Russell worried about the park’s ability to prioritize
ranger duties: “Such requests are numerous and daily, requiring immediate attention, and
are time and personnel consuming,” he wrote.^*
While most emergency scenarios in Yosemite involved lost or injured hikers, rock
climbing prompted the most significant changes in the park’s visitor protection
infi-astmcture. The increasing commercial availability of technical mountaineering gear
in the affluent postwar years fueled the rising popularity of climbing and other

Frank A. Kittredge, “Superintendent’s Monthly Report for September, 1945,” October 1, 1945, 3,
Yosemite National Park Library.
Carl P. Russell, “Superintendent’s Monthly Report for July, 1948,” August 10, 1948, 6, 7, Yosemite
National Park Library.
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mountaineering activities in the nation’s parks. Indeed, almost immediately following
the war, much of the equipment developed for the 10* Mountain Division began
appearing on the shelves of Army surplus stores and sporting goods retailers around the
country, enabling a new generation of outdoor enthusiasts to partake independently in
rock climbing and mountaineering. The Yosemite Valley, with its towering monoliths
and flawless glacier-polished granite, attracted the most ambitious of these hopeful
climbers. Comprised predominantly of California-based Sierra Club members, the small
contingent of serious rock climbers gathering in Yosemite in the immediate postwar years
made innovations in techniques and equipment that according to historian David Louter
“literally took the sport to new heights.”^^
Considered to be the “father of modem rock climbing,” John Salathe, an eccentric
Swiss-bom blacksmith who became enamored with climbing after participating in a
Sierra Club outing in 1946, forged his own pitons specifically for the Valley’s smooth
granite and innovated a number of new “aid climbing” techniques in which the climber
directly ascended pitons, bolts, or other gear placed in the rock. For some, aid climbing
contradicted a long-standing European mountaineering ethic which held that the rope
should only be used as protection in case of fall, not as an aid in upward movement. Yet
Salathe’s extraordinary endurance and skill in equipment use demonstrated to most
climbers that aid techniques, properly applied, could open up whole new possibilities in
big wall climbing without compromising the standards of physicality and self-reliance
demanded by the sport’s most stringent aesthetes. On September 3, 1947, Salathe and
Anton “Ax” Nelson completed a remarkable five day ascent of the much coveted Lost

^ David Louter, “Application for the Placement o f Camp 4 on the National Register o f Historic
Places,” October 15,2001. Camp 4 Nomination Documents, Yosemite National Park Library.
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Arrow Spire, a striking tower of granite jutting one hundred feet from Yosemite Point
just east of Yosemite Falls. Regarded as the first true big wall climb, Salathe’s
achievement ushered in the “golden age of Yosemite rock climbing,” which for the park’s
ranger force meant a new age of apprehension.^'*
Carl Russell’s concern in the summer of 1948 over the preparedness of the ranger
force stemmed in part from a climbing accident from the previous July which seemed to
many a prelude of challenges to come. On July 12, experienced Sierra Club climber A1
Baxter lost his handhold on a difficult pitch on Higher Cathedral Spire. The force of the
fall pulled a piton from the wall and Baxter plunged sixty feet before slamming into the
rock and shattering both of his ankles. With the aid of his companions and a climber who
had witnessed the accident from the nearby Lower Cathedral Spire, Baxter managed to
make three rappels down to the talus six hundred feet below. A party of thirteen rangers,
accompanied by Superintendent Frank Kittredge, arrived on the scene to meet the injured
climber. While descending the talus with Baxter strapped to an improvised stretcher, a
member of the rescue party dislodged a five hundred pound boulder which careened off
two rescuers breaking Ranger Byrne Packard’s ankle and leaving Assistant Chief Ranger
Homer Robinson badly cut and bruised. Though Baxter recovered - and later headed a
Sierra Club volunteer rescue force - the hastily contrived rescue effort anticipated the
challenges of responding to climbing mishaps and incorporating new technologies into
the park’s fragmented rescue apparatus.’*
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Later that same year, the Safety Committee of the American Alpine Club (AAC)
published the first edition of Mountaineering Safety, a guide offering expert analysis of
the various climbing accidents occurring each year in the United States and Canada.”
William P. House, direetor of the newly established safety committee, described the
publication as a means “to investigate climbing accidents and to formulate a program of
prevention for the future.” In subsequent years, the annual accident report became the
premier repository for safety standards in “new world” rock climbing and
mountaineering.’^ In the 1948 issue, editors prepared a detailed analysis of A1 Baxter’s
accident, pointing to his reliance on “old pitons” left by previous climbers and his lack of
caution in continuing to ascend difficult terrain without placing protection as the
immediate causes. “A leader is not justified in continuing if the difficulty is so great that
he cannot place pitons for safety,” the report concluded.’^* The AAC offered such
explanations as preemptive, educational tools to promote self-reliance in elimbing and
limit the need for a sophisticated rescue apparatus.
Mountaineering Safety also served to assert a class hierarchy in an increasingly
democratized climbing culture. Established in 1902 by American linguist and alpinist
Charles Ernest Fay, the American Alpine Club functioned as the North Ameriean
equivalent to the gentrified mountaineering clubs operating in Britain and Western
Europe since the mid-nineteenth century. Through the early twentieth century, AAC
leaders embraced a masculine ethie of technological restraint and self-reliance in

Safety Committee o f the American Alpine Club (AAC), Mountaineering Safety (New York: The
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Ibid., 3.
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climbing which they gleaned from the genteel tradition in Victorian alpinism.’^ In the
post-World War II years, many club members, a tight-knit contingent of elite
mountaineers primarily from East Coast cities, began to worry that the impending
democratization of their sport - and its loealized development in the West - eould threaten
the integrity of the club’s “established Alpine tradition.” This class anxiety manifested
into an all out effort to communieate and maintain safety standards in rock climbing and
other mountaineering aetivities. As the editors of Mountaineering Safety explained,
“Previously, many Americans had received valuable indoctrination at climbing centers
abroad from guides and from accomplished amateurs. The great distanees in Ameriea
have hindered the effective growth of a coordinated alpine tradition on this side of the
Atlantie. And now ‘budding extremism,’ in some sections, if not controlled, could
influence adversely the ‘eonservative’ doetrines of our sport.

While maintaining good

relations with the Sierra Club in California, the Mazamas in Oregon, the Mountaineers in
Washington State, the Roeky Mountain Alpine Club in Colorado, and other Western
mountaineering clubs, AAC leaders viewed the postwar recreation boom as a threat to
gentlemanly virtue in North American climbing.
The AAC safety eommittee meticulously detailed the mistakes of aeeident vietims in
order to dramatize the tragie consequenees of inexperience and overeonfidence among
the “occasional rash and impetuous climber.” Aimed at the independent American
climber who felt that regulations and organized mountaineering elubs “restricted his
freedom,” the publication would, according to its authors, “succeed in fostering national

Jones, Climbing in North America, 55-57.
Safety Committee o f AAC, Mountaineering Safety, 18.

45

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

respect for high places, wider understanding of established techniques, and a saner
philosophical approach to the benefits whieh aecrue to those who would know the
mountains.” The solution, the AAC’s safety eommittee proposed, was not to restrict
climbing, but to implement “a system of persuasive but friendly adviee by authorities.”
In the national parks, the AAC suggested that administrators eould require registration for
diffieult aseents in order to advise prospective climbers of the dangers involved without
aetively prohibiting elimbing activities. Independent climbers seeking the personalized
risk of a difficult ascent would therefore “be induced to register for their own protection
without feeling required to do so by edict.””
Even as administrators in Yosemite embraced these suggestions, aeeidents related to
climbing or rock scrambling continued to occupy a significant portion of the AAC’s
annual report. In Mareh of 1949, two teenagers fell nearly three hundred feet to their
deaths from the cliffs near Lower Yosemite Falls. The pair had been roped together and
had been carrying a piton hammer and few pieces of equipment. However, as the editors
coneluded, “So far as can be learned, the boys never had any organized training at all.”
The accident not only indieated the need for a registration process, for AAC leaders it
also exposed “the urgent need for efforts by organized climbing groups to pass
information and proper mountaineering attitudes to the younger generation.” In
November of that year, a soldier from a nearby air base fell to his death in nearly the
same loeation after a loose block gave way beneath his feet. He had not informed rangers
of his intentions and had been carrying no climbing equipment.’^

” Ibid., 18-19.
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In 1952, the AAC reported five similar ineidents in whieh park rangers were
fortunately able to save the lives of the vietims. One rock scrambler fell thirty feet from a
sloping ledge more than 1,000 feet above the Valley floor. He bounced off a ledge and
tumbled another twenty five feet into a live oak tree “which prevented him from falling to
eertain death.” The editors’ analysis of these incidents emphasized the persistent
administrative ehallenges of aeeommodating visitors seeking to participate in roek
elimbing and other potentially dangerous activities in Yosemite. Exuding the AAC’s
discomfort with the intersections between romantic individualism and class in a
democratizing climbing culture, the authors wrote:

One is impressed by the number of diffieult and dangerous reseue operations whieh the
rangers in Yosemite Park are required to earry out as a result of the actions of unwary
and sometimes irresponsible visitors. To the extent that organized mountaineering
clubs can reach potential elimbers and combat the false aspeets of drama and heroics
which “Hollywood” and the popular press so often impart to mountaineering, the
number of ineidents of this kind ean perhaps be lessened. It is recognized that the
immediate aeeessibility of steep eliffs and the great number of visitors in Yosemite
National Park will ereate a eontinuing problem there and in similar locales.’^

The AAC’s contributions to accident prevention motivated the Sierra Club to assist the
NPS in prioritizing safety proeedures in Yosemite. Riehard Leonard organized a “safety
eommittee” in 1949 and began forwarding incident reports and aeeident analyses from
Yosemite to the AAC’s editorial board. Leonard also provided park offieials with lists of
elimbers qualified to lead diffieult aseents.*** Sueh arrangements positioned visitor

Safety Committee o f the AAC, Safety and the Climber (New York: The American Alpine Club,
1950), 2.
™ Safety Committee o f the AAC, Accidents in American Mountaineering (New York: The American
Alpine Club, 1952), 12-13.
“ ibid., 18.
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protection as a vital administrative tool by which park officials could accommodate rock
climbing and other risk-oriented activities.
While serious climbing accidents remained relatively infrequent in Yosemite,
especially considering the more than one million tourists visiting the park annually by the
mid-1950s, the 849 rock climbers registering with park rangers for ascents in 1954 alone
confirmed the need for additional precautionary measures.** The most proaetive of these
early attempts at managing climbing safety in the park involved the implementation of a
voluntary registration process, as suggested by Richard Leonard in 1939 and again by the
AAC in 1948, in which rock climbers were to notify park officials of their objective, the
date of the climb, and their qualifications to lead the attempt. Rangers advertised this
process as a means to keep track of climbing activities and individual climbers so that a
rescue force could be assembled at a moment’s notice if the need arose. However, the
registration process also revealed a growing anxiety among park officials over their
inability to respond adequately to climbing-related accidents in the park. The program,
according to one ranger, served “not only to proteet climbers, but also to protect rangers,
as there were relatively few who were really qualified to do much in the way of reseue at
that time, and some unwilling and relatively unskilled rangers were pressed into service
when a climbing accident occurred.”*’
Park authorities had neither the resources nor the will to enforce climbing prohibitions,
especially since the influential Sierra Club remained the primary backer of climbing

United States Department o f the Interior, “Summary o f Annual Mountaineering Reports from Areas
Administered by the National Park Service, 1955,” June 12, 1956, Yosemite Central Files, Mountain
Climbing 1957-1969, L3423-L48.
^ Wayne Merry to Gary Colliver, March 19, 1993, YOSAR office files.
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activities in the park. Concerned more with maintaining safety in the park than
advancing a preservationist ideology, NPS administrators nevertheless voiced objections
to especially bold or dangerous proposals. Climbers responded to these perceived slights
with indignation. In 1954, experienced Sierra Club climber Jerry Gallwas - who later
accompanied Royal Robbins in the first ascent of the northwest face of Half Dome submitted a request to climb John Salathe’s route on Lost Arrow in the spring of that year.
Superintendent John Preston protested that “not only is the Lost Arrow climb a dangerous
one, but is considered something of a show or a stunt.” Preston cited a number of
concerns including the “precarious” weather of that time of year and the fact that “right
now our protection forces are at a low ebb, and we would be in no position to undertake a
major rescue operation.”*’ Gallwas, with obvious frustration, responded: “the desire to
make that particular climb has been with me for five years, and I find it rather difficult to
banish the thought from my mind.”*'* Richard Leonard, the president of the Sierra Club
at the time, also wrote to Superintendent Preston in defense of Gallwas. While
supportive of the climber registration process, Leonard overtly challenged the
superintendent’s authority to restrict climbing activities in the park. Restating the AAC’s
primary argument in Mountaineering Safety, and prescient of disagreements between
rock climbers and administrators to come, Leonard wrote “it is our feeling that.. .rules
and restrictions do little to increase safety.”*’

John C. Preston to Jerry Gallwas, April 9, 1954, Yosemite Central Files, Mountain Climbing 19571969, L3423-L48.
^ Jerry Gallwas to John C. Preston, April 12, 1954, Yosemite Central Files, Mountain Climbing 19571969, L3423-L48.
Richard Leonard to John C. Preston, May 25, 1954, Yosemite Central Files, Mountain Climbing
1957-1969, L3423-L48.
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To maintain amicable relations between Sierra Club climbers and the Park Service,
and to mitigate obvious deficiencies in the park’s ability to respond to climbing accidents,
Leonard proposed a direct line of communication between park officials and a group of
thirty San Francisco Bay area club members qualified to perform rescues. Since October
of 1953, this volunteer rescue force “had collected equipment, practiced raising and
lowering stranded or unconscious persons from exposed spots on cliffs, and developed a
list of contact people, possible participants, and contact procedures.” Leonard suggested
that when needed, these individuals could be dispatched from the bay area on a moment’s
notice and could reach “the valley about as quickly as climbers can be called in from
various scattered points about the valley itself.”*^ Soon after, club members Hervey
Voge and A1 Baxter (the same A1 Baxter that had been rescued fi'om Cathedral Spire
seven years earlier), submitted an official offer on behalf of the Sierra Club Mountain
Rescue Service to provide rescue services in Yosemite. Clearly outlining the limits of
this commitment, the proposal read:

Members of the Mountain Rescue Service are volunteers. It is not their intention to
assume public responsibility, but simply to offer their aid to public agencies in rescues
fi'om steep cliffs when normal means available to the agencies do not suffice for
rescue... The Rescue Service is a last recourse. Members of this service are highly
skilled climbers, and they should only be called out for rescue work on very
precipitous rock, ice, or snow.*’

Through the 1950s, rangers and climbers trained through the Sierra Club’s rescue
program devised a number of innovative strategies for lowering and raising injured rock

“ Ibid.
Hervey Voge and A.W. Baxter, Jr., “Sierra Club Mountain Rescue Service,” undated, Yosemite
Central Files, Mountain Climbing 1957-1969, L3423-L48.
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climbers from the vertical landscapes of the Valley. This ability to perform complex
climbing rescues distinguished Yosemite’s rescue force from similar volunteer networks
being organized at the same time by mountaineering clubs in the Pacific Northwest and
the Colorado Rockies.** In Yosemite, the first major rescue requiring technical climbing
skills occurred on May 28, 1955 when Sierra Club climber Helen Von Rykervorsel fell
ninety feet before being stopped by the rope three hundred feet above the talus on
Washington Column; she suffered “two broken legs and a broken arm and possible head
injuries” in the fall. Two rangers ascended ropes to join the remaining party of three
Sierra Club climbers, all of whom had been trained in rescue procedures. The makeshift
team then hauled up a “stokes litter,” a rigid stretcher developed during the war for
evacuating casualties, in which Rykervorsel was carefully lain. Belayed from above and
guided with ropes by rangers below, two climbers accompanied the litter, maintaining it
“in a horizontal position due to the extensive nature of the victim’s injuries.” Perhaps
understating the technical complexity of the process, Superintendent Preston described
the four hour effort as “a rather difficult rescue.”**
Such operations demonstrated clear advancements in the technical efficiency and
experience of the park’s rescue personnel. Occasional training programs in rope-work
had improved the response capabilities of the ranger force while new climbing and
emergency medical technologies had allowed for more complex rescues. O f these new
technologies, helicopters became the most significant tool of rescue for future

For a brief outline of other mountain rescue teams in this period see Farabee, Death, Daring, and
Disaster, 139-145
^ John C. Preston, “Superintendent’s Monthly Report for May, 1955,” June 13, 1955, Yosemite
National Park Library, Preston’s report also included several pictures o f the rescue taking place.
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administrators. Used sporadically for medical evacuations in Yosemite since the late
1940s, helicopters promised a myriad of possibilities.
Yet early air rescue techniques and technologies were often dangerously inadequate.
In responding to a stranded hiker in the summer of 1949, rescuers had to disassemble a
tiny Hiller 360 helicopter and drive it by flatbed truck to White Wolf campground on the
Tioga Road near Tuolumne Meadows. Crews then hastily rebuilt the helicopter and
dispatched the pilot to locate a twelve year old boy who had been lying injured near the
isolated Benton Lake for the past five days. After locating the boy, placing him in the
chopper, and dumping fuel in order to lift off in the thin air at 10,000 feet, the pilot
promptly got lost. Rescue crews, spotting the helicopter flying aimlessly in the wrong
direction, lit a small brush fire to signal the pilot who was finally able to land the craft,
literally on fumes. Helicopter capabilities improved dramatically following the
implementation of the National Search and Rescue Plan in 1956. The plan mandated that
military and other federal agencies perform civilian rescues when needed. In subsequent
decades, arrangements with Army and Navy helicopter units proved critical to the park’s
protection division. By the late 1950s, helicopters had become integral components of
search and rescue in Yosemite and other parks.***
For the Park Service, by the mid-1950s, cooperative search and rescue efforts
involving Sierra Club volunteers, local law enforcement, helicopter pilots, and
occasionally personnel from nearby military installations, had seemed to alleviate many
of the safety concerns brought on by heavy visitation and the increasing presence of rock
climbers in the park. The Sierra Club’s “qualified leader” program, a policy in which

^ Yarshee, Death, Daring, and Disaster, 181-182, 185-186, 191.
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prospective climbers had to demonstrate thorough, working knowledge of belay
techniques, rappelling, and piton use before leading climbs in Yosemite, allowed rangers
to readily judge the capabilities of parties registering for rock climbs in the Valley.** In
addition, the AAC’s annual accident report encouraged administrators to communicate
safe mountaineering practices to new climbers in order to limit the need for rescue.
Despite some isolated incidents involving unregistered or inexperienced climbers, and a
few clashes between Sierra Club qualified leaders and overcautious administrators, the
voluntary registration program worked surprisingly well through the early 1950s. Most
rock climbers in the park took safety seriously and felt that by keeping rangers informed
of their activities, NPS authorities would remain supportive of rock climbing as an
appropriate recreational use of the park.
As such, administrators expressed no pressing need to make significant adjustments to
the long-standing structure of the park’s protection division. Through the 1950s, search
and rescue remained a secondary duty of rangers, classified under a job category of
“other functions.” The 1952 management plan, for example, placed search and rescue
last on a long list of ranger duties behind fee collection, supervision of picnicking,
information services, insect control, campground maintenance, patrolling for illegal
hunters, removing bears fi'om campgrounds, traffic control, and fish stocking among a
number of other routine assignments. Park administrators regarded rescue as an ad hoc
operation “to be taken care of by rangers assigned to specific duties who let their regular
jobs go for the period of emergency.”*’ Though the chief ranger oversaw emergency

David Brower, ed.. The Sierra Club: A Handbook (San Francisco: San Francisco, 1960), 95.

53

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

operations and a few rangers had received training in rock climbing techniques, there
were no full-time search and rescue specialists on staff, nor did the protection division
have a clearly outlined set of procedures in place to deal with accidents. Additionally,
the Sierra Club rescue service, which the park increasingly relied on to perform
backcountry searches and climbing rescues, remained a volunteer force with no legal
responsibility to the park or its visitors. Remarkably, this informal search and rescue
arrangement sufficed through the 1950s with few serious mishaps. However, by the late
1950s, as a new generation of rock climbers set their sights on the still largely untouched
big walls of Yosemite, park officials recognized that formalized regulatory policies,
better trained personnel, and more advanced rescue technologies would be necessary to
accommodate a spectrum of new accident possibilities.

^ National Park Service, “Master Plan Development Outline: Park Operation Prospectus,” March,
1952, 10-12, Yosemite Central Files, Mountain Climbing 1957-1969, L3423-L48.
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CHAPTER 2

ROCK CLIMBING AND RESCUE
The rich history of rock climbing and rescue in Yosemite receives only passing
mention in traditional histories of the national parks. This neglect has persisted in part
because the manner in which climbing and rescue became cemented in popular and
administrative imaginations of the park complicated the preservation/ use dichotomy that
historians have relied upon to explain the transformation of national park management in
the age of environmentalism. Fortunately, rock climbers have compiled their own
narrative of this formative period in the development of their sport. Steve Roper,
Yosemite’s resident historian, characterized the “golden age of Yosemite rock climbing”
between 1947 and 1971 by emphasizing a persistent dialogue around the picnic tables of
Camp 4 over the social, technological, and environmental imperatives constituting
appropriate “style” in the rock climbing experience.*’ Symbolized by an ideological
conflict between Royal Robbins, the stringent proponent of technological restraint, and
Warren Harding, the enigmatic former race car driver who climbed because, as he wrote,
“I truly enjoyed busting my ass trying to somehow get up something,” the style debate

Steve Roper, Camp 4: Recollections o f a Yosemite Rockclimber (Seattle: The Mountaineers, 1994),
13.
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illustrated the changing recreational preferences of park-goers as Americans began to
embrace the tenets of wilderness preservation.*'*
While admittedly over-stated, the debate between Royal Robbins and Warren
Harding nevertheless underscored the tense interaction between nature, technology,
individual freedom, consumerism, and risk in popular environmental discourse through
this period. For Park Service officials, the emergence of rock climbing as a popular
activity in the 1950s and 1960s created a profound sense of anxiety over their ability to
ensure the safety of visitors and the park rangers charged with rescuing them. The
manner in which NPS administrators and rock climbers negotiated this very real
apprehension blurred the lines between culture and nature in the modem national parks
movement. The co-evolution of rock climbing as a recreational constmction of nature in
Yosemite, and rescue as an administrative means to accommodate that construction,
reflected the complex web of cultural hierarchies shaping national park management
philosophies in the second half of the twentieth century.
Warren Harding’s highly publicized ascent of the three thousand foot “Nose” of El
Capitan set in motion the gradual formalization of Yosemite’s search and rescue
apparatus. Requiring forty seven days spread out between July of 1957 and November of
1958, the climb demonstrated that the highest, blankest walls in the Valley could be
scaled with deliberate applications of boldness, stamina, and technology. Observed by
thousands of tourists from El Capitan Meadows, the climb also generated an emotionally
charged debate in the press. A number of observers railed against the ascent,
commenting that Harding’s unprecedented reliance on expansion bolts and fixed ropes

Warren Harding, “Reflections o f a Broken Down Climber,” Ascent 1, no. 5 (July 1971): 35.
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constituted nothing more than a “feat of engineering.” Citing these concerns, acting
director of the NPS, E.T. Scoyen questioned whether rock climbing could remain an
appropriate form of recreation. Writing to the Sierra Club, Scoyen indicated that the
climb and its accompanying media frenzy “exerted a strong negative influence on the
normal use of the park by visitors and on the normal park atmosphere.”*’ One observer
even claimed that upon seeing the climbers scaling the famous landmark “the great
view.. .had been impaired.. .forever.”*^ Notwithstanding the emotional intensity of these
reactions, for the NPS, the debate over the Nose revolved around matters of safety; both
for climbers and, more importantly, for rangers charged with rescuing anyone unlucky
enough to become injured or stranded high on the wall.
Though the El Capitan climbers were markedly overcautious in their slow progress up
the face, accidents remained a distinct possibility.*’ In September of 1957, Mark Powell,
the most accomplished climber other than Harding participating in the early stages of the
ascent, fell in a moment of inattention from an easy climb on the Royal Arches,
shattering his ankle and effectively ending his career as an elite Yosemite rock climber.
On the Nose climb itself, the climbers narrowly averted a series of close calls. In one
instance, a fixed hemp rope Wally Reed had been ascending suddenly snapped (early on
Harding had fixed hemp ropes instead of nylon for cost effectiveness). Luckily when the
line broke Reed had been only a few feet above a ledge and merely tumbled backwards

E.T. Scoyen to Thomas Kendall, March 27, 1959, Yosemite Central Files, Mountain Climbing 19571969, L3423-L48.Y osemite National Park Archives.
E.T. Scoyen to George Whitmore, April 2, 1959, Yosemite Central Files, Mountain Climbing 19571969, L3423-L48.
Wayne Merry even suggested that Chief Ranger Oscar Sedergren, who Merry described as “a crusty
old bastard,” actually encouraged the controversial fixing o f ropes “as there was no one capable o f coming
to help.” Wayne Merry to Gary Colliver, March 19, 1993, YOSAR office files.
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onto it. Soon after, while leading a difficult pitch, Harding dislodged a huge boulder
which miraculously caught in a crack just above his belayer.
In addition, the “appalling exposure” of the upper pitches and long hours spent
hanging in space in belay loops instilled a profound psychosis in the more inexperieneed
climbers. On November 8, 1958, only a few hundred feet below the rim, twenty one year
old Rich Calderwood suddenly decided to retreat, making the long rappels down to the
Valley and hastily returning to his home in Fresno after he “found himself sobbing
uncontrollably, for no reason he could fathom, maybe other than missing work, missing
classes, and missing his pregnant wife.”** Later Calderwood admitted that while sorting
gear unroped on the wide Camp VI ledge he had become distracted for a moment and
nearly stumbled over the edge from which he would have plummeted more than 2,500
feet straight down to the forest floor. If any such accidents were to happen in plain view
of hundreds of tourists and media representatives, as park officials worried, how would
the ranger force respond? In a letter to Superintendent John Preston, Richard Leonard
suggested that rangers would have to attempt a rescue or recovery, “for public opinion
will always force the administrative agency to do its best.”**
With such concerns in mind. Superintendent Preston began laying out plans for the
first official management strategy for climbing and rescue procedures in Yosemite. On
November 20, 1958, less than week after Harding’s team had reached the summit of El
Capitan, Preston issued a statement of the park’s position on rock climbing. Though
remaining ambivalent toward the future of technical rock climbing as a safe, manageable

^ Roper, Camp 4, 79.
^ Richard Leonard to John C. Preston, October 3,1957, Yosemite Central Files, Mountain Climbing
1957-1969, L3423-L48.
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form of recreation in the park, the superintendent voiced many of the arguments Richard
Leonard and other representatives of the growing constituency of Yosemite climbers had
been suggesting for some time. Setting the tone for future discussions over climbing and
rescue in the park, Preston wrote:

We feel we should recognize rock climbing as one of the many ways people can find
recreation and pleasure in our National Parks. Because of the risk involved we do not
believe we should encourage climbing but we do not believe we can stop it unless we
set up special regulations to do so and we doubt that such regulations would be
enforceable. On the other hand, well organized climbs by qualified climbers are
actually desirable as we can call on such people for help in rescue cases where we do
not have enough trained men for the job. As a rule, we have very little difficulty with
well qualified climbers; it is the inexperienced and ill-equipped persons who get into
trouble and require rescue operations which sometimes lead to unfavorable publicity
for the National Parks.*****

Partly a demand for climbing regulations, partly a means to appease the influential “rock
climbing fraternity,” and most importantly, a plea for the establishment of a workable
plan to ensure the safety of an inevitable wave of recreational climbers (and to avoid
“unfavorable publicity”), Preston’s statement set the stage for a series of debates between
independent climbers, the Sierra Club, and Park Service officials over the implications of
accommodating climbing activities in the park.
In December 1958, Park Service Director Conrad Wirth, through a series of illadvised comments to the press, drove a wedge into a developing rift between climbers
and park officials that Preston had hoped to smooth over with his earlier statement. In
response to persistent questioning from reporters, Wirth, who had “not had too much
experience with rock climbers” declared that “trick climbing,” which he defined as

John C. Preston to Regional Director, November 20,1958, Yosemite Central Files, Mountain
Climbing 1957-1969, L3423-L48. For the Sierra Club’s critique o f the expansion o f the Tioga Road see
Michael Cohen, History o f the Sierra Club, 1892-1970 (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books), 140-142.
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“driving iron pitons or bolts into a mountain,” would be banned in Yosemite.**** Wirth’s
declaration sparked a firestorm of protest from climbers pointing out that the proposed
ban amounted to an outright prohibition of the sport since rock climbing, especially as
practiced in Yosemite, depended on such devices. Harding called the proposed ban
“ridiculous” and argued that pitons and bolts in no way degraded the scenic qualities of
the rock.**” Rich Calderwood responded to Wirth’s accusations by attacking the
director’s support for the ongoing expansion of the Tioga Road along the granite shores
of Tenaya Lake: “We don’t believe a few bits of iron which can hardly be seen even with
binoculars deface the wilderness as much as blasting out entire seetions of rare glacier
polished granite in making new roads,” he told reporters, echoing critiques of Ansel
Adams and an increasingly confrontational Sierra Club.**”
In his response. Superintendent Preston complicated his earlier declaration of support
for climbing by distinguishing the ascent of El Capitan from other “normal mountain
elimbing expeditions.” Instead, he asserted, the Nose constituted “nothing more or less
than a ‘stunt’ climb which.. .cannot be considered a legitimate form of recreation.”***'*
George Whitmore, a Sierra Club climber partieipating in the final days of the climb, fired
back in an angry letter directed at Wirth and Preston: “Your implication that ‘tricks’ and
‘stunts’ were used in a camival-like spectaele again indicates a complete disregard for the
truth,” he wrote. “If you had taken the trouble to inquire.. .you would have found that we

Scoyen to Whitmore, April 2, 1959.
102

,

‘Harding Labels Trick Climbing Charge as Ridiculous,” The M erced Sun-Star (January 27, 1959).

Quoting Richard Calderwood in “Park Service May Ban Climbing Aids.” undated newspaper
article, Yosemite National Park Library.
John C. Preston to Regional Director, January 23, 1959, Yosemite Central Files, Mountain
Climbing 1957-1969, L3423-L48.
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used standard climbing techniques which have been commonly accepted and practiced in
Europe and this country for years.”***’ In a letter to Wirth, Thomas Kendall of the Sierra
Club’s Rock Climbing Section also chimed in on behalf of the El Capitan climbers and
rock climbing in general; A look at the record will show that those who have contributed
the most to preserve our wilderness areas have been guilty of this type of “stunting” from John Muir on up. It is axiomatic that those who know the mountains most
intimately want most to preserve them as they are. Rock climbing is a way of achieving
this intimacy. It is much, much more than a “stunt.”***^
Such invocations of Yosemite’s mountaineering tradition proved influential in
guiding rock climbing management policies in subsequent years. In fact, NPS officials
generally agreed with Kendall in spite of Wirth’s earlier comments and Preston’s vague
assessment of the El Capitan climb. The anxiety expressed by Wirth, Preston, Scoyen,
and others stemmed more from anticipated administrative difficulties related to visitor
safety than from a conflicting preservationist ideology. Conceptually, rock climbing
remained a “wholly proper use of the park,” as Scoyen insisted.***’ In practice, however,
climbing had become problematic both for its spectacle in the eyes of less active visitors
and more importantly for the challenges it posed for an understaffed, technologically
deficient, and otherwise ill-prepared internal rescue apparatus. The unprecedented scale
of the El Capitan climb, the intense publicity it generated, and the potential disasters it

George Whitmore to Conrad Wirth, March 16, 1959, Yosemite Central Files, Mountain Climbing
1957-1969, L3423-L48.
Thomas T. Kendall to Comad Wirth, March 10, 1959, Yosemite Central Files, Mountain Climbing
1957-1969, L3423-L48.
E.T. Scoyen to Thomas Kendall, March 27, 1959, Yosemite Central Files, Mountain Climbing
1957-1969, L3423-L48.
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held for both climbers and rescuers presented a very real dilemma for NPS officials
struggling to manage the repercussions of rock climbing as a popular recreational pursuit
in the park. The strained ambiguity of Preston’s distinction between a “normal” rock
climb as opposed to a “stunt” reflected this apprehension and presaged the gradual
institutionalization of visitor protection in Yosemite.
In lieu of the El Capitan controversy, National Park Service officials met with
representatives of the Department of the Interior in Washington to devise a system-wide
policy for managing climbing activities and implementing safety procedures in national
parks. Soliciting advice from the superintendents of major parks and prominent
mountaineering organizations including the Sierra Club and the American Alpine Club,
the Park Service sought to “bring the use of National Parks by mountain climbers in
consonance with basic park principles.” While supporting climbing as “an entirely
proper and appropriate use of areas within the National Park System,” the management
plan also empowered administrators to compel climbers “through persuasion and mutual
understanding” to behave in manner consistent with “the service’s responsibilities for the
protection of human life, the protection of natural, esthetic, and scientific values and the
protection of the rights and privileges of others in their normal use of these areas.”'***
This meant that climbers and park officials were to work together to ensure that climbing
would remain a safe, manageable form of recreation that did not detract from the scenic
qualities of Yosemite or compromise the experience of other visitors. The plan seemed
consistent with Richard Leonard’s contention that “the freedom of the individual to enjoy
the area in his own way without harming [the] park or others should be carefully
United States Department o f the Interior (DOI) and the National Park Service (NPS), “National
Park Service Mountaineering Policy and Guidelines,” October 15, 1959, Yosemite Central Files, Mountain
Climbing 1957-1969, L3423-L48.
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preserved.”'*** Yet the policy proved easier said than done since it chafed with a web of
recreational hierarchies that an increasingly diverse set of park users had been
constructing since the earliest days of the park.
Many Sierra Club rock climbers, hoping to protect their long-standing claim to
recreation in Yosemite, remained skeptical of the plan. Climbers worried that the policy
would result in arbitrary regulations and closures enacted by park authorities with no
demonstrable knowledge of the abilities of individual climbers and little familiarity with
advances in modem climbing techniques. Michael Laughlin, chairman of the
Qualifications Committee of the Sierra Club Rock Climbing Section, argued that the
mountaineering and rescue policy would have a “measurable effect in weakening the
puposefulness of the qualified leader program both for the Sierra Club and the Park
Service.” Building on arguments previously made by the AAC and Richard Leonard,
Laughlin stressed that safety concerns would not be assuaged by restricting climbing.
Instead, he suggested that “climbing activity is sufficient to warrant the presence in the
Valley of a fulltime climbing ranger, one who climbs actively himself and who is
personally familiar with the routes and the climbers.”"** Laughlin and other Sierra Club
leaders understood that assuaging safety concerns would give NPS officials confidence to
support the club’s claims to recreation in the park.
Laughlin made a number of other recommendations that underpinned later search and
rescue policies including the need for a “trained and equipped rescue personnel,”
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although as he rightly pointed out, “personnel would more likely be employed in rescuing
a stranded hiker than a climber.” Anticipating financial roadblocks to establishing an
internal rescue apparatus in Yosemite, Laughlin suggested that “if budgetary
considerations do not permit this, then perhaps the climbers and climbing organizations
could be of assistance in convincing the holders of the purse strings that money is needed
for this purpose.”" ' NPS officials expressed a measure of agreement with these
proposals, though most still viewed discretionary authority to monitor climbing as a
necessary step towards assuming responsibility for “the direction and control of rescue
efforts to assist mountaineers who are in serious difficulties.”" ’ The tension between
climbers’ desire for individual freedom in the national park experience and the NPS’s
efforts to determine the boundaries of this fi’eedom characterized subsequent discussions
of social responsibility and safety in climbing.
In Yosemite, officials influenced by close ties to the Sierra Club continued to
advocate relaxed restrictions on climbing. As such, the management plan functioned less
as a regulatory policy than as a set of guidelines for developing the park’s visitor
protection infrastructure. In effect, the plan codified many of the safety precautions
suggested earlier by Richard Leonard and the Sierra Club and already informally
practiced by the park’s ranger force. For instance, the plan specified a continuation of the
voluntary registration process, recommending that “insofar as it is possible to do so,
rangers who are experienced and competent in mountain climbing and who are
acquainted with local conditions and climbing techniques will be assigned to registration

Ibid.
DOI and NPS, “National Park Service Mountaineering Policy and Guidelines,” October 15,1959.

64

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

centers.” The plan also expressed a need for the “employment of a sufficient number of
Service personnel who are experienced mountaineers to cope with the normal rescue
requirements of the park.” Rescue personnel would be required to receive annual
training in the most up-to-date rock climbing and rescue techniques. In addition, the plan
called for “the development and maintenance of advance plans and agreements with
nearby mountaineering organizations which would provide assistance when rescue
operations exceed the limitations of the Service’s resources.” With a thinly veiled
reference to Harding’s El Capitan climb, the authors suggested that “there are certain
types of ascents which require special considerations.” In these still rather vaguely
defined situations, the climbing party would be responsible for providing a qualified,
self-sufficient rescue party to remain on-call if needed."’ Ultimately, the plan’s
significance lay in its plain expression of the apprehensions and inadequacies facing
Yosemite’s visitor protection division in continuing to accommodate rather than directly
regulate mountaineering and rock climbing activities.
Mounting concerns over the dangers of rock climbing and the problems of responding
to climbing accidents were soon realized. On March 19, 1960, seventeen year old high
school student Irving Smith fell into the “prehistorically dark and damp” Lost Arrow
Chimney, becoming the first experienced climber to die on a big wall climb in the
Yosemite Valley. Rappelling unseen by his climbing partners above. Smith uttered a
“brief howl” before the rope went slack and the “unmistakable sounds of a body tumbling
deeper into the nearly vertical gully” echoed from below."'*

Ibid.
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The following day, using a telescope from the Valley floor, ranger and expert climber
Wayne Merry located Smith’s body crumpled on a chockstone about six hundred feet
below where he had fallen. Soliciting the cooperation of Warren Harding, Merry
proposed to make a series of long exposed rappels to retrieve the body but the chief
ranger at the time prohibited the attempt arguing that recovery from such an
“inaccessible” spot would be too dangerous. The boy’s father even suggested, rather
morbidly, that leaving the body to decay in this dark chasm which Steve Roper
considered “one of the most sinister places in the valley” was perhaps “the way Irving
would have wanted it.”" ’ Frustrated and ready to “damn near quit the force,” Merry
regarded the chief ranger’s prohibition as “a vote of no confidence.”"^ More than a
personal slight to the experienced Merry, who had been Harding’s most reliable
companion in the final days of the El Capitan climb, the chief ranger’s decision to leave
the body exposed the lingering inadequacies of a ranger force supposedly responsible for
the safety of all visitors, even those taking it upon themselves to risk life and limb on
progressively more difficult rock climbs.
The pressures rock climbing brought to bear on the park’s protection division
followed from the transformation of Camp 4 from a quiet, non-descript campground in
the early 1950s into the cultural hub of modem rock climbing by the 1960s. Tucked
under the sunny north wall of the Valley across the Merced from the Sentinel Rock
monolith, the inconspicuous campground became the spiritual home for Yosemite rock
climbers and a significant locus for the co-evolution of modem rock climbing and
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professional rescue in the national parks. In the spring of 1957, Mark Powell, before his
accident on Royal Arches, discovered he could subsist for long periods of time with little
money camped among the boulders and sparse pines of Camp 4. A select group of selfproclaimed “climbing bums” quickly followed suit, carving a semi-primitive existence
out of this newly co-opted rock climbers’ base camp.
Comprised predominantly of white male college dropouts and other disaffected
middle class youths, the contingent of elite rock climbers inhabiting Camp 4 through the
1960s included such soon-to-be rock climbing luminaries as Royal Robbins, Warren
Harding, Chuck Pratt, Yvon Chouinard, Steve Roper, and Layton Kor. Invoking a range
of literature from Henry David Thoreau to Jack Kerouac to the heroic alpinists of the
Victorian era to the original mountaineer/ preservationist John Muir, Yosemite’s
climbing bums fashioned themselves as rebels pitted against mass consumer culture and
the “softening influence” of modem technological society. For these self-styled
bohemians, life in Camp 4 affirmed an elemental individualism in a society populated by
what social critic William Whyte labeled “organization men.” Climbing invigorated a
direct connection to the natural world that the postwar economic boom seemed to have
buried under endless rows of reproducible suburbs, television sets, and automobiles. As
Yvon Chouinard later reminisced, “We were like wild species living on the edge of an
ecosystem - adaptable, resilient, and tough.”" ’
As semi-permanent residents of the park engaged in an activity they considered to be
transcendent of mere “tourism,” climbing bums maintained a dismissive attitude towards
other visitors. Often appearing dirty, long haired, and bearded, climbers loitered around

Yvon Choiunard, Let My People Go Surfing: The Education o f a Reluctant Businessman (New
York; Penguin Press, 2005), 18.

67

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the Mountain Room Bar at the Yosemite Lodge, scrounged for leftovers in the cafeteria,
and held noisy wine-soaked parties in Camp 4 long into the night. Through the 1960s,
these behaviors created frequent headaches for concessionaires, law enforcement officials,
patrolling rangers, and especially for non-climbing campers who set up their tents in
Camp 4 unaware that they had “penetrated into a magic circle” where, according to
climber Doug Robinson, “they stand undazedly at the focus of a force-field of tradition
and emotion.”*'* Camp 4 had become not only a gathering point for climbers but also a
spiritual home where culture and nature intersected to form new conceptions of
Yosemite’s value in a modem consumer society.
Mueh like other “bum” subeultures forming around surfing and skiing, the climbing
bum lifestyle was by no means outside the realm of consumer culture."^ The strenuous
physicality of climbing - and daily life in Camp 4 - reflected a conscious choice on the
part of climbers to embrace a socially divergent, but ultimately reformist method of
consumption that emphasized a conscious physical engagement with the natural world
over the passive aeeeptance of modem convenience. Sleeping in tents and subsisting on
whatever food they eould scrounge from the National Park Service’s tourist infrastmcture,
elimbers in the “sprawling al-fresco slum” of Camp 4 reveled in denying themselves the
comforts of modem mechanized living.'^" This practice of inconspicuous consumption
allowed rock climbers to act out what environmental writer Bill McKibben deseribes as

Robinson, “Camp 4,” in Ordeal by Piton: Writings from the Golden Age o f Yosemite Climbing,
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“turning [inconvenience] into a pleasurable commodity.”’^’ Rather than scripting their
lifestyle in terms of the accumulation of material goods - the trait of modem consumption
they most adamantly rejected - climbers sought to build a relationship to the vertical
landscapes of Yosemite by resisting the urge to conspicuously consume, or more
precisely, by consuming a limited selection of specialized items that isolated their desired
interaction with the climbing environment. Interestingly, these efforts to divorce
climbing culture from mass-culture would propel rock climbing into the mainstream
commercial marketplace in the coming years.
Residing for extended periods of time in the Valley also allowed climbers to
significantly improve their physical capabilities to ascend more difficult - and more
dangerous - routes. Mike Borgoff, a regular in Yosemite but an admittedly timid climber,
deemed the Camp 4 crowd “salamanders” referring to their seemingly inhuman ability to
scamper up the slick cracks of the Valley. Beginning in the early 1960s, “free climbing”
or the practice of moving upward by hand and foot using only the existing features of the
rock gradually took precedence over aid climbing in the minds of many climbers as the
purest form of ascent. When not putting up bold new free climbing routes on the Valley
walls. Camp 4’s resident climbing bums practiced challenging gymnastic moves on the
numerous boulders dotting the campground. These “boulder problems,” Borgoff wrote,
were “calculated to assure a visiting climber’s complete psychological annihilation before
he ties onto a rope.” For climbers deeply engaged in this elitist atmosphere, ever more
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difficult ascents and the pursuit of risk became “a way of life - generously spiked with
brutal competition.”'^^ This competitive mood heightened over the course of the 1960s,
creating a complex set of new safety concerns for park officials. In the wake of the
“impossible” technical achievements of Harding’s El Capitan climb and Royal Robbins’s
equally significant ascent of the northwest face of Half Dome a year earlier, ambitious
climbers, their bodies honed on the practice boulders of Camp 4, discovered that “huge,
unclimbed ‘impossible’ walls lay in all directions.”'^''
Fresh ambitions required specialized technologies which climbers largely
manufactured themselves specifically for the unique qualities of the Yosemite granite.
The Valley’s steep, glacier-polished walls presented technical and psychological
challenges unlike any other climbing environment in the United States or Europe.
Consistently vertical or overhanging and nearly absent of ledges, the big walls instilled a
terrifying sense of exposure, sending many overconfident visitors back to their tents in
Camp 4 to “complain about the heat or the bears or somesuch.”'^^ Compared to the
highly featured limestone of the European Alps where teehnical rock climbing had first
developed, Yosemite’s polished granite lacked convenient handholds and boasted few
climbable contours. Vertical cracks existed but were rarely continuous, typically
shooting upward for hundreds of feet only to disappear into holdless swaths of blank
granite. On the big walls such as El Capitan and Half Dome, this discontinuous
topography required numerous pendulum traverses in which climbers, at times facing
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thousands of feet of air beneath their feet, made long looping runs across blank spaces to
reach parallel crack systems. These traverses often made retreat, and more significantly,
rescue, either uncommonly difficult or impossible.
Yosemite’s cracks also tended to be too wide, too small, or too shallow for secure
piton placements. With Salathe’s homemade steel pitons becoming a rarity in the late
1950s, other climbers began forging their own imitations. Chuck Wilts, Jerry Gallwas,
William “Dolt” Fuerer, Dick Long, Ed Leeper, and others manufactured a number of
pitons of various sizes to fit the unaccommodating cracks of the Valley. Prior to the El
Capitan climb, Frank Tarver hammered out a set of ultra-wide pitons from the legs of a
cast iron stove he had pulled from a scrap yard in 1956. These “stoveleg pitons” attained
legendary status in the Camp 4 climbing circle after proving essential on a particularly
problematic pitch on the Nose. Most significantly, Yvon Chouinard and Tom Frost,
through their garage-operated Chouinard Equipment Ine., (which later gave rise to the
Patagonia Corporation), designed, manufactured, and marketed a number of new
chromemoly pitons that became vital to the subsequent development of rock climbing in
Yosemite and ultimately other destinations around the world. Chouinard’s postage-stamp
sized RURP (Realized Ultimate Reality Pitons) and Frost’s wide angle bong-bong,
named for its distinctive echo when being pounded into cracks, enabled climbers to
ascend increasingly difficult routes which would have previously been impossible
without rock-defacing permanent expansion bolts.
In the wake of Harding’s El Capitan climb, expansion bolts, fixed ropes, and other
technologies which arguably “guaranteed success” on a climb, fell increasingly out of
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favor among the stringent aesthetes inhabiting Camp 4. Co-opting a Spartan
technological imperative practiced by British rock climbers and Alpine mountaineers in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Royal Robbins, T.M. Herbert, Yvon
Chouinard, and others criticized Warren Harding’s tendencies to choose routes requiring
numerous permanent expansion bolts. Climbing should be conducted as an aesthetic
adventure in a natural setting, they argued, with as little technological assistance as
possible. This delineation of appropriate “style” in the application of technology meant
that new routes in Yosemite were to be completed in single continuous pushes from the
ground up using gear that enhanced rather than insulated the climbers’ direct muscular
engagement with the rock. New technologies such as RURPs, bong-bongs, skyhooks,
haul hags, and the jumar, a devise Royal Robbins modified to significantly ease the
difficulties of ascending ropes and hauling up supplies, while in effect making climbing
easier, also made the most difficult routes possible without resorting to “insulating
technologies,” namely permanent expansion bolts and fixed ropes. The intended function
of this technological hierarchy was to force climbers to encounter the climbing
environment in accordance with its natural features. Stylistically inclined climbers in
Yosemite did not utilize technology “for its own sake,” but rather for the purpose of
isolating a strenuous experience in a natural setting and an individualized confrontation
with risk. This delineation of appropriate style allowed Yosemite climbers to associate
their sport with the notion of an appropriate “wilderness experience” gaining currency in
popular environmental discourse at this time.'^’
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Changes in the technological sophistication, physical capabilities, and cultural
imperatives of climbers in Yosemite had worrisome implications for park officials
seeking to manage this increasingly emboldened class of park visitor. In 1961, the park
recorded almost two thousand registrations for climbs, a more than two hundred percent
increase from 1953. Out of approximately two dozen aeeidents in the park requiring
ranger response in 1961, nine either involved rock climbing or required “mountaineering
techniques for evacuations.” Most of these incidents resulted from inexperienced and
often unregistered park visitors attempting to scale cliffs for which they were unprepared.
For example, on July 22, four Explorer Scouts had to be pulled from the exposed ledges
east of Lower Yosemite Falls, even though earlier they and their scout leader “were given
some advice concerning unauthorized elimbing and staying on marked trails.” In another
instance, an unregistered solo climber had to be guided off a “very precarious position”
on Tenaya Peak in a dangerous night rescue.'^*
The Sierra Club, now involved in a nationwide movement to preserve wilderness
extending well beyond its traditional focus on Yosemite and the Sierras, expressed
concern that these unaffiliated climbers had rendered the registration process and the
club’s qualified leader program inadequate in maintaining safety standards. Carl Weisner
of the club’s rock climbing committee wrote to Chief Ranger Fladmark, “We climbers of
the Sierra Club are.. .quite coneemed with the technical competency of some of the
newer free lance climbers. We do not wish to see this fine sport deteriorate because of a
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few delinquents, and certainly do not want any aecidents.”'^^ Fladmark responded with
assurances that the park would “continue to screen elimbers as carefully as possible.”
Highlighting the park’s continued reliance on the judgment of the club to patrol the
boundaries of rock climbing in the park, the Chief Ranger wrote to Weisner, “We are
pleased to know of your willingness to take action to discipline incompetent climbers
who do not follow good mountaineering praetices.”'^'* This exchange demonstrated the
park’s dependence on the Sierra Club while also illuminating the club’s growing anxiety
that it could loose its grasp on the cultural development and technological evolution of
rock climbing and other reereational activities in the park.
Despite the presence of this user group that administrators and Sierra Club offieials
regarded as “free lance and very disreputable roek climbers,” aeeidents involving even
the most highly skilled climbers occurred with surprising frequency. On July 29, 1961,
experienced Sierra Club rock climber Roger Ulrich suffered severe injuries after a bad
fall on Higher Cathedral Spire. The difficult rescue involved a number of park personnel
and a private contracted helicopter to fly resellers to the scene and evacuate the injured
Ulrich. A few weeks later, Steve Roper, a noted Camp 4 climbing bum and a Sierra Club
qualified leader, slipped and fell on a patch of ice at the base of an unregistered climb on
Half Dome while “trying to emulate my alpine heroes, Hermann Buhl and Gaston
Rebuffat,” as he later recalled.'^* Roper slid almost six hundred feet down a steep, ice-
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covered slope, suffering “deep bruises and abrasions and contusions of the kidneys.”
Superintendent Preston reported that Roper and his partner “had inadequate equipment
and both admitted using very poor judgment.”'^^
Though the pair was able to return to the Valley without a rescue, the accident
indicated that experience, knowledge, and affiliation with the Sierra Club did not negate
the need for a more sophisticated rescue apparatus. In response to such concerns, Preston
delegated responsibility for coordinating SAR operations to the district rangers, writing:
“This is done in view of the wide divergence of visitor use, terrain, and other conditions
that exist between the various districts.” Preston emphasized annual rescue training
programs and the need to invest in additional rescue and climbing equipment; yet his
delegation of rescue duties lacked specific instructions for coordinating communications
between the various parties within and without the NPS involved in rescues, and as a
result, only further de-centralized operations.
Changes in the park’s rescue priorities in the 1960s occurred in the context of the
unprecedented boom in outdoor recreation in the nation’s parks. In 1962, the Outdoor
Recreation Resources Review Commission, an investigative body convened during
Dwight Eisenhower’s administration, released Outdoor Recreation fo r America. The
report highlighted the profound significance of leisure and outdoor activities in postwar,
middle class American culture. In the wake of World War II, an “eager Nation,” the
commission argued, had developed millions of acres of open space into subdivisions,
highways, and industrial sites while “the resources for outdoor recreation - shoreline.
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green acres, open space, and unpolluted waters - diminished in the face of demands for
more of everything else.”'^‘' The report found that as incomes rose and automobile travel
became more accessible between 1951 and 1959, trips to recreation areas skyrocketed
143 percent while visits to the national parks rose 86 percent. The commission
concluded that not only were more recreation areas needed, but the nation’s diverse
socio-economic population required a similarly diverse set of options for recreation. The
report proposed categorizing recreation zones into six “classes” from open spaces in
urban areas to reserves of monumental scenery and finally to “primitive areas” in which
signs of human intervention were minimized.
These recommendations reflected the Park Service’s rethinking of its strained
recreation facilities during the same period. This renewed emphasis on the increasingly
diverse recreational demands being placed on the parks was embodied in Mission 66, a
plan to revitalize the tourist infrastructure of the parks by the NPS’s fiftieth anniversary
in 1966. Advanced by NPS Director Conrad Wirth, who many feared would sacrifice
opportunities for primitive recreation to accommodate less-active travelers. Mission 66
was intended to bring the parks “up to a consistently high standard of preservation,
staffing and physical development.”'^^ The Sierra Club, embroiled its bid to stop the
proposed Echo Park Dam in Dinosaur Monument, while tentatively supportive of the
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plan’s goals early on, rapidly discarded its historic alliance with the Park Service in an
effort to protect the parks, and Yosemite in particular, from over-development. Ansel
Adams argued that the NPS should focus on accommodating only those visitors to
Yosemite “who specifically seek its intrinsic values.”'^^ Yet the process of determining
who possessed the physical and intellectual traits necessary to enjoy nature in Yosemite and what that nature was to look like - remained an elusive goal for both the Sierra Club
and the Park Service in subsequent years.
Heated debates between the NPS and the newly radicalized Sierra Club over Mission
66 gave rock climbing, even with its potential hazards and unaffiliated practitioners, the
appearance of an appropriately physical means to encounter the wilderness, or primitive,
qualities of the park. While locked in disagreement over road expansions, development
plans, natural resource management, and the influx of mass-recreation in the parks, both
the Sierra Club and the NPS remained at least passively supportive of climbing as an
acceptable activity consistent with the goals of the national park system. A report of the
1961 Mountaineering and Rescue Conference held in Rocky Mountain National Park
reiterated the service’s stance on climbing: “It was concluded that our objective must be
to control, guide and direct the activity by a positive approach rather than to regulate
against it.”'^* Rock climbing seemed especially appropriate when viewed in contrast to
popular, but intensely criticized, resort-style activities such as auto-touring, golf, and
stays in the luxurious Ahwanee hotel. Efforts to formalize Yosemite’s search and rescue
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capabilities, while in many respects a reactive countermeasure to rock climbing, also
functioned as a distinctly proactive sign of support for the growing constituency engaged
in this particularly dangerous use of the park.
On April 19, 1962, in an incident suggestive of the complex rescue scenarios to come
if the park maintained an accommodating stance on climbing. Camp 4 regulars Glen
Denny and John Weichard became stranded in a snow storm after descending from the
Lost Arrow tip into the notch separating the spire from Yosemite Point (the same
cavernous slot where Irving Smith had plummeted to his death two years earlier).
Preston, in his monthly report indicated that Denny and Weichard “knew in advance that
a storm was expected” yet proceeded with the climb nonetheless. Dispatched after calls
for help could be heard from the cliff face. Ranger Wayne Merry and George Whitmore,
of the Sierra Club volunteer rescue force, reached Yosemite Point late that night finding
that while descending, the climbers’ ropes had become “frozen to the cliff.” Merry
lowered himself into the notch by rappel “entirely in darkness,” joining the stranded
climbers at 1:30 a.m. The next morning, Whitmore and a force of rangers raised Denny,
Weichard, and Merry to the Valley rim using a manual winch constructed from two free
standing pulleys wound with steel cable which the rangers had hauled up the Yosemite
Falls trail in the early morning hours.
Another incident in September of the following year further exemplified the life and
death challenges facing the park’s maturing rescue infrastructure. That afternoon, novice
climber Edward Hsu, belayed by his even less experienced fourteen year old brother, fell
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ninety feet onto a sloping ledge on Cathedral Peak in the high country southeast of
Tuolomne Meadows. Wayne Merry and ranger John Ward responded to the accident,
requesting the services of a private contract helicopter. In his account of the rescue
operation. Merry reealled the delicate handling skills of the chopper pilot: “it was really
stretching the altitude limits... but he managed it - [the pilot] put a skid down on the
edge, and one at a time we cautiously slithered out, eyeballing the drop on either side... I
remember glancing up at the pilot.. .and I still remember his face - pale, absolute
concentration, big beads of sweat on his forehead.” After landing on the precipice, the
rescue team found Hsu “unconscious and very critical” while his younger brother sat
paralyzed with fear on a ledge “still belaying the motionless body.” After immobilizing
the critically injured climber and raising him to the hovering chopper. Merry and Ward
“managed to secure the basket to the skid tray without dropping it or falling off in the
process.” The efforts to save Hsu’s life proved futile as Merry later recalled: “I have
always thought afterward of many ways each operation could have been done better - but
this one remains in my mind the only one that was almost picture-perfect. We did
everything we could - but the patient still died.”'""*
These incidents demonstrated the extent of the National Park Service’s willingness to
accommodate rock climbing activities despite the delicate margin of error involved. Due
in part to improved technical capabilities, access to helicopters, and the employment of
rangers with significant climbing experience, park officials continued to regard climbing
as a manageable form of recreation in the park. Yet administrators increasingly faced the
alarming reality that rock climbing in Yosemite had become even more heavily infused
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with risk than in the previous decade. By the mid-1960s, climbers had begun to shun the
use of fixed ropes and expedition style rock climbs in favor of less conspicuous ascents
involving only two or three climbers and a minimum selection of gear. In terms of style,
even inexperienced climbers began emulating breakthrough climbs such as Royal
Robbins’s ascent of the Salathe Wall on El Capitan in which he, Tom Frost, and Chuck
Pratt cast off their fixed ropes at the nine hundred foot level making retreat or rescue
from the remaining two thousand feet all but impossible. Yvon Chouinard credited the
safety standards making such risks feasible to “the American’s love of safety and security
and his innate fear of death, which have caused revolutionary innovations in belaying and
equipment.”'^' Yet the increased security made possible by technical advancements only
encouraged climbers to take greater risks.
This balancing act with risk gave the most accomplished climbers a fatalistic attitude
towards the possibility of death. Steve Roper, in an effort to “break the tension” upon
finding Irving Smith’s desiceated remains in the Lost Arrow Chimney in 1961, shouted to
his belayer below, “Goddamn it! His parka doesn’t fit me!”'"'^ Jim Bridwell recalled his
mixed emotions after being asked to carry out the body of Jim Baldwin, a regular Camp 4
climber that had been killed in a sudden fall from Washington Column in 1965: “From
the tense faces and reddened eyes of the climbers around me as we lifted him arose a
sense of deep, abiding brotherhood. Afterward. ..I determined to never let my awareness
lapse and always remain self-reliant.”'"'^ In his characteristically philosophical tone.

Yvon Chouinard, “Modem Yosemite Climbing,” American Alpine Journal 13, no. 2, issue 37
(1963): 320.
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Royal Robbins described his thoughts regarding the possibility of “inevitable death” on
the first ascent of the terrifying North Ameriean Wall on El Capitan in 1965: “Mankind is
truly insignificant,” he wrote. “Man’s fate...is to have to swallow these truths and still
live on. If one could only find meaning to make these hard truths of insignificance and
omnipresent death acceptable. Where to find this meaning? Again the search.. .and we
climb on.”’"'"' Such attitudes reflected evolving coneeptions of risk and reereation in the
burgeoning wilderness movement.
Though not immediately applicable to the national parks, the landmark Wilderness
Act, passed by the United States Congress in 1964, threatened to undermine the National
Park Service’s long standing autonomy in promoting what it considered to be appropriate
recreation in its holdings. Incorporating a more sophisticated ecological perspective with
the older critique of meehanized recreation, Harold Zanhiser of the Wilderness Soeiety,
the primary drafter of the legislation, argued that eertain tracts of public land, including
portions of the national parks, were to be preserved as wilderness “untrammeled by man”
with no roads or other obvious signs of mechanization to mar the natural processes
shaping the l a n d s c a p e . F o r the Sierra Club, the Wilderness Society, and other
increasingly radiealized proponents of “the new eonservation,” this punitive level of
protection would prevent the Park Service from accommodating forms of mass-recreation
that eould corrupt both ecological integrity and the psychic effect of an appropriately
self-reliant engagement with wild nature in as yet undeveloped portions of the parks. The
act added fuel to a long standing discussion between preservationists, park-goers, and the
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NPS over the behaviors, technologies, and philosophies constituting an appropriately
“primitive” form of recreation in wilderness areas.
For many outdoor enthusiasts, roek elimbing fit the model of “primitive recreation”
newly codified in the Wilderness Act. In subsequent years, through climbing periodicals,
advertisements for equipment, and guidebooks, elite climbers in Yosemite perpetuated a
romantic narrative of rock climbing as a transcendent pursuit of calculated risk and an
opportunity to eome in eloser contact with the “untrammeled” nature that Zahniser had
refereneed in the Wilderness Act. Yvon Chouinard, for example, in a 1965 article for the
American Alpine Journal, celebrated his eight day first ascent with T.M. Herbert of the
Muir Wall on El Capitan as an embodiment of the self-reliant adventure that modem,
wilderness-oriented climbing techniques enabled:

The new philosophy of climbing is characterized by small expeditions going to remote
areas and trying new and extremely difficult routes with a minimum of equipment, no
support parties nor fixed ropes to the ground; living for days and weeks at a time on the
climb and leaving no signs of their presence behind. This purer form of climbing takes
more of a eomplete effort, more personal adjustment, and involves more risk, but being
more idealistie, the rewards are greater.

Chouinard compared this emerging “Yosemite style” to the wanderings of John Muir
who “used to roam the Sierra for weeks, eating only bread and whatever he could pick off
the land, sleeping under boulders in only his old army overcoat, and rejoicing with the
summer storms.” Chouinard further eanonized Muir as a model wilderness elimber who
“chose to accept nature without trying force himself onto the mountains but rather to live
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with them, to adjust himself to the rigors of this sort of life.”'"'* For Chouinard and other
elite climbers engaged in this scripting of history and space in Yosemite, the Valley
served as a historic point of origin for the technical, philosophical, and environmental
imperatives in modem rock climbing.
Due in no small part to the commercial activities and literary output of Camp 4
climbers, by the mid-1960s rock climbing had transformed into a far more democratized
activity than it had been through the 1950s. With the expanding availability of
equipment, mountaineering schools, and guidebooks, rock climbing could be pursued not
only by those initiated into Camp 4 ’s “elite brotherhood” but also by vacationing
climbers from other parts of the United States and Europe, as well as neophyte climbers,
like Edward Hsu, who sought to experience the park in new intimate ways. Climbers in
Camp 4 became increasingly anxious about their ability to maintain control over these
changing recreational preferences. In response, Chouinard, Robbins, Roper, and other
elite climbers deliberately stepped up their involvement in the commercialism driving the
popularity of climbing. Climbers used their connections to the dynamic commercial
marketplace to communicate the technological imperative and cultural hierarchies
embedded in Yosemite climbing to new participants. This did not necessarily represent a
contradiction in their critique of consumer culture but was instead entirely consistent with
the evolution of consumer capitalism into the primary framework by which postwar

Ibid.
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Americans communicated cultural and political hierarchies, notions of “the good life,”
and even standards of environmental responsibility.
Indeed, for these entrepreneurial climbing bums, the growing industry surrounding
rock climbing and other wilderness activities seemed to provide the most reliable channel
for communicating standards of appropriate recreation to a disconnected cohort of
neophyte outdoor enthusiasts. Through advertising and guidebooks, climbers sought to
establish elass distinctions within climbing culture based on physical skill, technological
restraint, and an environmental sensibility.'^' Steve Roper’s 1964 Climber’s Guide to the
Yosemite Valley, for example, with its “inevitable red cover,” included descriptions and
detailed maps, or “topos,” of more than two hundred climbing routes in the Valley,
providing an essential tool for those unfamiliar with Yosemite climbing to be initiated
into its unique c h a l l e n g e s . Wh i l e the guidebook ultimately facilitated an increase in
climbing activities in the park, Roper made a concerted effort in his introduction to assert
the cultural hegemony embedded in Yosemite climbing, stressing the strict technological
standards and humility demanded of visiting climbers:

For the politics and culture o f postwar consumption sec Lizabcth Cohen, A Consumer’s Republic:
The Politics o f Mass Consumption in Postwar America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003); Gary S. Cross,
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Many climbers from out of state have left the Valley with no desire to return. There
are several reasons for this, and occasionally it is the fault of the outsider himself. No
matter who he is or how good he is in his own area, if he arrives in Yosemite with even
a faint trace of arrogance, he is in for an unpleasant time: not only will he not gain the
respect of the Valley climbers, but it is unlikely he will ever fulfill his ambitious
climbing schedule.

The romanticism and blatant elitism expounded by entrepreneurial climbing bums
influenced the standards of practice in rock climbing as it transformed into a mainstream
recreational activity in the late 1960s.
Elite climbers’ attempts to police the boundaries of the sport also engendered a level
of competition and hubris in Valley climbing that contributed in no small part to the
dramatic rise in climbing accidents in the late 1960s. While responses to these accidents
remained the responsibility of the park’s visitor protection division, independent climbers
played an increasingly important role in assisting with the more technically demanding
rescues. Through rescue, climbers forged an unlikely working relationship with the often
antagonistic ranger force. The first major cooperative effort involving park rangers and
climbers occurred in June of 1965 when Berkeley “weekender” Pete Spoecker broke his
leg on a fall from the north face of Sentinel Rock. A relatively easy “warm-up” for elite
big wall climbers in 1965, the route had been the hardest climb in the United States when
John Salathe and Alan Steck made the first ascent in 1950.'^"* Though straightforward in
comparison to the several new routes on El Capitan, the Sentinel climb remained a
significant ordeal for less experienced climbers. Lacking sufficient technical knowledge
or manpower to perform a rescue from this imposing monolith, park rangers recruited
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four climbers from Camp 4 to secure the victim before they could raise him by winch
from the face. The effort demonstrated, according to Steve Roper, “that Camp 4 bums
were good for something.” More importantly, the success of this rescue smoothed over,
at least temporarily, the tense relationship that had been developing between park
officials and the Valley’s vagrant climbing community.
A series of events in 1968 solidified cooperative rescue as the linchpin holding
rangers and climbers in consensus over the continued viability of rock climbing as an
appropriate, largely unregulated activity within park boundaries. On October 14, a fierce
snowstorm overwhelmed expert climbers Chuck Pratt and Chris Fredericks high on the
Dihedral Wall, a difficult route ascending the nearly ledgeless west face of El Capitan.
From the ground, twenty year old Jim Madsen, an “impulsive fellow” who had arrived on
the Valley scene two years earlier, determined that the pair was likely suffering from
hypothermia and in desperate need of rescue. A park helicopter shuttled Madsen, a team
of Camp 4 climbers, and several rangers to the summit in the early morning hours of the
fifteenth. With a pack loaded with rescue equipment, Madsen rappelled over the edge
and out of sight - the last time anyone saw him alive. In the moments that followed, the
horrified rescue team heard Madsen shout an expletive as he rappelled off the end of the
rope, plummeting 2,500 feet to his death. Pratt and Fredericks later reported hearing
“something big whistle past” as they hung in slings huddled against the cold. Finding
traces of blood on the wall as they made their way to the summit when the weather
cleared, the climbers hoped it had been a deer or other large mammal that had fallen but

Roper, Camp 4 , 203.
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soon found Madsen’s broken glasses on a ledge, confirming their worst suspicions.
Ranger Pete Thompson, the park’s first “rescue specialist,” later recalled that “Jim’s
passing served one enormous purpose... It pushed rescue safety in Yosemite to the
forefront where it is firmly established.”’^^
Madsen’s death, the first fatality on a climbing rescue in the park, alerted climbers
and park officials to the possibility that despite advanced technologies and increased
safety standards, the atmosphere of risk permeating the culture of Yosemite rock
climbing and the ad hoc organization of rescue procedures could lead to horrific tragedies
involving even the best climbers and rescuers. Within the ranger force, such
apprehensions had been brewing beneath the surface for some time. In fact, the very day
before Madsen’s rescue team choppered to the summit of El Capitan, Ranger Steven
Hickman, the most experienced rescuer in the ranger force, had issued the park’s first
ever draft plan for organizing a centralized internal visitor protection apparatus. In his
introductory statement, Hickman expressed concern that search and rescue lacked any
consistent set of guidelines which volunteer rescuers, rock climbers, and incoming
rangers could follow. “It is my experience.. .that too often the ‘plan’ for handling such
priority visitor protection activities has existed only in someone’s head and when they
transfer out, this knowledge goes with them. It then falls upon the next man to essentially
start from scratch, benefiting only from his own mistakes and experiences.”'^* Less than
twenty-four hours after Hickman handed his memo to the Valley District Ranger, Madsen
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fell to his death in the midst of an ill-planned and hastily contrived rescue effort, proving
the ranger’s warning to be strangely prophetic.
Critiquing administrators’ apathy towards centralized rescue, Hickman framed his
plan with the assertion that “the saving or safe-guarding of human life takes precedence
over all other Park activities.” The first step towards accomplishing this goal, in
Hickman’s view, was to clearly delegate responsibility for SAR operations among the
most capable park personnel. Building on the recommendations in the 1959 NPS
Mountaineering Policy, he wrote: “The most essential element of planning is a
recognition of the need for qualified personnel... A team of strong, experienced, and
well-trained mountaineers is the backbone of any rescue plan, and without these men, no
plan will succeed.” Establishing a clear management structure for SAR operations,
Hickman placed the Chief Ranger at the top of the chain of command as “the man in
charge of the Protection Division.. .responsible to the Superintendent for all Visitor
Protection activities.” He also designated the Assistant Chief Ranger as the immediate
supervisor of the various District Rangers who would be responsible for overseeing
operations within their respective zones of the park.'^^
Hickman stressed that a set of new job duties within the protection division would be
necessary to formalize rescue procedures. The “Search and Rescue Officer” would
“supervise the activities of the technical search and rescue team,” maintain rescue
equipment caches around the park, organize training sessions, issue incident reports, and
establish communications with outside rescue forces. In addition, the “Field Operation
Leader” would be in charge of delegating duties as each rescue scenario demanded.

“Mountain Search and Rescue Operations, A Handbook for Protection Personnel,” quoted in
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Hickman stressed that this person “must be capable of making sound judgments based on
experience and a thorough working knowledge of both rock climbing and search and
rescue techniques and equipment.” A trained rescue team would also be available at all
times for response to emergencies. The “Primary Team Members,” which Hickman
envisioned as being composed of rangers, helicopter operators, and fire control forces,
would “function as the basic operational unit under technically adverse conditions and
must be capable of carrying a rescue attempt to any extreme necessary if a life is at
stake.” A “Support Team” consisting of a least six “men” (though women ultimately
played a significant role) would “provide logistical support and non-technical assistance
to the primary team.” Hickman also called for the maintenance of open channels of
communication with members of the Mountain Rescue Association, a newly formed
nationwide support network of professional and volunteer rescue teams that Yosemite’s
fledgling rescue force had yet to join.'^°
Up until this point, with the exception of brief references in the Superintendent’s
Monthly Reports and scattered reports in the press, very little documentation of search
and rescue operations had been preserved for future reference. To remedy this
“information” problem, Hickman argued for the mandatory implementation of a
standardized incident report form detailing what happened, where it happened, when it
happened, to whom did it happen, and most importantly, why it happened. Compiled
information would be readily available and easily transmittable to rescue teams in the
field through improved radio communications capabilities. Hickman also proposed a
revamping of rescue training for the park’s ranger force. Rangers involved in visitor
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protection operations would receive regular training in rock climbing techniques, seuba
diving, and helitaek proeedures. The acquisition and maintenance of a readily available
supply of the most up-to-date rock climbing and rescue equipment would also be a
neeessity. Emphasizing the need to establish a rescue apparatus capable of enaeting even
the most difficult climbing rescues, Hickman wrote, “Yosemite should have on hand
equipment adequate to effeet an evaeuation (from above or below) the middle of.. .El
Capitan.”'^' The plan served as a clear indication to park administrators that an internally
managed set of specific rescue procedures would be needed to aeeommodate rapidly
changing patterns of recreation in the park.
A narrowly averted disaster a month later confirmed the need for the implementation
of Hickman’s plan and set the stage for the official incorporation of Camp 4 climbers into
the park’s protection apparatus. After two years and a number of false starts, Warren
Harding, accompanied by a young Galen Rowell, finally succeeded in ascending past the
massive overhanging arch donning the otherwise blank two thousand foot south face of
Half Dome. After six days of painftilly slow climbing, the pair managed to ascend about
two hundred feet up the slabs above the arch, with Harding leading desperate, holdless
pitches using “bat hooks,” an aid climbing device of his own design that could be placed
temporarily in hastily hand-drilled holes too superfieial for bolts. That evening, the
elimbers hung in a shallow “pothole” from bolts in “bat tents,” another Harding
innovation which would, in principle, keep the climbers warm and dry even high on a big
wall in November. From this uncomfortable stance, the pair watehed with guarded
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apprehension as clouds streamed into the Little Yosemite Valley below. Rowell
described what followed:

midnight: awakened by raindrops.. .four a.m.: snowing.. .dawn: everything is
white.. .our vertieal wall is plastered with a layer of snow.. .as the temperature warms
we witness a graphie demonstration of how the potholes were formed: they are the
focal points for the drainage on the upper wall.. .both of us are soaked to the skin.. .we
puneture holes in the floor of the Bat tents to let out water.. .we shiver and pray for
sun.'^^

For three days Harding and Rowell hung in this tight spot, too cold to move, with
their ropes and gear frozen in a tangled mass as a series of storms sent torrents of icy
water rushing through their eramped pothole. On the third day Harding managed to reaeh
Pete Thompson at ranger headquarters through a sporadically functioning two-way radio,
which in Harding’s telling “went dead almost immediately after we had transmitted our
Mayday eall.”'^^ That night the climbers listened to a helieopter making passes over the
wall but remained hunkered down and shivering, believing that a rescue could not be
performed at night. But soon after, as Rowell recalled, “we hear a strange squawking.. .a
light is coming down the w all.. .an angel with a radio, down jacket, and headlamp. ..a
ranger?...ehopper pilot?...no. Royal Robbins.. .guardian angel brings hot soup, dry jaekets,
gloves, and a lifeline to the s u m m i t . T h o u g h hypothermic and slightly frostbitten,
Harding and Rowell managed to jumar to the summit up Robbins’s rope where they were
soon “ensconced in sleeping bags, sipping brandy in the m o o n l i g h t . H a d it not been
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for the preparedness of Pete Thompson and the ranger force, the availability of a fire
response helicopter from Sequoia-King Canyon National Park, and the presence of Royal
Robbins, perhaps the most capable big wall rescuer in the United States, the two elimbers
would likely have not survived the ordeal.
In 1968, rescue teams enacted fifty three major search and rescue operations in
Yosemite, amounting to nearly thirty percent of the approximately three hundred total
incidents over the previous twenty y e a r s . G i v e n the complexity of many of these
rescues, the park’s ranger force could no longer rely solely on its own resourcefulness;
nor could administrators count on the Sierra Club to maintain its commitment to rescue in
this era of democratized recreation in which most accident victims had no relation
whatsoever to the club. Moreover, the National Park Service - increasingly under fire
from old allies in this period - could no longer impose its will in management decisions
as it had in the days of Mather and Albright. In the adversarial climate of the late 1960s,
administrators had neither the authority to restrict dangerous activities, or the ability to
keep up with rapid changes in the culture and practice of rock climbing and other
wilderness-oriented activities. Facing mounting accidents, administrators began
exploring alternative courses of action, the most significant being the establishment of an
internal rescue force staffed with the most capable rock climbers in Yosemite, even if
these climbing bums-tumed-rescuers had been loitering in Camp 4 in defiance of park
authorities year after year for months at a time.
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The incorporation of independent climbers into the park’s protection division
indicated more than administrative concern over the technical deficiency of the ranger
force; it represented a profound shift in the ordering of national park constituencies in the
age of environmentalism. The Sierra Club, increasingly at odds with the Park Service
over wilderness designations and development plans, remained conspicuously absent
from the new arrangements being forged in Camp 4. The club’s growing emphasis on
broader environmental issues, its distance from changes in Yosemite’s climbing culture,
and the quiet disappearance of its volunteer rescue force in the late 1960s made room for
unaffiliated climbers, backpackers, and other visitors to define for themselves how
recreation should be managed in the park. In the wake of the controversial Mission 66
and the 1964 Wilderness Act, the Sierra Club, like the Wilderness Society in the interwar
years, concerned itself with determining what activities should be excluded from a
national park setting. In contrast, independent climbers and other user groups assumed a
more active role in defining what recreational behaviors should be included as
appropriate means to experience wilderness in parks. This pragmatic, visitor-oriented
view of wilderness as recreational space proved comprehensible to the park-going public
and conformed to the NFS’s historical mission to provide for the enjoyment of visitors.
The professionalization of search and rescue through the 1970s became the tool by which
the National Park Service could accommodate these changing cultural perceptions of
recreation and wilderness in Yosemite.
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CHAPTER 3

CAMP 4 AND SAR CULTURE
In November of 1970, Assistant Valley District Ranger Pete Thompson, the park’s
first “rescue specialist,” prepared a set of policy guidelines for the incorporation of
independent rock climbers into Yosemite’s visitor protection division. In Thompson’s
proposal, a group of twenty climbers would have permission to live full time in four
designated campsites in Camp 4 (and one in Camp 12). The climbers would receive oncall wages as emergency hires - much like the park’s fire response team - on the
condition that they remain available to perform search and rescue operations when
needed. Under persistent pressure from Thompson, administrators agreed to formalize
the arrangement in December of 1970. In the following spring crews erected a circle of
tent cabins in the northwest comer of the campground where the climbing bums-tumedrescue staff would live for most of the year.’^* In subsequent decades, the “rescue site”
became the epicenter of the rock climbing universe and the point of origin for a number
of technical procedures and administrative policies that revolutionized modem wildemess
search and rescue in the national parks.
For years park rangers had called on climbers to assist with technical rescues on and
around Yosemite’s cliffs, but the official hiring of Camp 4 climbing bums in 1970

Pete Thompson, Assistant Valley District Ranger to Valley District Ranger, “Guidelines: Rescue
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represented a signifieant cooperative effort that bound these frequently antagonistic
constituencies under an official edict to provide for the safety of visitors. Over the course
of the 1970s and 1980s, incidents of disorderly (often criminal) behavior of climbers
employed as rescuers persisted as an administrative nightmare for rangers, maintenance
workers, law enforcement, and concessionaires. In spite of frequent clashes with
authorities, these rogue park employees became erucial figures in the park’s protection
apparatus, successfully performing thousands of search, rescue, and recovery operations.
Rescue site climbers became integral to Yosemite Search and Rescue (YOSAR) - an
internal rescue apparatus comprised of rangers, medics, climbers, and helicopter
operators - innovated a number of rescue technologies, vastly improved the investigatory
capabilities of the protection division, and devised wholly new methods of pulling
stranded rock climbers from the vertical walls of the Valley. Over the course of the
1970s, rescue site climbers became not only the technical experts in condueting climbingrelated rescues but also cultural liaisons between the centralized authority of the Park
Service and a younger generation of individualistic Baby Boomers seeking to both
preserve nature in the park and experience it as wildemess.
Until 1970, park offieials did little to challenge the climbers’ ascendancy in Camp 4.
At a time when the National Park Service was renovating many of the park’s drive-in
campgrounds, setting up numbered campsites and aetively discouraging the free-for-all
auto camping practices of the prewar era. Camp 4 remained a haphazard collection of
ragged tents and communal picnic tables where rock climbers and other “hard-to-classify
and vaguely undesirable” visitors could park their cars anywhere and remain for as long
as they wished. A few attempts by park authorities to instigate seven day camping limits
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went unheeded and easily transgressed by resident climbers who simply left the park for a
day or secreted into the woods to escape patrolling rangers. Climbers actually gained a
measure of celebrity status among rangers who, though were often forced to break up
parties and investigate shoplifting incidents and visitor complaints, largely avoided
disciplining the unruly Camp 4 crowd. In one instance recounted by Chris Jones, an irate
camper, after being berated by an intoxicated Warren Harding, summoned a ranger who,
upon confronting the offending party, smiled and gushed, “Why, you’re Warren Harding,
I’ve never met you.” The two shook hands and Harding staggered back to the campfire
where “the party continued into the small hours.
Camp 4 ’s quaint anti-authoritarianism little prepared the park’s ranger force for the
widespread cultural upheaval that spilled over into Yosemite in the late 1960s and early
1970s. As an iconic symbol of wildemess and a counterpoint to the Cold War militaryindustrial complex, Yosemite became a flash point for the anti-establishment fervor
gripping the nation’s youth culture in this period. Legions of young people congregating
in San Francisco for the “Summer of Love” invariably made their way to Yosemite where
they vented their frustration with “the establishment” by rebelling against the patriarchal
airs of the National Park Service and flaunting the authority of the starched-suited ranger
force. Dmg use became rampant, even among rock climbers who codified the hedonism
of the changing times in their choice of names for new climbing routes. In guidebooks,
this new generation of climbers inscribed hallucinogenic references such as “Tangerine
Trip,” “Psychedelic Wall,” and “Magic Mushroom” to the now world famous granite
walls surrounding the Valley. By the early 1970s, the individualistic counterculture, a
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mainstream pop phenomenon since the mid-1960s, had not only filtered into the beat
intellectualism of the Camp 4 scene, it had also left its mark on the distinctive cultural
geography of the “Incomparable Valley.”'^'’
In light of the changing cultural composition of visitors, administrators worried that
their “traditional.. .soft-sell law enforcement policy” had become ineffective in
maintaining order in the park. In June of 1970, Valley District Ranger James Olsen
expressed concern that the old system of issuing warnings to offenders before citing them
indicated “an attitude of weakness to the younger age group frequenting the park at an
accelerated rate.” As a solution, Olsen suggested a number of changes to law
enforcement protocol with an emphasis on strict vehicle inspections. He instructed
rangers to refuse entrance to visitors whose automobiles failed to meet any one of a
number of obscure requirements in the California Vehicle Code. A visitor could be
turned back if their vehicle lacked fenders or an appropriate muffler; they could be cited
if their license plate was not illuminated or their brakes were not adequate, if the vehicle
had no windshield wipers, or lacked a rear-view mirror on the left side. Visitors could
even be denied entrance if their car’s center of gravity had been raised or modified “so as
to unsafely affect its operation or stability.” Olsen also stipulated that hitchhikers were to
be cited and transported out of the park immediately. Rangers were given the authority to
cite “out-of-bounds” campers, hikers with unleashed pets, or anyone operating motorized
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vehicles on trails. Any failure to comply with these regulations could, and often did,
result in arrest.'^*
Olsen’s plan to step up law enforcement, while an understandable response to rapid
increases in crime and overcrowding, had the effect of further aggravating the large
groups of “hippies” gathering in the park who felt that these measures were directed at
them specifically. On July 4, 1970, tensions erupted as horse-mounted rangers
confronted a contingent of approximately six hundred young people who had been
defiantly camping out and conducting loud, drug infused parties in Stoneman Meadows
over the holiday weekend. Ill-prepared for a full-scale riot, the over-anxious horse patrol
charged haphazardly into the crowd. Chaos ensued. Rioters hunkered down behind
bulwarks constructed from fallen trees and pelted rangers with rocks, bottles, camping
equipment, and anything else they could find. Rangers were forced to retreat. The
confrontation then devolved into a tense standoff which lasted for the next two days until
reinforcements arrived from the Mariposa County Sheriffs Department. Over two
hundred rioters were arrested in the melee, shattering any illusions that the narrow
corridor of the Yosemite Valley was or ever could be a true sanctuary from the stresses of
modernity. As Alfred Runte observes, “even the national parks.. .were not invulnerable
to urban tensions and social problems.”'^^
While Camp 4 ’s climbing bums had little to do with the Fourth of July riots, park
officials associated their disheveled appearances, vagrant lifestyles, and casual disregard
for authority with the countercultural tendencies at the root of this blemish on the
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administrative history of the park. In an effort to provide stmcture in camping
accommodations and avoid a repeat of Stoneman Meadows, administrators stepped up
their “renovation” of Camp 4, a project that had been initiated in fits and starts since a
flood closed the campground temporarily in the winter of 1969. By the fall of 1970, in
addition to closing the upper forested part of the campground (the climbers’ favorite
section) and enforcing length-of-stay limits, park authorities established designated sites
complete with fire pits and chained down picnic tables, a parking lot, and most
importantly a fee collection booth. At three dollars a night, the camping fee proved to be
a strain on resident climbing bums, many of whom had been scraping by in the Valley on
little or no income for several months out of each year. Even more galling to climbers,
administrators renamed the campground “Sunnyside,” apparently as a means to erase any
lingering associations with the Camp 4 climbing bum lifestyle. Royal Robbins famously
mourned these changes as the end of “laissez faire camping” while another climber
responded with the simple lament of “freedom lost.”*^^ Galen Rowell regarded this
moment as the closing of a significant era of exploration in the history of climbing. With
the renovations occurring in Camp 4, Rowell expressed a lament that “the creaking door
suddenly closed on the Golden Age of Yosemite.”*^"^
This sense of loss seemed counter-intuitive. By 1970, Yvon Chouinard and other
adamant defenders of the cliquish, laissez faire Yosemite climbing scene of the 1950s and
1960s had transformed their small-scale entrepreneurial efforts - through which they sold
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homemade gear to each other in order to afford climbing trips - into globally recognized
names in the manufacture and sales of some of the best climbing equipment on the
market. By 1970, Chouinard and Tom Frost had turned their garage-operated Chouinard
Equipment Inc. into the most respeeted brand in the burgeoning climbing industry. Royal
Robbins even endorsed a brand of climbing boots by the late 1960s. He also published a
rock climbing manual, Basic Rockcraft, in 1971 and had begun operating his own
climbing school near Lake Tahoe through which he hoped to educate neophyte climbers
to appropriate standards of style and risk in climbing.
This participation in the marketplace, which climbers professed to reject, made sense
when considering Robbins’s efforts to communieate the Yosemite style to new climbers.
In this era of fragmented markets and disconnected recreational constituencies, the
commercial marketplace became the most effective means to pass on the technological
hierarchies, philosophies, and social values of Yosemite climbing to an increasingly
affluent, mobile, and environmentally-enlightened middle class population seeking new
means to experience nature in their public lands. For many elite Yosemite elimbers, the
popularization of their sport seemed inevitable, and only by meshing their corporate
ideologies with the messages of the burgeoning environmental movement did they
believe they could maintain a semblance of the adventure and risk they associated with
the early years of Yosemite’s rock climbing.
Yosemite’s climbing bums-tumed-businessmen little comprehended the enthusiasm
with which American consumers in the age of environmentalism embraced the elitist
environmental standards built into the climbing lifestyle. In the context of the social
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upheaval, rampant individualism, and unprecedented affluence of the late 1960s and early
1970s, middle class Americans found much to support in the seemingly contradictory
promises of what enviromnental historians have labeled “quality-of-life
environmentalism.” Inspired by bestselling books including Rachel Carson’s Silent
Spring and Stewart Udall’s The Quiet Crisis, concerned citizens organized into local and
nationwide environmental groups in record numbers to speak out against the destruetive
consequences of industrial progress. At the same time environmentally-aware Amerieans
emphatically embraced the technological conveniences, financial security, and high
standard of living industrialization had made possible. Quality-of-life environmentalists
desired the benefits of modernity without the destructive environmental consequenees.
These consumer-environmentalists did not reject modernity but instead proposed a new
modem experience in which the individual’s opportunity to engage with wild nature
through recreation remained a fimdamental right.
Keeping with this paradoxical marriage of social responsibility and individual
gratification, Americans, especially active Baby Boomers with the money to invest in the
specialized products and the time to learn the rudimentary techniques, regarded the
wildemess experience to be had by rock climbing, backpacking, or other outdoor pursuits
as an integral criterion of improved quality of life. The expanding constituency of these
mcksack-toting park supporters in the 1970s regarded themselves as morally entitled to
the intensely personalized experience with wild nature celebrated in the wildemess
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movement, and in the commereial activities of Yosemite rock climbers. The tensions
developing between the notion of individual freedom to experience wildemess and an
often blatantly elitist sense of social responsibility to eonform to communally policed
standards of appropriate wildemess appreeiation played out in high relief among the dust,
boulders, and communal picnic tables of Camp 4.
Contrary to the nostalgia of older elimbers, Yosemite roek climbing underwent a
renaissance in subsequent deeades as a generation of younger climbers including Jim
Bridwell, John Long, Ron Kauk, John Bachar, Peter Croft, Lynn Hill, and others put
down roots in the newly refurbished Surmyside campground. These “yogurt-eating
health food faddists,” as Royal Robbins labeled them, pushed the boundaries of Valley
climbing to levels of diffieulty and risk that the “crew cut climbers of the 1950s” eould
scarcely have imagined. “The terror barriers are down,” Robbins declared in 1970, “the
big walls not so fearsome.” Not only were the new Yosemite regulars scampering up
terrifyingly difficult free climbs all over the park, sometimes even without the security of
ropes, hundreds of unknown climbers from all over the world were completing suceessful,
lighting-fast ascents of big wall routes that only five years earlier had been the most
difficult rock climbs ever completed. The buzz that surrounded the Yosemite elimbing
seene in this period also attraeted thousands of younger neophyte climbers who created
new recreational expectations for Yosemite and new coneems for veteran Camp 4
elimbers, the ranger force, and park administrators.’^^
Not surprisingly, the surge in climbing activities brought about a corresponding spike
in serious accidents. Through cooperative reseues, the NFS hoped to develop a
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relationship with the climbing community that would facilitate open charmels of
communication over appropriate standards of risk and safety in climbing. In this sense,
administrators believed, the creation of the rescue site, in addition to filling a gap in the
technical capabilities of the ranger force, could also serve as a vital link between park
authorities and a growing constituency of regular and visiting Yosemite climbers. Still,
relations remained strained between park rangers and rock climbers, many of whom
resented the Park Service’s ongoing renovation of Camp 4. In a November 1970 column
for Summit, a popular California-based climbing periodical. Royal Robbins announced to
readers the details of the Park Service’s plans to allow twenty climbers to live for free on
the rescue site. Robbins’s pretense of neutrality did little to mask his underlying sarcasm:
“This seems a marvelous solution to indigent climber’s problem of camping fees in the
Valley,” he wrote, “at least for the lucky twenty.”'^*
While Robbins largely resigned himself to the reality that the “halcyon days” of
Yosemite rock climbing had run their course, the American Alpine Club (AAC), in an
attempt to represent a broader constituency of recreational climbers, offered a harsher
critique of the newly formalized camping arrangements in Camp 4. In a letter to NPS
Deputy Director Harthon Bill, AAC secretary James McCarthy argued that the service’s
efforts to “allow the maximum usage by the largest number of the public” by enforcing
length-of-stay limits in Camp 4 limited opportunities for climbers who often required
more than seven days to prepare for and complete the Valley’s famous big wall climbs.
Yosemite, McCarthy noted, had “become something of an international mecca for
climbers.” Climbers from around the world were zeroing in on the famous Valley which
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McCarthy called “a unique area for which the most natural use is climbing.” Unlike the
Sierra Club, which in the late 1960s increasingly shied away from advocating recreation
of any sort (indeed the term had become something of a bad word in preservationist
circles), the AAC had no qualms about advancing a strict recreational hierarchy in which
rock climbers and other visitors engaging in wilderness-oriented activities deserved
preferential treatment over the majority of tourists who stayed only for a short time and
rarely distanced themselves from the roads, hotels, restaurants, and shops lining the
Valley floor. “I am sure that I don’t have to spell it out for you,” McCarthy wrote to Bill,
“that to adequately use and acclimatize to the conditions of the Park, it is necessary for
climbers to spend extended periods of time there.”
In McCarthy’s view, the rescue site did little to mitigate a “series of conflicts between
climbers and the Park Service” which he perceived as stemming from new camping
limits and fee collections in the new Sunnyside camp. As a solution to this “sticky
wicket,” McCarthy proposed organizing a separate climbers’ camp to be administered by
the Park Service but developed, maintained, and operated by the AAC. “Such an
arrangement would solve a great many problems,” he explained. “The Superintendent of
the Park would be released from the burden of constantly policing the campgrounds
where climbers tend to congregate.” McCarthy further suggested that an “unobtrusive”
climbers’ campground, closed to the non-climbing public, would be “a great boon to
American climbers as well as to those foreign climbers who have been attracted to
Yosemite.” The AAC, assuming a role as the representative body for an increasingly
disjointed constituency of climbers, sent veteran mountaineer Raffi Bedayn to Yosemite
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to meet with administrators regarding this proposal to provided alternative camping
arrangements for rock climbers in Camp 4.’*’’
Pete Thompson welcomed the meeting with Bedayn, who had in the 1930s
participated in a number of groundbreaking climbs in Yosemite and the high Sierra with
Dave Brower, Richard Leonard, and other Sierra Club rock pioneers. Yet Thompson also
expressed frustration with McCarthy’s characterization of the strained relationship
between the NPS and rock climbers in this period. Instead, he insisted that “we are
enjoying the best climber-Park Service relationship that has ever been.” While agreeing
that special arrangements should be made for rock climbers not employed on the rescue
site, Thompson felt that the AAC would not be an appropriate mediator between
recreational climbers and park officials: “The AAC, an old, very conservative
organization with but 900 or so members, is not in the best position to knowledgably
represent 5000 or so long-haired and hip rock climbers,” he concluded.'*’

Thompson’s

response was indicative of the re-organization of park constituencies in this period. With
the Sierra Club reluctant to outwardly support its traditional recreational constituents, the
Wildemess Society and other conservation groups largely preoccupied with natural
resource protection, and the gentrified AAC increasingly out of touch with the new
generation of wildemess enthusiasts, the fi-agmented constituency of rock climbers
passing through Yosemite in this period had little organized representation in forging a
working relationship with the Park Service.’*^

''"Ibid.
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Thompson’s tireless campaigning to assert the success of the rescue site, more so than
any other factor, ultimately gave climbers a voice in park politics. Defiantly referring to
the renovated Sunnyside as “Camp 4” in correspondence to park authorities, Thompson
recommended a second overhaul of the camp to render it more suitable for independent
rock climbers, even those not employed as rescuers. He suggested constructing showers,
secure lockers, a climber registration booth, and living quarters for “rescue rangers” who
would anchor the campground and serve as liaisons between climbers and NPS
administrators. This official “climber’s camp” would be administered as a walk-in only
site and the number of campsites would be halved. (The current fifty-two sites had
become “an ecological disaster,” according to Thompson). Thompson also recommended
lowering the camping fee for climbers and establishing an identification system for
rescue site hires, who he referred to as “Camp 4 residents.”’*^
Thompson’s efforts proved influential in swaying park administrators anxious to
explore new avenues of support for park management plans, especially in light of the
increasingly adversarial position of the Sierra Club and other preservationist groups. For
the National Park Service, an accommodating stance on rock climbing and other
wilderness-oriented activities seemed a pragmatic solution to the ever-present problem of
maintaining the park “in a purely natural state yet available for those who wish to take the
time and vigor to visit the wonders.” Park Service officials in Washington and the
majority of visitors through this period for the most part agreed with administrators’
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support for wilderness-oriented forms of recreation, including rock climbing, which did
not necessitate the large-scale infrastructural development that preservationists in this
period so adamantly rejected. As a means to accommodate rock climbers, in the spring
of 1972, administrators agreed to reserve a portion of Camp 4 as a walk-in climbers’
campground. Park officials reduced the fee from three dollars a night to fifty cents and
allowed climbers with plans to undertake multi-day ascents on the big walls of the Valley
to apply for permission to remain in Camp 4 beyond the seven day limit. Superintendent
Lyim Thompson, in his annual report for 1972, confidently declared that “this experiment
worked very well and will be continued.”'*'’
Even as the culture of Camp 4 persisted as a thorn in the side of NPS administrators,
park officials gradually become more supportive of climbing as an appropriate form of
recreation in Yosemite. A post-Wildemess Act policy statement described climbing as
among those activities that could be “accommodated without material alteration or
disturbance of environmental characteristics or the introduction of undue artificiality into
a natural environment.” In 1969, the Yosemite Park and Curry Company (YPCC) cited
the NPS’s recreation policy as rationale for establishing a Yosemite Mountaineering
School and Guide Service in the park. Emphasizing Yosemite’s history as the birthplace
of modem American rock climbing techniques, the YPCC argued that a mountaineering
school would facilitate the communication of the “Yosemite style” to new climbers while
providing “an opportunity for the park visitor to learn basic backcountry safety
techniques as well as a chance to enjoy the high mountain environment under the
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guidance of a trained mountaineer.”’*^ In subsequent years, the ubiquitous “Go Climb a
Rock” t-shirt worn by participants in the Yosemite mountaineering school indicated that
the NPS not only tolerated climbing, it also actively promoted the sport as a legitimate
form of wildemess recreation in the park.
The co-evolution of rock climbing and rescue as integral components of the
wildemess experience in Yosemite was not without controversy. In the fall of 1970,
Warren Harding, Camp 4 ’s resident renegade, once again brought national attention to
rock climbing in the Yosemite Valley with his audacious ascent of the blank,
overhanging “Wall of Early Moming Light” on the southeast face of El Capitan.
Preparing for twelve days on the wall, Harding and his partner Dean Caldwell ended up
bivouacking through a series of storms and nailing bolt ladders up long sections of blank
granite, reaching the summit after an incredible twenty seven consecutive days. As with
the earlier ascent of the Nose, the climb gamered attention from tourists, the Park Service,
and the national media. Attempting to put a stop to the mounting spectacle (though
inadvertently aggravating it) Park Service officials organized a daring rescue involving a
contingent of Camp 4 climbers and an Army helicopter. Pete Thompson described his
reasoning for initiating the rescue, even though it was not clear that Harding and
Caldwell felt they were in need of assistance: “They had been up for many days longer
than anyone had ever been on a wall before, their rations should have been critically short,
and they reported that their feet were numb, their gear got wet when it rained, and that

Yosemite Park and Curry Co., “A Prospectus for Yosemite Mountaineering School and Guide
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they were suffering from open sores brought on through lying in wet bags during the first
big storm. They were ten days overdue and had 1600 feet to go!”’*^
Park officials on the ground had difficulty discerning communications from the
climbers. Harding had been dropping notes in film canisters indicating that they were
fine and did not need to be rescued, however, Caldwell had responded to rangers shouting
through a bullhorn that a rappel to the ground would be impossible and that “we know
that our asses are in a sling.” Thompson questioned whether this vague reference meant
that the climbers were indeed in serious trouble or that Caldwell “was merely referring to
his belay seat.” Thompson concluded that the men were “in unknown psychological
condition” and, given that forecasters were predicting yet another winter storm, the most
logical course of action would be to initiate a rescue.’*^
Concerned that weather conditions would prohibit a helicopter from shuttling supplies
to the summit, Thompson mobilized climbers in Camp 4 to haul supplies to the summit
on foot. (Climbers were also recruited by film crews to carry news equipment to the
summit; a task for which they were paid handsomely). In the afternoon of November II,
after all rescue equipment had been assembled, a would-be rescuer rappelled down to the
ledge where Harding and Caldwell were bivouacked. To the delight of the news media,
Harding angrily refused the rescue and determined that he and Caldwell would continue
climbing the next moming. On the twelfth, the dire weather predietions proved false; the
sky eleared and “snowplumes blew from the peaks to the east while a great debate raged

Pete Thompson, “Search and Rescue Incident Report,” November 22, 1970, YOSE SAR files, 1970.
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on the summit,” as Thompson later recalled. Seven days later, the climbers finally
emerged onto the summit to meet the paparazzi.’**
A photograph of Harding’s grizzled, devilish face coming over the lip on the twenty
seventh day made a striking image in the national media. The San Francisco Chronicle
called the climb “a heroic achievement in these days when there is precious little
adventure to be found anywhere.”’*^ Harding and Caldwell later made the rounds of late
night talk shows, appearing on the “Merv Griffith Show” and various sports programs
including an interview with Howard Cosell on the ABC network’s “Wide World of
Sports.”’^” While Harding and Caldwell were hailed as heroes in the press, the
conspicuous rescue fiasco revealed the delicate position visitor protection occupied in an
emerging culture that associated self-reliance and risk with the national park experience.
Rescue was both a desperately needed component of park management and a potential
impediment to the national park experience for ambitious park users seeking an
individualized adventure. Technical rescues could also be distractions for tourists
seeking quiet contemplation in a natural setting. In subsequent decades, search and
rescue served as the gauge by which the boundaries of the wildemess experience could be
drawn and administered by the Park Service.
Further complicating the issue, a number of climbers in Camp 4 objected to Harding’s
and Caldwell’s eopious use of permanent expansion bolts as an affront to the strict
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technological imperative embedded in the Yosemite style. For Royal Robbins, Yvon
Chouinard, and others, Yosemite’s walls provided an interaction with nature that could be
all too easily compromised by an over-reliance on technology.’^’ If bolts were acceptable
in all situations, anyone could force their way up any climb with no regard for the
climbable contours of the rock. This group of climbers, who an embittered Harding later
labeled “the Valley Christians,” viewed rock climbing in Yosemite as an activity to be
conducted in solitude through muscular activity and an intellectual appreciation for the
non-human elements of the landscape: in essence, climbing was to be a wildemess
experience, accessible only to those with the requisite skills to function within the set of
strict (yet arbitrary) technological parameters that elite climbers had been devising
around the picnic tables of Camp 4 for years.
Harding was quick to pounce on the blatant elitism underlying such pronouncements.
Resurrecting an often-repeated argument of the early Park Service, Harding wrote,
“Theoretically, the use and preservation of our mountain areas would seem to depend on
the vote of the masses. How, then, can we expect the support of the average citizen in
conservation if he is told the mountains are too good for him, that they should be reserved
for a minority of self-styled “good-guys?”’^^ By arguing over the role of technology in
climbing and the democratization of their sport in the familiar terms of conservation,
Harding, Robbins, Chouinard, and others exhibited the fundamental connection between
recreation and popular conceptions of wildemess that persisted into the modem national
Harding, “Reflections o f a Broken Down Climber,” 35; Royal Robbins, “The El Capitan Climb,”
31.; Allen Steck and Galen Rowell, “Interview with Royal Robbins,” in The Vertical World o f Yosemite,
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parks movement. Rather than existing as oppositional motives - preservation as an
altruistic philosophy on a higher plane than use, and recreation as a profane embodiment
of a corrupting consumer influence - for administrators, rock climbers, and other park
enthusiasts, recreation remained the only practical means by which the value of
preservation could be comprehended. Defining the terms of use - specifically the
behaviors, philosophies, and technologies constituting appropriate recreation - became
the focus of rock climbers, wildemess enthusiasts, and national park administrators in this
period of rising environmental consciousness and skyrocketing participation in
wildemess-oriented outdoor activities.
As a vehicle for the promotion of an environmentally responsible recreational ethic,
Chouinard Equipment Inc. embodied an elitist moral economy in the commercial outdoor
recreation industry. Chouinard and Frost’s 1972 Chouinard Equipment Catalogue
promoted an elitist formula of physical skill and technological restraint in the outdoor
experience as prerequisite for participation in rock climbing. In the catalogue, Chouinard
and Frost struggled to balance the enabling and despoiling potentials of new innovations
in climbing technology. They recognized both the liberating qualities of technology and
the ease in which new equipment could be misapplied. In the introduction Chouinard
expressed the values to be gained by limiting reliance on technology in the climbing
experience. “The fewer gadgets between the climber and the climb, the greater is the
chance to attain the desired communication with oneself - and nature,” he wrote. While
clearly expressing an aversion to technology as a hindrance to the climbing experience,
the catalogue was ultimately an advertisement for “gadgets” needed to climb rocks. For
Chouinard and Frost, the solution to this apparent contradiction lay not in the
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abandonment of technology altogether but through the promotion of new, highly
specialized equipment that enhanced the physicality of the climbing experience while
leaving no permanent markings on the rock.’^'’
Deliberately minimalist in design and oriented towards the most skilled climbers,
“clean climbing” technology enabled an even closer contact to the climbing landscape.
Royal Robbins, in a 1967 article for Summit, advocated the use of “nuts,” a British
innovation from the mid 1960s originally consisting of a typical machine nut attached to a
sling. As alternatives to pitons, which had to be forcefully pounded into cracks in the
rock with a hammer, Chouinard’s stoppers and hexentrics, his own iimovation of the
crude British nuts, could be eased with the fingers into cracks and other contours of the
rock face without damaging the rock. Although this new equipment could stop falls as
effectively as pitons, clean climbing technology required a significantly more advanced
knowledge of the intricate features of the rock.’^^ Climber Doug Robinson, in an essay in
the 1972 catalogue made it clear that the use of nuts relegated climbing to an activity for
an elite few: “Pitons have been a great equalizer in American climbing,” he asserted. “By
liberally using them it was possible to get in over one’s head, and by more liberally using
them, to get out again. But every climb is not for every climber; the ultimate climbs are
not democratic.” With its elitist connotations, Robinson’s essay reiterated the social
hierarchy of Yosemite climbing as an integral aspect of the moral economy developing
within the specialty outdoor recreation industry.

Yvon Chouinard and Tom Frost, Chouinard Equipment Catalogue (Ventura: Chouinard Equipment,
Inc., 1972), 3.
195 1

’ Royal Robbins, “Nuts to You!” Summit 13, no. 4 (May 1967): 2-7.

113

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

From the Search and Rescue Officer to the Chief Ranger to the Director of the
Western Region, NPS officials supported the environmental aspects of clean climbing
and began encouraging climbers to discontinue the use of crack-destroying pitons in favor
of less-invasive nuts and hexentrics. This communication between the commercial
climbing industry and the NPS highlighted the shifting constituencies within the national
parks movement in this period. These efforts also continued beyond the cliquish dialogue
of climbing. Through the late 1960s and early 1970s, backpacking emerged as the most
popular means to experience wildemess in Yosemite and other national parks. This
widespread appeal of wildemess recreation signaled to long-time backpackers, leaders in
the conservation movement, and NPS officials that park goers might “love the wildemess
to death.” Growing numbers of backcountry hikers were creating havoc in Yosemite and
other popular destinations; backpackers polluted campsites with trash and human waste;
they scavenged for firewood in fragile alpine regions where trees were scarce; they
trampled vegetation; and in many cases they marred the psychic impact of the wildemess
experience for each other by their mere presence.
In response, administrators in Yosemite implemented a wildemess management plan
in 1972 which included a mandatory backcountry permit process. Whereas in the
relatively small climbing community, standards and ethics could be communicated rather
effectively through advertising and peer pressure, backpacking attracted a far larger
constituency that did not follow such ethics as uniformly. While limiting the individual
freedom of wildemess recreation by requiring backcountry users to camp in designated
Doug Robinson, “Tbe Wbole Natural Art o f Protection,” in Cbouinard and Frost, Chouinard
Equipment Catalogue, 12, 25.
Roderick Nasb, Wildemess and the American Mind.
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sites, avoid campfires, and show permits to patrolling rangers, regulatory policies also
allowed the NPS to avoid what environmental critic Garret Hardin had called “the
tragedy of the commons.” If every individual exercised their fi*eedom to maximize their
personal gain, Hardin argued, they would invariably lessen the utility of the environment
for all others including themselves since every environment has limits.’^* The notion of a
human “carrying capacity” informed wildemess management policies in the national
parks and elsewhere through this period, serving as one administrative means to bridge
the contentious preservation/ use divide in park politics.
Search and rescue functioned as the linchpin holding this together. Given the
increasing popularity of wildemess-oriented activities and the unprecedented volume of
complicated and dangerous rescues this trend encouraged, emergency response
capabilities became ever more critical. In fact, the institutionalization of search and
rescue became essential to the NPS’s review of potential wildemess areas in the parks as
stipulated by the 1964 Wildemess Act. The authors of a report for the National Parks
Centennial Commission in 1973 contended that managing the parks as wildemess would
present “a completely new set of philosophical problems and arguments on access which
compound the basic problems of administration.” Basing their analysis on recreation and
the assumption that “parks are for people,” even considering the wildemess bill’s
emphasis on limited access and ecological protection, the drafters determined that the
most problematic administrative issue raised by the implementation of the act would be
visitor safety and the organization of a search and rescue infrastmcture. The commission
Garrett Hardin, “The Tragedy o f the Commons,” Science 162 (1968): 1243-1248.
Theodore Catton, National Park, City Playground: Mount Rainier in the Twentieth Century
(Seattle: University o f Washington Press, 2006); John Alan Wagar, The Carrying Capacity o f Wild Lands
fo r Recreation (PhD. diss.: University o f Michigan, 1961), 4.
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observed that “There are those who feel that the Wildemess user goes into the
backcountry at his own risk and that his safety need not be a concem of the Service nor
the public at large.” However, as the drafters ultimately concluded, “In our society, the
safety of a person cannot be ignored. Legally, since the national parks are federal
property, the National Park Service carmot abdicate its responsibility to protect the
public.” Accommodation through rescue became the administrative framework through
which the NPS interpreted new wildemess legislation.^’’’’
The commission argued that the new generation of wildemess users visiting the
national parks would have to be educated in regards to the safety requirements of
backcountry travel and other forms of wildemess recreation. However, even with safety
controls, certification programs, and guide services, the commission found that “a
manpower rescue system will have to be available to rescue those who have not retumed
from wildemess areas when scheduled to do so.”^”’ As a response to the perceived
dangers of allowing visitors to venture into undeveloped terrain, the creation of a rescue
force seemed the most pragmatic means for administrators to accommodate wildemess
recreation. Guide services, registration policies, and education programs did not
guarantee the safe, responsible behavior of wildemess users; in fact, reliance on such
policies caused even greater concems by removing safety standards from the exclusive
control of the NPS and placing it on independent, often untmstworthy visitors. The
formalization of YOSAR over the course of the 1970s exposed this apprehension and

National Parks Centennial Commission, Preserving a Heritage: Final Report to the President and
Congress o f the National Parks Centennial Commission (Washington D.C.: National Park Service, 1973),
118-121.
Ibid., 120.
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provided the foundation for an accommodating policy towards rock climbing and other
potentially dangerous forms of wildemess recreation.
Park officials could not conceivably accommodate wildemess recreation, nor could
they endorse independent climbing and the operation of the mountaineering school
without the quick-response capabilities of the rescue site hires. In 1972, YOSAR
responded to 102 documented incidents, a high proportion of which would likely have
resulted in the death of the victim had the park’s protection division not maintained a
cadre of physically capable expert climbers in Camp 4. Rescue site hires were, of course,
most effective in performing climbing rescues which comprised anywhere from fifteen to
twenty five percent of the total emergencies annually. On September 22, 1972, a team of
twenty two park rangers and climbers performed an evacuation from the face of El
Capitan that park Superintendent Lyim Thompson described as “the most spectacular and
hazardous rescue ever attempted.

That moming at sunrise, 600 feet below the rim on

the Nose route, climber Neal Olsen dislodged an enormous granite boulder which toppled
backwards, cmshing his right leg badly. Ranger coordinated from above as five rescue
site climbers rappelled to the ledge where Olsen lay anchored to the wall. Unable to raise
the injured climber due to the massive overhangs between his position and the summit,
the rescue team scrambled to obtain enough climbing rope to lower Olsen the daunting
1,800 feet down to the Valley floor.
Lloyd Price and rescue site hire John Dill began the task of knotting together more
than 7,000 feet of yachting rope that had been flown in that moming by helicopter fi*om
San Diego. (An arson fire had recently destroyed the rescue cache where YOSAR had

^ Lynn Thompson, “Superintendent’s Annual Report, 1972,” 5.
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kept most of its long ropes.) After protecting the exposed knots with water bottles which
had to be cut and then duct-taped in place along the rope, Dill and Price lowered two
lengths of 3,000 foot rope to the ledge. Rescue site “guru,” and the best climber in Camp
4 at that time, Jim Bridwell, accompanied Olsen’s litter as the remaining climbers at the
accident site lowered them “very delicately.. .through a simple braking system” until they
reached the ground approximately and hour and a half later. As the longest single rope
lowering ever completed, the rescue received considerable attention in the media.
Thompson described the operation as “entirely professional, and carried out with
expediency despite the fact that it was a step into the u n k n o w n . T h e climbers
involved later received a unit award for excellence of service from the Department of
Interior.^®'' Following this unprecedented rescue, few administrators in positions of
power questioned the value of maintaining the rescue site in Camp 4, even as the anti
authoritarian tendencies embedded in the culture of Camp 4 created a persistent human
resources nightmare for park authorities.
While Thompson had cast the rescue team as “Camp 4 residents,” presumably as a
way to give legitimacy to the rescue site, these full-time climbers continued to pride
themselves as “climbing bums” and subverted NFS authority whenever the opportunity
presented itself. In one instance, Jim Bridwell and a handful of rescue site climbers
secreted into an unlocked maintenance shed near Camp 4 where, on a Mission
Impossible-stylQ undertaking, they made off with an extension cord. They then
“purloined the Park electricity,” running the extension chord from the camp restroom to

Pete Thompson, “Search and Rescue Incident Report,” September 22, 1971, YOSE SAR files, 1971.
Charles R. “Butch” Farabee, Jr., Death, Daring, and Disaster: Search and Rescue in the National
Parks, revised edition (Lanham: Taylor Trade Publishing, 2005), 305, 306.
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Bridwell’s tent on the rescue site where they “hosted an almost continuous party, playing
Jimi Hendrix, Bob Dylan, the Rolling Stones.
Bridwell, the ringleader of the rescue site through the 1970s, had arrived in Yosemite
in 1964 as a wide-eyed seventeen year-old lacking experience or even a pair of proper
climbing shoes. By 1970, after being taken under the wing of physically gifted climbers
Layton Kor and Frank Sacherer, Bridwell gained a reputation as the strongest free
climber in the Valley. Glen Denny described Bridwell’s unusual training regime for
which he “designed specialized exercise machines that raised climbing performance to
new heights... His campsite became an outdoor gym,” as Denny recalled.^'^^ More than a
decade younger than Robbins, Chouinard, and other golden age climbers, Bridwell
bridged the generation gap in Camp 4. He became a mentor for younger climbers in the
Valley through the early 1970s. Meeting the tanned and toned Bridwell for the first time
in 1970, a teenaged John Long, who in the next decade made his own significant mark in
Yosemite climbing, rattled off a list of myths he had picked up around the picnic tables of
Camp 4: “He told me he'd heard I did sets of a hundred pull-ups, tore three phone books
in half at once and pulled a stop sign out of cement to throw at a car that wouldn't pick
me up hitchhiking,” Bridwell recalled.^®^
Such rumors of mythic feats reinforced Bridwell’s stature in Camp 4. With his wild
curling hair and drooping mustache reminiscent of Dennis Hopper in Easy Rider,
Bridwell set himself apart from the clean-shaven, uniformed rangers who relied on his

Jim Bridwell, “Birds Eye V iew ,” Alpinist 18 (2007).
^ Glen Denny, Yosemite in the Sixties (Ventura: Patagonia and T. Alder Books, 2007), 54.
207

Ibid.
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expertise in hundreds of search, rescue, and recovery operations during his tenure in
Camp 4. As the central figure of the rescue site - which at that time housed the best
climbers in Yosemite - the bell-bottom-clad Bridwell exuded a smug independence that
was representative of both the rescue site climbers and the parade of Camp 4 transients
passing through Yosemite in this period. At first, administrators maintained a favorable
opinion of the rescue site and its “non-traditional” human element. This budding
relationship with climbers represented a concerted effort on the part of administrators to
adjust to the changing times and refashion the Park Service with a more contemporary
image. In 1972, Superintendent Lynn Thompson heralded this effort by announcing that
the park had hired its first “summer ranger with shoulder length hair.”^"^ Similarly, in an
attempt to build rapport with climbers in Camp 4, ranger Mead Hargis submitted a letter
to the editor for a 1973 issue of Summit offering, in the vernacular of the day, to “rap”
with anyone concerned with camping arrangements in Camp 4 or any other “climbingrelated happenings in Yosemite.”^"^
These attempts to reach out to the Camp 4 counterculture did little to inspire climbers
to conform to the strict standards of behavior park authorities expected. In February of
1974, in response to “a myriad of concerns” from campers, maintenance workers,
concessionaires, law enforcement officials, and the newly established natural resources
division. Valley District Ranger James Brady issued a memorandum to all “Camp 4
users” that park authorities would begin clamping down on vagrancy and misbehavior in
the walk-in camp. Brady cited a number of problems including out-of bounds camping.

^ Lynn Thompson, “Superintendent’s Annual Report, 1972,” 3.
^ Mead Hargis, letter to the editor in Summit (December 1973): 33.
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littering, and the doubling up of campsites: “Most distressing was the lack of camping
manners and environmental sensitivity,” he wrote. “Dirty unattended camps, which
continually blocked the site for other visitors, misuse of the adjacent service station
facilities, scarfing in the lodge cafeteria, ‘rip-offs’ within the camp itself, hassles over
quiet hours, and disorderly conduct complaints were all part of the ‘Camp 4 ’ scene during
the past few summers,” according to Brady. As a solution to these persistent problems,
he proposed, once again, that mandatory camping registration, nightly fees, designated
sites, and length-of-stay requirements (seven days in the summer and fourteen in the off
season) would be strictly enforced.^*®
It was also apparent to Brady that the rescue site had become the centerpiece of the
entire “Camp 4 scene.” Jim Bridwell, Eric Beck, John Long, and other rescue climbers
had indeed became cultural figureheads for visiting climbers seeking to participate in the
now world famous Yosemite climbing bum lifestyle. Beck, one of the most notoriously
impoverished climbers since the mid-1960s, celebrated the transcendent upending of
class-lines the climbing bum lifestyle represented: “At either end of the social spectrum
there lies a leisure class,” he remarked. Beck, like most climbers in Camp 4, little
understood the realities of less voluntary forms of poverty.^** John Long best
encapsulated the romanticism of Camp 4, writing, “Yosemite is the homeless and the
brave, gray granite monoliths and Jeffrey Pines, lush meadows and farting tour busses, a
dime-bag of bunk weed and a twelve pack of Lucky Lager, 10,000 campfires and twice

James Brady to Suimyside “Camp 4” users, re: “Management o f Sunnyside Campground,” Febmary
25, 1974, YOSAR office files.; Brady also published an editorial in Summit repeating many o f his concerns
to the larger elimbing community. James Brady, “Open Letter to Yosemite Climbers,” Summit, 20 (March
1974): 1.
Jones, Climbing in North America, 330.
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as many tourists.” For rangers, “Camp 4 was the biggest Babylon of rogues in California,
full of ‘no-counts, grifters, dare-devils, and punks,’” Long wrote, “But had you pasted the
same punks up on El Capitan, they were dreamers and heroes and even the rangers
couldn’t argue the fact.”^’^ Such attitudes generated concern among short-handed
administrators who had grown increasingly dependent on the manpower and technical
capabilities of the Camp 4 rescue team.
In comparison to their relative infrequency through the 1960s, serious climbing
accidents became epidemic by 1973. Out of total of eighty seven search, rescue, or
recovery operations that year, more than two dozen involved rock climbing or required
rock climbing techniques to carry out. O f these incidents, an unprecedented eleven had
resulted in death.^'^ The majority of these tragedies stemmed from carelessness on the
part of inexperienced rock scramblers or novice technical climbers who ventured onto
terrain for which they were unprepared. In one instance, a group of four teenagers were
ascending difficult slabs above Sunnyside Bench when their leader slipped and fell. He
plunged, “twisting in mid air,” as witnesses later reported, one to two hundred feet down
to the talus slope below. When rescuers arrived, they found that the victim had suffered
multiple fractures and massive internal trauma. With the severity of these injuries, the
rescue team was unable to save the young man’s life. Pete Thompson called the incident
“a ridiculous death” upon discovering that the group apparently “had a clothesline along,
but they were not even using that!”^'‘^
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Even “respectable and fairly experienced” climbers were not immune to poor
judgment. In an article for Summit in June of 1973, Thompson described, in detail, four
climbing deaths that had occurred within a span of only a few weeks. In one instance a
climber had drowned while attempting to cross a swollen Bridalveil Creek after
completing a nearby climb. Two climbers died from falls after failing to set proper
rappel anchors. A fourth died on a foolish solo climb of the Steck-Salathe route on
Sentinel Rock when he relied on a fragile 3/8 inch rope tied into his primary line to stop a
fall. He fell, and the knot “burned through” the rope, sending the nineteen year old
plummeting over one thousand feet to his death on the ledges at the base of the cliff. In
light of these mishaps, Thompson implored climbers to be “good mountaineers.. .who
know their limitations, and the technical, designed, limitations of their equipment.”
Despite warning signs, he had little confidence that such accidents would taper off.
“When will these absurd, outrageous, and mind boggling wastes of lives cease?” he asked.
Directly addressing the cost of continuing to accommodate climbing and other dangerous
activities, Thompson answered his own question: “Obviously, never. Their frequency
may just be a function of numbers. Camp IV this spring is full of inexperienced, ill
prepared, or rankly unqualified, overly ego-involved people with huge aspirations. By
anyone’s measuring stick, these past few weeks have been the grimmest in Yosemite’s
rock climbing history.”^ T h o m p s o n ’s previous optimism and his perception of the
rescue site as the saving grace of wilderness recreation in Yosemite became tempered by
a recognition that the popularity of climbing and other dangerous activities threatened to
overwhelm even the advanced capabilities of YOSAR.

Pete Thompson, “Tragedies in Yosemite Valley,” Summit 19 (June 1973): 1-2.
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Yet administrators expressed no intention to actively restrict rock climbing or any
other potentially hazardous, wilderness-oriented activities. Partly in response to pressure
from user groups, yet also due to the fact that these activities were widely considered to
be historieally appropriate uses of the park, administrators maintained a positive approaeh
towards rising participation in rock climbing, backpacking, and other activities. In
eorrespondenee to the associate director of the National Park Service in 1970,
Superintendent Lawrenee Hadley celebrated the park’s elimbing possibilities, writing,
“The great walls are perhaps without equal anywhere for the several types of challenges
offered.”^ L a t e r that year Valley District Ranger Olsen stated that administrators would
be “heartily in favor o f ’ a proposal by the British Broadcasting Corporation to televise a
climb of El Capitan by live satellite to Europe. In 1974, in a controversial move
purportedly related to the Park Service’s eoncessions contract with MCA, administrators
allowed a Hollywood film erew to tape a television drama, titled “Sierra,” within the park.
Advertised as a story of rangers dealing with “the eonfliet between trying to preserve the
natural beauty of the wilderness and aecommodating the flood of tourists wanting to
utilize the resources of the park,” the short-lived series glamorized the altruism of rescue
rangers and romanticized the feats of elimbers.^*^ YOSAR functioned as a psychie
safeguard allowing administrators to maintain this aceommodating approaeh towards
rock climbing, despite the troubling increase in aeeidents and the fragile eonsensus
between park rangers and Camp 4 rescue site climbers.

Superintendent, Yosemite to Associate Director Jensen, re: “Yosemite Rock Climbing,” January 8,
1970, Yosemite Central Files, Mountain Climbing 1970-1975, L3423-L48.
Quoted in Farabee, Death, Daring, and Disaster, 312-313.
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In 1974, in an effort to professionalize the rescue site climbers and mold them into
functional representatives of the Park Serviee, ranger Mead Hargis and Anthony
Anderson, the first full-time search and rescue officer in the park, eompiled a set of
requirements for the hiring of rescue site employees. In light of the disconcerting number
of serious accidents and deaths in the previous year, Hargis recognized that the Camp 4
site served a vital funetion in providing for visitor safety. For one, a high turnover rate in
the ranger force made it diffieult for distriet rangers to maintain an adequately trained
reseue foree. Also, rangers trained in search and rescue techniques were often burdened
with other duties that limited their ability to respond to emergencies. In order to address
rescue site climbers’ problematie disregard for authority, Hargis stressed that “when
vietims, reseuers, and rangers lives are at stake,” no member of park’s protection division
should “participate because of monetary considerations, ego whims, political or social
cliques.”^'* With this hiring plan, rangers and park administrators hoped to eultivate a
more professional SAR culture in Camp 4 that would temper the countercultural
tendencies of the Yosemite elimbing scene.
Hargis and Anderson determined that the most eritieal qualification for an effective
member of the rescue site should be their capacity to “avoid conflicts” and “deal with
National Park Serviee policies and personnel.” Of eourse, rescue site climbers were also
to demonstrate good judgment, advanced elimbing skills, and a “desire to learn rescue
techniques.” Rescuers would be required to posses knowledge of Yosemite’s complex
terrain, first aid experience, a willingness to attend regular training sessions, and the
ability to “keep and orderly, neat, and clean campsite.” Rescue site climbers were also to

Mead Hargis to Search and Rescue Officer and Valley District Ranger, re: “Rescue Team,” March
20, 1974, YOSAR office files.
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“obey all Park rules and regulations” and be capable, as representatives of the NPS, of
setting “an example of good eamp maimers.”^’^
Yet while the YOSAR team eontinued to improve upon SAR techniques through the
1970s and early 1980s, the rescue site climbers remained a constant personnel headache
for administrators. In January of 1977, Joe Windsor, the chief of campground
maintenance, proposed closing Camp 4 and the rescue site for the winter to facilitate
“better and more efficient management.” Windsor expressed frustration that the rescue
site climbers had failed to assume any responsibilities for maintaining order in the
sprawling camp. In fact, Windsor observed that the rescue site climbers seemed to be
“leading the vandalism and misuse of the area facilities.”^^*’
Windsor had reason to complain. In addition to dealing with disappearing electric
cables, filthy campsites, and blatant, pervasive drug use, his maintenance staff faced a
host of other minor but persistent problems in Camp 4. Shelves in the bathroom were
being ripped off and used as firewood; fire pits were being dismantled and moved to
other areas in the eamp; someone had been cutting the chain-anchors on picnic tables and
moving them around the campground and into the rescue site; the rescue site sign had
been “chipped away on its top and side...as though somebody spent their idle time
banging away on the post;” eampsite posts had been pulled out of the ground and turned
upside down so that the numbers could not be seen; and the collapsible stanchions placed
at the entrance to the parking lot to prevent unauthorized vehicles from entering had been

Anthony Anderson to Valley and Mather District Rangers through the Acting Chief Ranger, re:
“Rescue sites in Camp 4 and Tuolumne Meadows,” May 30, 1974, YOSAR office files.
^ Joe Windsor to Chief Ranger, re: “Sunnyside Campground management,” January 6, 1977, YOSAR
office files.
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destroyed and then stolen/^ ^ Windsor recommended that if the rescue site hires eould
not “follow established rules, regulations, and policies that the present courtesies
extended to this group be discontinued.”^^^
In response to such complaints, Superintendent Leslie Amberger requested that the
Chief Ranger and other protection staff “tidy up and ‘regularize’ the management of the
climbers’ sites at Sunnyside Campground.” Chief Ranger Charles Wendt then wrote to
Tim Setnicka, Anthony Anderson’s replacement as the search and rescue officer,
charging him to clean up the “general disarray and mess” surrounding the rescue site. If
these problems could not be resolved, Wendt voiced concern that “the whole eoneept of
the elimbing site and its value of liaison between the climbing community and the
National Park Service is at stake.” Considering the necessity of the reseue site in
ensuring visitor protection, such a possibility remained for Wendt, “a position which I do
not want to take.”^^^ Valley Distriet Ranger James Brady agreed and called on shift
supervisors to “police and enforce the regulations” in order to “see that climbers do a
better job all year round.” Administrators ultimately determined that the rescue site could
not be disbanded; instead, individual perpetrators would be singled out, dismissed from
the climbers’ camp, and replaced by any number of qualified Yosemite roek climbers
hoping to be employed through YOSAR.^^^

Joe Windsor, re: “Sunnyside Campground,” January 3, 1977, YOSAR office files.
^ Windsor to Chief Ranger, re: “Sunnyside Campground management.”
^ Charles Wendt to Search and Rescue Officer, re: “climbing site,” February 11, 1977, YOSAR office
files.
^ Valley District Ranger to Shift Supervisors, undated, YOSAR office files.
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Such a policy proved easier said than done. As the global epicenter of a burgeoning
rock climbing culture by the mid-1970s, Camp 4 had sprawled well beyond its already
impossible-to-regulate boundaries. In the busiest times, this nomadic “shantytown”
spilled over into the parking lot of the nearby Yosemite Lodge where “crusty, dustcovered” climbers milled around, frightening “tidy Bermuda clad tourists.” The
sprawling encampment had become what one journalist described as “a refugee camp for
survivalists.” During the long days from early spring until late fall, countless dilapidated
tents, dispersed at random throughout the camp with no regard for designated sites,
fluttered in the breeze; spare climbing gear lay in haphazard piles throughout the
campground; and food containers and laundry hung on crisscrossing lines through the
trees, weaving “a colorful thread through the dreary camp.” By dusk, the resident
climbers, draped with pitons, carabiners, and other tools of the trade, returned in
“clanking hordes” from the vertical walls of the Valley. Once settled in and relieved of
their heavy equipment, climbers separated into cliques, transforming the slum into
raucous '"‘'Animal House al-fresco.” “Camp 4 is a very romantic, anarchistic kind of
place,” one climber explained, “at night everyone sits around the fire telling stories and
getting high.” Rangers, law enforcement, and other authorities could do little to restrain
the sprawling encampment. “The climbers aren’t going to leave,” Camp 4 regular Phil
Bard observed, “this place is too important to them.”^^^
Indeed, to the frustration of administrators responsible for overseeing the
formalization of rescue procedures in this period, replacements for troublesome rescue
site hires were invariably drawn from the same pool of Camp 4 miscreants. In spite of

^ All quotes from Ryan Garcia, “Danger in High Places,” Focus (April 1981): 33-36.
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administrators’ drafting of a series of management proposals designed to “change the
overall atmosphere and acceptance of responsibility by site members,” personnel
problems continued well into the 1980s?^^ True to their word, park authorities were
quick to discharge any rescue site climbers who exhibited signs of unprofessionalism.
Site veteran Russ Walling recalled a number of dismissals including one climber who
was sent packing after showing graphic pictures of “some very expired humans” to
reporters for Playboy Magazine. Another climber lost his rescue site privileges after
overdosing on PCP and nearly dying before an ambulance evacuated him from Camp 4.
And it was “Paradise Lost for yet another Site member” after authorities discovered that
he had posed for pictures “in mock frozen form” alongside two deceased climbers whose
bodies had been recovered from the face of El Capitan.^^^
Law enforcement officials were called in on numerous occasions to handle complaints
from visitors, concessionaires, and rangers over the criminal behavior of some rescue site
employees. Rescue site climbers in this period were arrested for a myriad of offenses
including illegal camping, slashing tires, public intoxication, and even the cultivation of
marijuana in the dense, boulder-strewn forest behind Camp

In one instance a well-

known rescue site climber, who had previously been disciplined for public drunkenness,
was detained and charged with sexual harassment after numerous reports surfaced that he
had been harassing a female ranger over an extended period of time. The incident report
described the perpetrator’s actions in the Mountain Room Bar at the Yosemite Lodge -

YOSAR, “Rescue Site Guidelines - Draft 9/1/82,” September 1, 1982, YOSAR office files.
Walling, “Death Valley Days,” 50-51.
^ “Hugh” to Bob Howard, SAR Officer, re: “Standards o f SAR Site Personnel,” January 3, 1988,
YOSAR office files.
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including staring at the woman while licking his lips and making inappropriate gestures
involving a cactus plant - as behavior “contrary to the image that has been established by
the Chief Ranger for members of his division.”^^^
While the culture of the Camp 4 rescue site remained problematic for NPS
administrators, rarely did misbehavior, criminal or otherwise, interfere with the rescue
climbers’ stipulated responsibility to respond quickly and efficiently to accidents in the
park, particularly those involving other climbers. An incident on May 23, 1977
demonstrated to rescue site hires that, at the potential cost of their own lives and the lives
of others, the anarchistic, anti-establishment lifestyle of Camp 4 could not be allowed to
interfere with what had become a professional responsibility. At three in the morning,
rangers assembled a rescue team in Camp 4 to respond to two climbers calling for help
fi'om an easy climb near Upper Yosemite Falls. Jack Dorn, an experienced rescue site
climber (and among those who allegedly profited from the Dope Lake scheme), followed
the team up the well-worn Upper Yosemite Falls trail. In a moment of inattention,
possibly because he had been “listening to tunes on his portable tape cassette” or because
he “had partied too long” or “climbed too hard,” Dorn missed a turn on the trail and
stumbled over a cliff, falling six hundred feet to his death on the rocks below. Much like
Jim Madsen’s death nearly a decade earlier, the suddenness of Dorn’s accident shocked
Yosemite’s visitor protection staff. His death produced an atmosphere of consensus
among rangers and rescue climbers who agreed that a strict formalization of the
procedures YOSAR had innovated over the previous decade would be needed to maintain
a high standard of performance, especially as the number of emergencies requiring

Susan Clark, “Supplemental Criminal Incident Report,” October 21,1987, YOSAR office files.;
Bill Blake to “Files,” August 30, 1987, YOSAR office files.
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organized rescue continued to mount. In subsequent years, the countercultural cliques of
Camp 4 blended with the administrative pragmatism of the NPS to create a distinct SAR
culture in Yosemite that revolutionized rescue in the parks.
Three years after Jack Dorn’s accident. Search and Rescue Officer Tim Setnicka
completed Wilderness Search and Rescue, a detailed and often entertaining account of
the techniques, technologies, and procedures YOSAR had developed or adapted over the
previous decade. The work represented the culmination of the cultural and technical
evolution of visitor protection in Yosemite, becoming the “SAR bible” for mountain
rescue outfits around the nation for years to come.^^*^ With the release of Wilderness
Search and Rescue, YOSAR came of age; it became a professional organization,
coordinated through a web of cooperative arrangements with not only Camp 4 rock
climbers but also local law enforcement, medical technicians, helicopter pilots, and
military personnel. YOSAR’s full time staff of SAR experts and climbers including Pete
Thompson, Butch Farabee, Tim Setnicka, and former rescue site hire John Dill had both
the practiced expertise and the technological capabilities to respond to emergencies in
Yosemite’s diversity of terrains with a speed and efficiency unparalleled in any national
park. By the early 1980s, YOSAR’s depth of talent, technological sophistication, and
adaptability rivaled even the staid rescue outfits that had been operating in the European
Alps since the late nineteenth century.
In Wilderness Search and Rescue, Setnicka presented SAR as “a problem of
transportation” with the primary goal being “eliminating the victim’s isolation.

^ Farabee, Death, Daring, and Disaster, 341.
Tim Setnicka, Wilderness Search and Rescue (Boston: Appalachian Mountain Club, 1980), 34.
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Though grounded in a highly complex system of technical equipment and the specialized
knowledge of how to use it, Setnicka stressed that effective wilderness search and rescue
derived from the basic survival techniques that had governed travel in mountainous
regions since the beginning of human history. “This direct, modular approach,” he wrote,
“is a step back from the rush toward a vast quantity of technological wizardry that often
floods our lives with complicated systems for attaining rather simple goals.”^^^
Setnicka’s approach struck a balance between technology and wilderness use that
characterized cultural perceptions of appropriate recreation through this period. For the
Park Service, Setnicka’s technological imperative rationalized the blending of
preservation and use in administrative policy; his modular approach posited a pragmatic
means, as historian Leo Marx would argue, to seamlessly incorporate the “machine” of
modem technological search and rescue into Yosemite’s “garden” wilderness as
efficiently and inconspicuously as possible.^^^
Setnicka’s “soft path” for conducting SAR operations emphasized planning at the
local level. He maintained that search and rescue procedures should be directed by the
individuals most familiar with the terrain, weather conditions, and types of accidents
particular to the specified locale. In Yosemite, this meant that rangers and rock climbers
would continue to be the most qualified to determine how, when, and with what
technologies the park’s search and rescue apparatus should respond to any given
emergency. Though Setnicka insisted that SAR procedures should remain as simple as
possible, the YOSAR team had at its disposal the most sophisticated arsenal of rescue

^^Ibid., viii.
Leo Marx, The Machine in the Gar den: Technology and the Pastoral Ideal in America (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1964), 23.
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technologies ever assembled under one mountain search and rescue outfit. By the late
1970s, YOSAR was either equipped with or had access to a staggering array of rigging
systems, climbing devices, field medical equipment, communications systems, tracking
technologies, high-powered spotlights, transportation devices, swift water rescue gear,
and other emergency response paraphernalia. As emergencies became more prevalent,
Yosemite’s localized outfit could call on an expanding regional network of military
installations and volunteer rescue groups to provide additional resources for visitor
protection needs in the park. This coordinated effort, which Setnicka explained as “a
highly regionalized response to growing local problems,” became the hallmark of modem
wildemess search and rescue in the national parks.
Helicopters brought the most significant changes to Yosemite’s search and rescue
network. From the mid-1960s until 2004, the NPS maintained a working relationship
with a rescue outfit at Lemoore Naval Air Station about thirty miles south of Fresno.
Through the 1960s, the Navy employed a handful of UH-34 “Seahorse” crafts which had
considerable difficulty operating at high elevations. These small airships were typically
too dangerous for use in high mountain rescues. However, in 1970, Lemoore transitioned
to the HH-IN “Huey” which could operate at altitudes up to 15,000 feet. In subsequent
years, YOSAR developed personal relationships with a number of Lemoore pilots, most
of whom veterans of the Vietnam conflict. The Lemoore “Rescue Angels” participated in
at least 950 SAR operations throughout the Sierra Nevada range including hundreds of

^ Setnicka, Wildemess Search and Rescue, 29.
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missions in Yosemite and Sequoia-Kings Canyon National Parks before the Navy
terminated the helicopter response unit in 2004/^^
Lemoore’s airships could be used to search vast areas for lost hikers, covering more
ground at a much faster rate than searchers on foot or horseback. Helicopters could
extract an injured person from an isolated location and transport him or her to a medical
facility, often within minutes. Chopper pilots could rapidly shuttle additional rescuers
and supplies to remote locales to supplement the efforts of ground crews. Helicopters
also became critical tools in performing difficult climbing rescues. In the mid-1970s,
rescue pilots at Lemoore devised a helicopter rescue technique known as “cliff evolution”
which allowed YOSAR an efficient but risky option for pulling critically injured climbers
from high on Yosemite’s big walls. The technique involved lowering a rescuer from the
helicopter as the pilot hovered in a fixed position, often dangerously close to the cliff face.
Dangling below, the rescuer would work to secure the victim to his or her own harness
after which the pilot would transport both the victim and the rescuer, still suspended
beneath the craft, to a safe landing zone.^^^
Lemoore crews employed this technique for the first time in May of 1978 after a
climber suffered severe head trauma in a fall from a difficult big wall route on Quarter
Dome near Half Dome. YOSAR immediately called in Lemoore pilots John Sullivan and
Don Swain to assist in the evacuation. The rescue crew, which included YOSAR
permanent staff, park rangers, rescue site climbers, and the Lemoore pilots, concluded
that a standard cliff rescue, in which a team of climbers would be lowered from the

Michael P. Ghiglieri and Charles R. “Butch” Farabee, Jr., Off the Wall: Death in Yosemite
(Flagstaff; Puma Press, 2007), 322.
Setnicka, Wilderness Search and Rescue, 396.
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summit to immobilize then raise the injured climber, would take too long since darkness
threatened to delay the evacuation until the next morning. So, Butch Farabee, Yosemite’s
search and rescue officer at the time, gave the Lemoore crew permission to attempt the
difficult cliff evolution before nightfall.
Within minutes Sullivan and Swain found a position from which they could hover
while Crew Chief Benny Revels prepared to be lowered three hundred feet from the
helicopter to the injured climber. Revels backed out of the craft and immediately began
spinning in space as another crewman carefully lowered him into position. Meanwhile,
Sullivan eased the whirling rotary blades to within six feet of the granite wall, where he
maintained his hover while Revels struggled to secure the semi-conscious victim.
Setnicka described the anxious moments that followed: “Sullivan could feel the sweat
running down the inside of his flight suite. After twenty minutes of hovering, he felt his
arms and back tense up fi'om the tension of constantly working the controls.” Revels had
difficulties of his own. After several moments of “twisting around” trying to reach the
rock, he finally managed to clip the injured climber’s harness to his own and cut the
ropes attaching them to the wall. “The victim was barely conscious and kept sporadically
fighting him,” Setnicka wrote, “Continuous bleeding all over Revel’s hands made it
difficult to determine what his injuries were.” Finally, rescuer and victim swung free
from the wall; Sullivan deftly anticipated the redirection of weight and five minutes later.
Revels and the injured climber settled down in Ahwahnee Meadows. An ambulance
rushed the victim to a local clinic where doctors prepared him to be transported to a
hospital outside the park for “immediate surgery to relive the pressure on his brain.” The
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entire mission took less than an hour and if not for the speed and proficiency of the
Lemoore crew the victim would not have survived/^^
Despite the obvious utility of helicopters, Setnicka stressed that it would be a mistake
to consider air evacuations a panacea for all search and rescue operations. Helicopters
were to be considered one of many components of an overall SAR plan; without a “Plan
B,” he argued, an effective rescue outfit would be severely limited in its ability to deal
with intangibles and effectively carry-out “each phase of the rescue operation.”
Helicopters were fallible technologies, subject to mechanical breakdowns or pilot error
and ineffective in poor weather conditions or darkness. During a body recovery on June
15, 1975, for instance, a Lemoore Huey stalled while lifting off. The chopper pitched left
and the rotary blades chopped into a live oak tree before the skids hit and the entire craft
rolled down a rocky slope. The crew managed to escape, but soon after, the wreckage
burst into flames, charring the victim’s remains and burning the $1.2 million airship to a
pile of twisted metal and ash.^^* Considering this event, Setnicka concluded: “We
therefore want to stay helicopter independent in SAR planning and thinking, in spite of
the seductiveness of constant reliance on helo support.”^^^
Setnicka further argued that basic backcountry skills and rock climbing techniques
remained the foundational components of SAR operations in Yosemite. His elaboration
on a modular SAR structure established the model used in subsequent decades by rescue
organizations in wildemess destinations around the globe. “By relying on conventional

Ibid., 397-396.
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equipment,” contributing editor Kenneth Andrasko wrote, “the Yosemite SAR crew has a
vast manpower pool available in the climbers that frequent the Valley. Training of
support personnel is minimized, and roles become fairly interchangeable.”^'^® This
structured approach allowed YOSAR to adapt technologies and procedures to what John
Dill called a “matrix” of emergency scenarios.^'^* By coordinating missions based on the
judgment and skill of the individuals most attuned to wildemess travel, YOSAR could
adjust techniques to the particular combinations of terrain, season, weather, medical
necessity, and type of emergency that each search, rescue, or recovery operation involved.
Yet, even as administrators gradually resolved the cultural conflicts that marred the
professionalization of YOSAR through the 1970s, a host of new administrative concems
related to the high costs of rescue, the legal liability of the NPS, and the philosophical
function of search and rescue changed the way in which visitors to Yosemite engaged in
their respective wildemess experiences.

^ Andrasko, “Editor’s note,” in Setnicka, Wildemess Search and Rescue, vi.
The concept o f a SAR “matrix” comes from a conversation with John Dill, March 2007.
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CHAPTER 4

WHO PAYS?
On July 19, 1978, Susan Cunningham, eight months pregnant with her first child,
reported to rangers that her husband David Cunningham had failed to return from a three
day solo backpack trip along the Illiouette Creek drainage in the southwest comer of the
park. The couple had been camped at Bridalveil Campground when Cunningham
decided to embark on his spontaneous excursion. Before departing from Glacier Point,
Cunningham informed his wife that he would meet her three days later at Housekeeping
Camp - he never arrived. On the aftemoon of the nineteenth, as Butch Farabee and
Michael Ghiglieri detail, Susan Cunningham’s “imagination painted mishap after
potential mishap that may have left her husband stranded somewhere off-trail and injured,
perhaps trapped, and now desperately in need of rescue.”^''^ Cunningham worriedly
explained to ranger Craig Stewart that on July 15 she had driven her husband to the
trailhead and watched him depart down the Illiouette Trail at approximately 9:00 a.m.
Ranger Stewart determined that since David Cunningham was more than twenty four
hours overdue, a search was warranted. The next moming, rangers Mead Hargis and Pete
Hart conducted a two-hour helicopter search of the area. Finding no clues, YOSAR

Michael P. Ghiglieri and Charles R. “Butch” Farabee, Jr., O ff the Wall: Death in Yosemite
(Flagstaff: Puma Press, 2007), 445.
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initiated what would become the most extensive, frustrating, and expensive search
operation conducted to date in Yosemite.^'*®
Searches for lost or overdue hikers have historically cost the National Park Service
more money, time, and effort than any other SAR o p e r a tio n s W h ile big wall climbing
rescues typically involved extreme levels of technical difficulty and risk, backcountry
searches frequently required hundreds of searchers, complex investigative work, and
thousands of hours of billable time for rescue workers and contract helicopters. As such,
large-scale searches, in addition to climbing rescues, have been instrumental in initiating
administrative dialogue over the organization, planning, and especially the funding of
SAR procedures in Yosemite. The search for David Cunningham, though unusual in its
outcome, highlighted the administrative challenges the Park Service faced in continuing
to maintain a technologically proficient, professional search and rescue apparatus
provided free of charge to the visiting public.
YOSAR operators began their full scale search for Cunningham on the moming of
July 21. For six hours, rangers combed the Illiouette Creek drainage by helicopter,
finding nothing. YOSAR also dispatched a horse patrol to search the area and interview
“all persons encountered along the trails Cunningham would have walked on.” Again, no
leads surfaced. That same moming, contract pilots choppered a pair of professional
trackers to the remote area on the north side of Red Peak where they followed a single
hiker’s boot trail along a creek bed until it ended at the Merced River. Later,

Tim Setnicka, “Yosemite Seareh and Rescue Ineident Report,” August 1978, YOSE SAR files,
1978
Ghiglieri and Farabee cite numerous examples o f expensive searches oecurring after the
Cunningham incident ineluding a 1981 seareh for Timothy John Barnes which cost $178,501 and a 2005
search for Michael Fieery which cost the Park Service an astounding $452,000. Ghiglieri and Farabee,
Death in Yosemite, 467.
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investigators determined that the boot track did not match the star-shaped pattern of
Cunningham’s size ten-and-a-half Lowa Scouts. Thus, while rangers considered the find
“a good clue” (in fact it remained the only clue anyone uncovered that day), it led
nowhere. On the twenty fourth, search parties convened to conduct additional searches
of the area. Searchers followed boot tracks and traversed creek drainages looking for any
signs of Cunningham’s passing but found none.^'^^
On the twenty eighth, John Dill began contacting by telephone all the backcountry
permit holders that had been hiking in the area on the dates when David Cunningham
went missing. Interestingly, a few permit holders had seen someone fitting that
description, but these sightings seemed to have all occurred in the immediate vicinity of
the trailhead. Apparently Cunningham did not make it very far. Armed with this new
information. Butch Farabee, as mission coordinator, determined that the search should be
reconvened. On July 30, Farabee requested the assistance of the Sierra Madre Search and
Rescue team from Southern California and the Explorers SAR group from the San
Francisco Bay area. The following day, twenty additional searchers arrived in Yosemite
firom these organizations, joining teams of rangers, climbers, law enforcement, and local
volunteers to again traverse the entire southwestern quadrant of the park. Searchers
uncovered some provocative clues. In one instance, a search party discovered an
abandoned tent that had purportedly been in the same position for several days. Inside
they found nothing but a single playing card, a Joker. The tent did not match the
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description of the tent Cunningham had been carrying but the find sparked excitement
and wild speculation among searchers?'^®
The case finally broke on the aftemoon of August 1. On that day, a friend of
Cunningham’s received a postcard mailed from Bangor, Maine. The card was penned in
what appeared to be David Cunningham’s handwriting. That aftemoon, John Dill spoke
with Cunningham’s father who confirmed that his son indeed had contacted him by
telephone earlier that moming. It was clear, as one rescuer declared, “our pigeon had
flown the coop.” Dill and Farabee called off the massive search that night and YOSAR
investigators immediately began the task of piecing together the unusual chain of events
that spurred this “most elusive mission.”^'^^
From an interview with Susan Cunningham on August 12, Tim Setnicka concluded
that David had staged his backpacking trip in order to leave his wife. Susan explained
that they had been dealing with marital problems in the months leading up to the
Yosemite trip and that David probably “had leaving on his mind prior to taking the
backpacking trip.” The next day, Setnicka reached David Cunningham by telephone.
After being read his Miranda rights, David agreed to recount his actions leading up to and
during his flight from marital commitment. He explained that not long after leaving the
Glacier Point parking lot he began feeling ill and decided to retum to the Valley. He
hiked back by the Pohono Trail on July 16 and stayed one night in Camp 4, without
attempting to contact his wife or anyone else. The next moming he purchased a thirtyday “anywhere in the U.S.” Greyhound bus ticket and spent two weeks traveling “from

Setnicka, “Incident Report;” Information also from the attached report filed by Explorer Search and
Rescue (ESAR), “Mission # 50,” August 1978.

^^ESAR, “Mission #50.”
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Merced to Sacramento to Reno to Omaha to Minneapolis to Green Bay to Chicago to
New York to Boston to Acadia National Park to Bangor, Maine to Great Smokey
Mountains National Park and [back] to Maine where he got sick and decided to retum
home.” Not until meeting with friends in Santa Barbara on August 2, Cunningham
claimed, did he leam that park officials had been conducting a massive search operation
for him. He told Setnicka that he knew that park officials routinely conducted searches
but felt, as he stated, “I thought my wife would know why I left... We did talk about how
unstable our relationship was.”^'*^ Setnicka analyzed Cunningham’s behavior,
emphasizing the unprecedented cost it incurred:

The cost to the National Park Service.. .was over $20,000.00 with thousands of paid
hours spent on the operation. Over 75 sorties were flown into the backcountry with the
Park helicopter. Hundreds of hours were spent walking around and flying in the
helicopter by all rescue personnel. Every government employee is required to be
compensated for this extra hazard by a 25% increase in their hourly wage... Hundreds
of hours were also spent walking and riding by horse in the search areas which includes
steep snow fields, wild rivers and sheer, steep rock faces and spending nights in the
wildemess. Safety is the prime consideration for searches by the operations leader and
some areas could only be searched by technical climbers or by helicopter... The
physical hazards that his actions exposed the searchers to were totally unnecessary and
Cunningham created these conditions with no legitimate purpose.^'^^

In September of 1978, The United States District Court charged Cunningham with the
only violation park authorities could use to recover the costs incurred during the
unnecessary search: namely, his creation of a “hazardous condition” for rescuers. The
federal code stated specifically that an individual could be charged and found guilty if
prosecutors could prove that he or she “create[d] a hazardous or physically offensive

^ Setnicka, “Incident Report,” August 1978.
^ 'Ibid.
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condition by any act which serves no legitimate purpose of the actor, to wit: cause[d] a
hazardous search and rescue operation to be undertaken without just cause or reason.”^^®
Unfortunately for park authorities, the maximum penalty for a guilty verdict under this
violation was a disappointing fee of only five hundred dollars, hardly enough to make up
for the $21,379 that the NPS had incurred over the course of the search. Through this
period of continually mounting SAR incidents, the legal precedents determining the
National Park Service’s ability - or inability - to collect search and rescue costs became
an increasingly paramount concern for administrators responsible for coordinating visitor
protection operations in Yosemite.
In this period, searches for lost backpackers, helicopter rescues of climbers stranded
on big walls, recoveries of the bodies of accident victims, and other SAR operations
became progressively more expensive, costing the National Park Service (and hence tax
payers) upwards of $400,000 annually by the late 1980s.^^* In response, many local
media outlets, rescuers, federal agencies, and environmentalists argued that since most
accidents resulted from poor judgment on the part of inexperienced (or incompetent)
visitors, the high cost of rescue should not be the sole responsibility of the Park Service
but should be covered partially by victims upon assessment of their individual negligence.
Some wilderness advocates even suggested the dissolution of professional rescue
altogether, arguing that the promise of free rescue sanitized the psychological effect of an
appropriate, self-sufficient wilderness experience, giving visitors a false sense of security

^ Donald W. Pitts, “United States o f America v. David Andrew Cunningham,” Complaint heard
before the United States District Court for the Eastern District o f California, August 1, 1978, this document
as well as a copy o f a later summons is filed with Setnicka’s incident report.
Western Regional Office, “Search and Rescue Summary - Western Region,” 1985, YOSAR office
files.; Jim Reilly to All Concerned, re: “ 1984 SAR Statistics,” February 3, 1985. YOSAR office files.
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and encouraging irresponsible recreational habits. While park officials could not
logically, or legally, disband YOSAR and continue to support potentially hazardous
forms of recreation, debates over the high cost of search and rescue highlighted the
philosophical, technological, and administrative imperatives shaping cultural perceptions
of wilderness recreation in the national parks.
Prior to the 1960s, the cost of search and rescue remained insignificant. SAR
operations were few and far between and most could be carried out without the need for
expenditures beyond ordinary ranger payroll. A 1926 addendum to the Organic Act had
established the National Park Service’s authority to perform search and rescue services,
stipulating that “The Secretary of the Interior is authorized to aide and assist visitors
within the national parks...in emergencies.” The legislation also indicated that the service
would absorb the costs of food and supplies accrued in search and rescue operations, a
policy that remained in effect through the 1970s.^^^ As the number of complex
emergencies increased through this period, forcing administrators to implement extensive
training programs, incorporate helicopters and other new technologies, and begin
employing highly experienced specialists to perform SAR missions, costs spiked
considerably. As early as 1966, Park Service officials began expressing concern over
mounting SAR costs, particularly those related to the use of helicopters. In cases where
helicopter costs were high, NPS Director George Hartzog concluded: “Considering the
sensitive nature of judgment regarding payment of costs by persons rescued,” the Park
Service would continue footing the bill for visitor proteetion. Hartzog’s system-wide
policy statement urged the following:
Quoted in Krystal Jackson, Expenses o f Search and Rescue Service in the National Parks: An
Overview and Examination o f issues o f Charging Visitors (master’s thesis: Central Washington University,
2000), 44.
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In emergent seareh situations, ground control forces may be deployed and assisted by
aircraft. In rescue operations where prompt action is necessary to save a life or avoid
more serious injury, available helicopters as well as any other means at the
Superintendent’s disposal will be utilized. All expenditures necessary to effect the
above will be absorbed by the M&P appropriation.^^^

The M&P appropriation, a regional fund covering emergency maintenance costs or
fire related expenses, remained a limited financial resource. As such, the director
stipulated that park superintendents “encourage all reasonable methods for cutting costs.”
Edward Hummel, the regional director for the western region conveyed this request to the
superintendents in Yosemite and Sequoia-Kings Canyon National Parks, recommending
that park administrators encourage “voluntary payment” of SAR costs by relatives or
friends of victims as a means to reduce the financial burden of visitor protection.^^"^ In
April of 1967, Yosemite Superintendent John Davis issued a memorandum of agreement.
Davis described the hourly flight rate of ninety dollars specified in the park’s newly
minted contract with a private helicopter service as a “substantial sum.” The
Superintendent indicated that in the previous year, search and rescue forces logged
approximately thirty five hours of flight time, constituting a “very costly function” of
management. Davis rightly predicted that “with yearly increases in park visitation, the
number to be rescued will likewise increase.”^^^

Edward Kenner, Acting Assistant Director to Regional Director, Western Region, re: “Charges for
helicopter use in search and rescue,” September 9, 1966, YOSAR office files.
Edward Hummel, Regional Director, Western Region to Superintendents, Yosemite and Sequoia
and Kings Canyon, re: “Helicopter Search and Rescue,” September 13, 1966, YOSAR office files.
John Davis, Superintendent, Yosemite to Regional Director, Western Region, re: “Funds helicopter rescue and evacuation,” April 27, 1967, YOSAR office files.
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With no legal means to enforce collection of SAR costs, regardless of the victim’s
culpability, Davis suggested that park authorities inform rescuees, their families, or their
guide services that they “would be expected to assume the cost of the helicopter
services.” Of course, if the rescuee, their family, or their outing sponsor refused, the
National Park Service would be forced to pay the cost. Such a policy had obvious
problems. For one, administrators would likely face legal consequences if they failed to
inform the parties involved that they were not legally required to assume costs. Second,
that a rescuee or guide service would reward the park’s rescue force with voluntarily
repayment remained an unlikely possibility. Even insurance companies typically refused
to cover costs since the National Park Service had no clear legal authority to abdicate
financial resp o n sib ility N ev erth eless, Director Hummel supported Davis’s policy of
voluntary collections and authorized the superintendent to pursue this cost-cutting
measure, however ineffective it proved to be.^^’
In 1972, the problems of funding helicopter rescues in Yosemite became acute. The
previous year, the costs for conducting SAR missions reached more than $20,000, far
exceeding the maximum of $6,500 that administrators had been able to draw from the
M&P appropriation since 1966. To make things worse, the regional contingency funds
for 1971 had been entirely used up before YOSAR officials were able to seek
reimbursement of that year’s search and rescue expenses. “The ‘pot of gold’ dried up,”
Chief Ranger Jack Morehead explained to his protection staff, “we were told by Region

^ Ibid; Davis cites an instance in which an insurance company was considering reimbursing
helicopter costs o f 1,500 dollars on a rescue from Mount Whitney. Such cases proved to be a rarity and it
is unclear whether Sequoia Kings Canyon officials were able to collect on this particular incident.
R.B. Moore, Assistant Regional Director, Operations, Western Region to Superintendents, Sequoia
and Kings Canyon, Yosemite, re: “Funding o f helicopter rescue missions,” May 4, 1967, YOSAR office
files.
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that no contingency funds were available.” The entire $20,000, a heretofore
unprecedented annual SAR bill, had to be cut from already financially burdened seasonal
services within the park. “This hurts!” Morehead exclaimed. He furthered cautioned
rangers that he “had no idea” whether any contingency funds would be available for the
current year, SAR costs for which already showed signs of exceeding the previous year’s.
“With the extra money being spent on the Yellowstone Centennial and the Tetons World
Conference of National Parks,” Morehead wrote, “I personally doubt if our chances for
receiving any rescue money are very good.”^^*
For Morehead, costs could only be reduced by streamlining emergency response
procedures and limiting YOSAR’s reliance on expensive helicopters. The chief ranger
determined that on at least six of the thirteen total missions that year involving a
helicopter, ground crews could have adequately carried out the operation. These
instances involved evacuations of victims with minor injuries or illnesses including
constipation, the flu, and relatively insignificant cuts. Also, two helicopter searches were
conducted “for persons when the specific location or description was not known.” While
acknowledging that rangers did not always have the time or the manpower to fully
evaluate a situation before taking action - as in the numerous cases that season of boy
scouts reportedly suffering from appendicitis in the backcountry - Morehead encouraged
rangers to “research every call for a helicopter as thoroughly as possible” and clear any
requests for air support through Pete Thompson or the chief ranger’s office. As costs
continued to mount, it became clear to Morehead and other park authorities that since

Jack Morehead, Chief Ranger to All Permanent Rangers and Seasonals responsible for search and
rescue missions, re: “Helicopters,” August 25,1972, YOSAR office files.
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search and rescue remained an indispensable administrative funetion, means of
recovering costs from victims would have to be thoroughly considered and perhaps
implemented, particularly if the Park Service or the Department of Interior could not be
relied upon to reimburse SAR expenses/^^
The Interior and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of 1972 eased some of
Morehead’s eoncem by giving the NPS authority to use Department of Interior funds to
“cover the unbudgeted costs of emergency and other unforeseen law enforcement
situations in the National Park system.” Yet, in effect, the act only formalized the
regional contingency fund that had already been informally tapped for this purpose for at
least the past decade; it was not clear to anyone in Yosemite or the regional office that
additional funds would be made available or that the numerous annual system-wide
demands for the funding of road improvements, fire fighting, unanticipated law
enforcement incidents, and other “emergency” projects would not drain the appropriation
before rescue costs could be covered.^^*’
In preparation for future crises, Morehead and Pete Thompson began exploring a
number of alternative possibilities for the collection of search and rescue costs. John
Taylor, secretary of the American Alpine Club, suggested implementing a rescue
insuranee program in which individuals could purchase policies either through
mountaineering organizations or while registering for roek climbs or backcountry
permits.^^’ Taylor cited correspondence from AAC member David Bidwell, who had
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Wildland Fire in the National Parks (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 90-92.
John Taylor to Pete Thompson, undated, YOSAR office files.

148

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

been living in Switzerland for several years, indicating that in Europe, mountaineers
could purchase accident insurance from nationwide institutions for fifty to sixty five
dollars per year. Such policies, Bidwell explained, usually covered nearly one hundred
percent of search, rescue, and recovery c o s t s . T h o m p s o n expressed interest in
pursuing such a policy but concluded that due to the particular structure of the NPS,
accident insurance would probably not be feasible. “If a private organization somehow
had the rescue responsibility in the parks the insurance approach would work,”
Thompson wrote to Taylor, “but.. .to put such a scheme into effect now would mean two
very large waivers, both presumably from Congress. As a simpleminded mountaineer I
shudder at the prospect of wrestling with that one!”^^^
In February of 1974, a group of park superintendents, chief rangers, and National
Park Service officials met at the Albright Ranger Training Facility in Grand Canyon
National Park to discuss mounting search and rescue challenges in the nation’s parks.
The problem of increasing costs occupied center stage in debates. The “task force”
ultimately determined what Jack Morehead had learned two years earlier, that regional
funds set aside for all emergency situations were not reliable in covering SAR costs.
There were simply too many hands in the pot. As a solution, the committee
recommended setting up a separate regional account, similar to fire suppression and
certain law enforcement funds, to support “our highest priority management
responsibility - saving human life.” Addressing Morehead’s dilemma, the task force
concluded: “Area supervisors and park managers should not be placed in a position of

^ David Bidwell to John Taylor, October 19, 1972, YOSAR office files.
Pete Thompson to John Taylor, July 1, 1973, YOSAR office files.
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having to make the decision to exert an all-out effort during a potential life-saving
activity, knowing that when they do so, they are faced with the possibility of having to
operate their area below standard later in the fiscal year.”^^"*
Even with a separate SAR account, costs escalated at an alarming rate. By July of
1974, SAR expenses for that fiscal year had exceeded $100,000 for 121 missions
including more that $69,000 for the use of helicopters from Lemoore Naval Air Station.
YOSAR operators became understandably worried that their newly activated funds would
quickly dry up. In response, SAR Officer Anthony Anderson suggested that simple air
evacuations involving the park’s contract helicopter should be billed to the evacuee.
Anderson reasoned that since the contract helicopter was “essentially a commercial
ambulance service,” victims could be charged for its use as they would be in any urban
medical emergency when a ground ambulance was required. Maintaining a distinction
between simple evacuations and technical SAR activities, Anderson wrote: “Though
Yosemite National Park traditionally has paid for SAR expense, there is no reason why if
should also pay for the ambulance service.” He calculated that of the 65.2 hours of
contract helicopter use that fiscal year, only 14.3 hours (equaling $1,856 out of total of
$8,476) were accrued in “technical support.” Anderson pointed out that Sequoia-Kings
Canyon National Park had been successful in collecting approximately fifty percent of its
air evacuation fees over the past year and argued that “perhaps this should be a Regional
decision for all parks utilizing contract helicopters.”^®^

J.W. Wade, “Search and Rescue Task Force Meeting,” February, 1974, YOSAR office files.
^ Anthony Anderson to Chief Ranger, re: “Payment for use o f contract helicopter service by park
visitors,” July 18,1974, YOSAR office files.

150

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Anderson’s primary concern revolved around the issue of individual responsibility in
the backcountry. Since most SAR expenses were incurred due to the poor judgment or
inexperience of the victim, many rescuers and administrators began to question the value
of free rescue. Frustrated with the contradictions embedded in the emerging culture of
wilderness recreation, Anderson wrote, “The philosophy of today tends toward the
resentment of the bureaucracy and the ‘Big Brother’ attitude. Along with this should be
the acceptance of consequences of the individual’s decisions and actions, which include
paying for a helicopter when it is needed.” He concluded that in many instances the park
helicopter had been used to evacuate victims who either suffered from minor injuries
which probably did not necessitate an air evacuation or who were “not really sick or
injured.” Referring to a group of handicapped boy scouts that had encountered problems
while camping in the backcountry, he further indicated that “the charge might discourage
some visitors from over extending themselves, especially if they have physical
disabilities.”^®® Anderson suggested that before YOSAR dispatched a helicopter, the
victim or the person reporting the accident should be required to sign an agreement
indicating their obligation to pay for the evacuation. Chief Ranger Charles Wendt agreed
with Anderson’s conclusions, writing to the park superintendent that “the deterrent effect
of this program is something that we cannot express in dollars and cents... We hope this
will place more responsibility on the individual citizen. ”^®^ This concern, that the
promise of free rescue inspired wilderness users to take greater risks without adequate

^ Ibid.
Charles W. Wendt to Superintendent, re: “Payment for ambulance use o f helicopter,” July 22,1974,
YOSAR office files.
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preparation, became the crux of subsequent debates over the philosophical implications
of free search and rescue in Yosemite.
Yet the questionable legality of charging victims for air evacuations rendered this
program short-lived. “There is one basic test that must be applied to all proposals to
establish a reimbursable operation and credit collections to an appropriation,” cautioned a
legal advisor for the western regional office, “You must be prepared to cite the legal
authority for such action.” As it stood, neither Yosemite nor the NPS had any clear legal
grounds to demand repayment, regardless of the victim’s culpability in causing his or her
own emergency. In response to YOSAR’s decision, the regional office concluded that
“the desirability of a reimbursable activity, no matter how compelling, cannot negate the
fact that reimbursement authority has not been granted.”^®* As of February 6, 1975,
Yosemite’s Assistant Superintendent discontinued the practice, stating, “In the future I
don’t think we should bill any users until we have developed a Park policy on the matter
and had it approved by the Field Solicitor.”^®^
To date, the park had billed at least thirteen evacuees and collected approximately
$900 out of total $2,626 charged. These instances ran the gamut of SAR scenarios. In
one case a scout on a handicapped boy scout outing broke his shoulder and ruptured his
spleen while scrambling over rocks; other rescuees suffered injuries ranging fi-om a
twisted back to a dislocated shoulder to a broken big toe; two teenagers experienced
ruptured appendixes in the backcountry; and one backpacker had to be evacuated after

Associate Regional Director, Administration, WR to Superintendent, Yosemite National Park, re:
“Reimbursable Accounts,” January 31, 1975, YOSAR office files; Also see attached tally o f helicopter
evacuations, including the amount billed, the amount collected, and injuries sustained for each instance.
^ Assistant Superintendent to Chief Ranger, re: “Helicopter Services,” February 6,1975, YOSAR
office files.
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loosing his vision due to “possible botulism or anaphylactic shock.” In response to the
uncertain legal ramifications of pursuing collections from these victims, Superintendent
Amberger issued a request to the regional office to cancel an outstanding balance of
$1,500. “It has been administratively determined that the bills were made in error,” his
memorandum read, “They were emergency evacuations for injured park visitors and were
erroneously billed into a reimbursable account.”^’®
The debacle over charging for helicopter evacuations prompted the Regional Office
to immediately prepare a policy statement outlining the NFS’s legal responsibility for the
performance and funding of search and rescue operations. The document clearly detailed
the extent of the NPS obligation:

The National Park Service has a moral and a legal responsibility for the welfare of
visitors... The National Park Service will assume the responsibility for determining the
whereabouts of visitors who are reported to be lost and for rendering assistance, if
required, for their return to a point of safety. Any visitor who becomes injured to the
extent that transportation is required will be provided such transportation by the
National Park Service. Emergency Transportation will be provided only from the point
of injury to the nearest facility where professional medical services are available... No
charges will be assessed for such transportation and no efforts will be made to collect
any costs incidental to such transportation.^^*

The determination that the National Park Service would continue to pay for helicopter
transportation did not end debates over the high cost of rescue. In fact, the decision
vaulted the issue into the public arena, sparking heated arguments among wilderness
supporters, national media outlets, and local taxpayers over the moral and financial

Superintendent, Yosemite to Regional Director, Western Region, re: “Cancellation o f Bills for
Collection,” undated, YOSAR office files.
United States Department o f the Interior, National Park Service, Western Region, “Western Region
Policy Statement: Search and Rescue and Emergency Transportation,” September 26, 1975, YOSAR office
files.

153

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

implications of maintaining a professional search and rescue infrastructure in Yosemite
and other popular wilderness destinations. In an era of rising conservatism in which
environmentalism, wilderness, and the spending of federal dollars faced renewed attacks,
rescue costs became central to debates of NPS policy. Citing a 1976 rescue of six
elimbers who had been stranded in winter weather on the summit of Half Dome after they
“ignored warnings of possible storms,” an editor for the Fresno Bee questioned the NPS
policy of using tax dollars to pay for rescues in which the “rescued were victims of their
own stupidity or carelessness.” The Half Dome rescue cost the park nearly $10,000, an
amount that ultimately came from public coffers. “These are hard lumps for the average
taxpayer to swallow,” the author concluded. While federal, state, and local rescue
organizations including the Coast Guard, the Humane Society, and other public service
agencies had historically assumed the costs for emergency response in urban or maritime
environments, the mounting frequeney of expensive rescues in the mountains of
California and the media coverage they received inspired a sense of urgency among
taxpayers. Interestingly, mounting SAR costs produced an unlikely political consensus.
Reports of expensive rescues fhistrated not only conservatives but also many wilderness
enthusiasts who felt that through free rescue the NPS encouraged inexperieneed tourists
to engage in irresponsible behaviors in the backcountry.^^^
A number of prominent wilderness advocacy groups expressed concern that by
providing a rescue service, the Park Service actually compromised the wilderness
experience sought by the most active and experienced visitors. In March of 1976, the
University of Oregon Outdoor Program hosted a conference titled “Wilderness and

Verne H. Cole, “Commentary, Search and Rescue,” The Fresno Bee (February 26, 1976): A19.
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Individual Freedom” to address a number of questions including: “Is individual freedom
in the wilderness equivalent to minimization of management?” And, “What elements of
a quality wilderness experience are essential freedoms?”^^^ The particular phrasing of
these questions illustrated a pervasive tendency in 1970s environmental culture to
associate individual freedom of expression with social responsibility through the
preservation of wilderness, a perspective that further cemented the interrelatedness of
recreation and preservation in the public imagination?’"* The conference attracted a
surprising number of prominent wilderness advocates including world-renowned climber
Willy Unsoeld, Sierra Club lobbyist Brock Evans, the revered “arch-druid” of
conservation David Brower, and even Edward Abbey, the petulant critic who in 1968 had
challenged the NPS to “Let them take risks, for Godsake, let them get lost, sunburnt,
stranded, drowned, eaten by bears, buried alive under avalanches - that is the right and
privilege of any free American.” For Abbey, the psychological effect of entering an
undeveloped area with the knowledge that rescue would be all but impossible if a mishap
occurred defined the ideal wilderness experience.^’®
Given Abbey’s influence, the conference attendees agreed that the promise of free
rescue in wilderness areas should be scaled back. “Past governmental policies and
practices of providing Search and Rescue operations have decreased the authenticity of
the wilderness experienee by discouraging self-reliance,” the conference’s statement on

Darvel T. Lloyd, AAC Conservation Committee, “Wilderness and Individual Freedoms
Conference,” March 9, 1976, YOSAR office files.
Hal K. Rothman, Saving the Planet: The American Response to the Environment in the Twentieth
Century (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2000), 7.
Edward Abbey, D esert Solitaire: A Season in the Wilderness (New York: McGraw Hill, 1968), 5556.
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rescue policy declared, adding: “Such policies have also increased use impact by
encouraging the inexperienced to attempt performances beyond their ability.” The
conference committee recommended that the NPS and other government agencies “cease
to maintain” caches of rescue technologies and cancel appropriations for the funding of
SAR operations and the wages of emergency hire rescue personnel. Search and rescue
missions should be conducted only by volunteers, the committee argued, with the purpose
of placing the “financial responsibility” of rescue on the wilderness user and not on
government agencies, taxpayers, or other park users. As an attack on the democratization
of wilderness recreation, the “individual freedom” to engage in wilderness-oriented
activities, as outlined by the conference attendees, remained accessible only to an elite
few with the physical capabilities, the specific philosophical proclivities, and the
technical know-how to assume the high level of risk implicit in this particular conception
of an appropriate wilderness experience. This seemingly contradictory notion of the
meaning of individual freedom actually made sense since the idea of wilderness, while
dependent on the support of the masses, was ultimately conceived of and advertised by an
elite group of outdoor enthusiasts, including Edward Abbey and his cohorts, who fought
hard to protect their claim to appropriate recreation.” ®
Interestingly, administrators generally agreed that free rescue contributed to
irresponsible recreational habits, though their concerns were far more pragmatic and
political than philosophical. Moreover, the Park Service had neither the authority nor the
inclination to judge preemptively the relative self-reliance and responsibility of individual
wilderness users. Park officials did not wish to scale back access in order to avoid rescue

Lloyd, “Wilderness and Individual Freedoms Conference,” March 9, 1976.
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costs; instead administrators sought means to recover costs after the fact by establishing,
through legal channels, the negligence of rescuees. In 1976, YOSAR carried out 124
SAR missions, more than double the total operations from only seven years earlier, and at
a cost to the NPS in excess of $100,000. Already faced with a drastically insufficient
annual SAR budget of $70,000 (still up from only $6,500 just ten years before), Yosemite
Superintendent Amberger predicted that “the end is not in sight.” In his estimation, costs
would continue to rise and the park’s response eapabilities would invariably require
“special legal attention,” specifically, a legislated means to reeover costs from negligent
victims. “The National Park Service is burdened with the one-sided responsibility of not
being able to regulate climbers or wilderness users who are incompetent from pursuing
park aetivities,” Amberger wrote: “However, we must be totally responsible for rescuing
or looking for them when they get in over their heads.” The Superintendent suggested a
system-wide policy change authorizing the NPS to collect rescue costs from “any person
who negligently plaees himself [or herself] in such a position as to request assistanee,
rescue, or any other type of help.”” ’
In Amberger’s view, the recommendations of the Wilderness and Individual
Freedoms conference seemed unrealistic, over-simplified, and ultimately self-defeating.
Scaling back the park’s rescue infrastmcture would mean one of two things from an
administrative perspective: Either the National Park Serviee would be foreed to require
wildemess users to sign a legally questionable waiver stating that administrators would
not perform a rescue if an aecident occurred or, more likely, wildemess activities would
have to be restrieted to everyone, even the most experienced and environmentally

Leslie P. Amberger to Regional Director, Western Region, re: “Special Regulation - Yosemite
National Park,” June 30, 1977, YOSAR office files.
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enlightened wildemess enthusiasts. Both options would be highly problematic since rock
climbing and other forms of wildemess recreation were widely regarded as historically
appropriate uses of the park and were in fact codified as such in NPS policy; to forcibly
regulate these aetivities would not only defeat the mandated purpose of the National Park
Service to provide for the enjoyment of the parks it would also create a public relations
nightmare for park officials. Neither the Park Service nor even the most adamant
supporters of limited aceess to wildemess areas would support an outright prohibition on
recreation in Yosemite’s backcountry.^’*
Tim Setnicka, in an editorial for the popular climbing periodical O ff Belay, wamed
that if inexperienced and negligent wildemess users continued to drain the park’s
financial resources, the NPS would have no choice but to enforce more regulations, more
restrictions, and more closures of popular climbing routes and remote backeountry areas.
“Mountain and wildemess activities are among the freest forms of park use,” Setnicka
observed. Yet in this purported freedom lay the problem: The Park Service had no means
to restrict access based on the inexperience of individual wildemess users yet
administrators had a responsibility to rescue any visitor “in direct danger of destroying
himself or the environment.” Setnicka referenced several costly rescues that year
involving poor judgment or inexperienee. In a number of cases hikers and climbers had
to be rescued after failing to bring adequate food or clothing even though bad weather
was imminent. In one instance, a pair of climbers became stranded and hypothermic on
their descent route near the Royal Arches after allowing their rappel ropes to be “blown
away” in a storm. One persistent climber even had to be rescued from El Capitan twice

'ibid.
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in the same month. Rangers concluded that in both scenarios the man probably could
have helped himself instead of calling for a rescue. Setnicka stressed that park officials
should not “attempt to babysit a person’s movement.” However, if wildemess users put
themselves or others in danger, ‘’'they will be responsible for new restrictions which will
unjustly affect all wildemess users.”^”
Solutions remained unclear. Setnicka vaguely proposed that climbers and other
wildemess users willingly assume “moral and financial responsibility” for their actions or
face charges of negligence in the courts.^*** Chris Jones, in his authoritative Climbing in
North America, spoke to the climbing community directly, writing: “When a public
agency becomes responsible for our safety and pulls us off the crags, we must expect
them to become increasingly concemed about what we climb. The precedents are clear.
Either we bring our affairs into order by taking a greater responsibility for rescues, or the
government will want to regulate us.”” * Galen Rowell, the notable Yosemite climber
and adventure photographer, offered a partieularly insightful analysis of the problem: “At
stake is the most basic of wildemess values: the right to risk life and limb in the wilds,”
he wrote. To protect this quality of the wildemess experience, Rowell suggested that
perhaps “it is better to sacrifiée some of the appearance of wildemess in order to regain
self-sufficiency.” He argued that by placing SAR caches fully stocked with ropes,
stretehers, radios, oxygen tanks, and other technologies of rescue in remote locations,
wildemess users eould eonceivably help themselves or each other before calling in
helicopters, which were not only expensive but also “noisy machines that intmded into
Tim Setnicka, “Mountain Insanity,” O ff Belay 37 (February 1978): 6-8.
^ Ibid., 8
Chris Jones, Climbing in North America, second edition (Seattle: The Mountaineers, 1997), 354.
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everyone’s experienee.”^*’ Rescue, as a technological safeguard, had beeome both
facilitator of and anathema to the wildemess experienee depending on which conception
of an appropriate wildemess experience the NPS adopted.
Indeed, whether or not the National Park Service should charge victims for rescues,
or even provide a rescue serviee at all, became the policy hot potato by which
administrators and park constituents debated the meaning of preservation and the role of
technology in the national park experience. For Edward Abbey, the promise of free
rescue eompromised the psyehological effect of an encounter with wild nature since it
signified an over-reliance on the technologies of civilization at large. For Galen Rowell,
the mdimentary technologies of rescue, including climbing gear and basie medical
supplies, actually enhanced the wildemess experience by enabling wildemess users to
push the boundaries of risk and self-reliance to greater lengths than would be possible if
these conneetions to society were not available. Yet Rowell drew the line at allowing for
the extensive use of helicopters to perform rescues since these “noisy machines” existed
too far along the gradient of faeilitating technologies that he and other recreationists
eonsidered appropriate in a wildemess setting. As administrators, Amberger and
Setnicka faced the delicate task of adjusting park policy to accommodate these varying
recreational discourses of nature. YOSAR’s stmggle to constmct a definitive plan for
preparing for, coordinating, and funding SAR activities illustrated the ehallenges of
balancing the freedom to experienee wildemess with the increasingly costly need to
mitigate the grizzly consequences of this freedom.

^ Galen Rowell, “On Safety and Wildemess,” Sierra Magazine (November/ December 1977).
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For all the active campaigning of Amberger, Setnicka, and others to lower rescue
costs and avoid regulating climbing and other wildemess activities, the decision-making
power to recover SAR eosts ultimately lay with NPS officials in Washington. In March
of 1978, Associate Director Daniel J. Tobin determined that Amberger’s proposal to
eharge negligent victims for rescue costs would be “neither neeessary nor in keeping with
the Department of the Interior and the National Park Service policies.” If search and
rescue eosts threatened park operations, Tobin suggested that administrators pursue a
number of eost-eutting measures including the aequisition of less expensive helicopter
contracts through private companies rather than through military installations - an
unlikely possibility, especially in Yosemite, since few private contractors possessed the
requisite skills or technologies to perform complex climbing rescues. Tobin also
recommended seeking reeovery through the federal “disorderly conduct” statute - though
as park officials discovered in the aftermath of the Cunningham search, this violation
carried a drastically inadequate penalty of only five hundred dollars. The Assistant
Director concluded that if most SAR emergencies were indeed preventable,
administrators should implement “an aggressive program in education and information to
alert the visitors to these inherent dangers.”’*® While necessary, sueh a poliey opened up
a whole new legal can of worms for park administrators.
Observers often considered visitor protection a legal responsibility of the NPS, yet
policy only established the service’s authority to provide for the safety of visitors; it did

^ Daniel J. Tobin to Director, Western Regional Office, re: “Financial Responsibility, Search and
Rescue,” March 29, 1978, YOSAR office files.
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not directly convey legal responsibility?*"* The Federal Tort Claims Act, passed by the
United States Congress in 1946 as a check on the expanded power of the federal
government, ultimately determined how the Park Service’s decision to act on this
authority could be enforced as a legal mandate. The act stipulated that a defendant
incurring a loss due to “the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the
government” eould sue the government and recover costs under the same standards of
liability applicable to a private citizen. This meant that if park authorities negligently
created an unsafe condition for visitors or failed to adequately respond to an emergency,
the NPS could be held liable for damages. In 1948, a visitor to Yellowstone National
Park, William Claypool, filed suit against the National Park Service after a bear attaehed
him and his wife while they slept in the open in sleeping bags. That day, the defendants
had twice asked rangers, who knew that a “problem bear” had recently been active in the
area, if it would be safe to remain outside their tent. On both occasions, rangers advised
the eouple that “hundreds of people sleep outside in Yellowstone every night and that the
bears never attack without provocation.” The federal district court determined that under
the Tort Claims Act, the Claypools were classified as “invitees” of the NPS, and since
rangers were aware that “a new and extraordinary danger” existed, they had a legal duty
to inform the couple of that danger.’*® The case set a clear precedent: the National Park
Service had a legal responsibility to maintain not only search and rescue capabilities but
also certain preemptive safety measures.

^ National Park Service (NPS), Yosemite National Park Search and Rescue Plan, revised May 14,
1986, YOSAR office files.
Paul A. Svboda, “Protecting Visitors to National Recreation Areas Under the Tort Claims Act,”
Columbia Law Review, 84 (November 1984), 1792-1812; James R. Levine, “The Federal Tort Claims Act:
A Proposal for Institutional Reform,” Columbia Law Review, 100 (October 2000), 1538-1571.
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To avoid burdening the government with excessive legal costs (which would
ultimately come from taxes and other public funds) and deter frivolous lawsuits, the Tort
Claims Act also allowed for limitations on the Park Service’s responsibility to maintain a
safe environment for park visitors or “invitees” as the federal courts regarded them after
the Claypool decision. In order to prevent judicial “second guessing” of the legislative
and administrative decisions of government bodies, the drafters of the act included a
“discretionary function exception” which allowed agencies to determine the boundaries
of their own liability through reasonable considerations of social, economic, and political
policy.’*® In the national parks, if safety measures proved too costly or otherwise
impractical from an administrative perspective, the NPS could choose not to implement
them. Park authorities also had discretionary authority to determine whether or not a
preemptive safety program including but not limited to the widespread construction of
safety railings, the posting of warning signs in dangerous areas, or the commencement of
mandatory visitor education programs would unduly compromise the “atmosphere” of the
park for visitors. Exercising discretion in visitor protection proved to be a delicate task.
Once administrators established programs for search and rescue or sets of preemptive
safety measures, the NPS would be liable for maintaining the standards derived from
such policies. As a legal analyst for the Division of Conservation and Wildlife explained,
“Once the bureau has committed to providing.. .SAR services, it has in all probability lost
the discretion not to provide the service.”’*’

^ Levine, “The Federal Tort Claims Act,” 1542-1547.
^ Deputy Associate Solicitor, Division o f Conservation and Wildlife to Director, National Park
Service, re: “OIG Audit Report 96-1-806: National Park Service Emergency Medical and Search and
Rescue Services,” May 11, 1999, YOSAR office files.
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Thus, by implementing aggressive accident prevention measures, administrators in
Yosemite could conceivably become more susceptible to tort claims. This concern was
most evident in administrators’ continued resistance to regulating or directly managing
rock climbing activities in the park. A tragic accident in 1978 illustrated why the NPS
maintained this surprisingly laissez faire approach to rock climbing, despite the high
level of risk. On May 14, three experienced climbers in their twenties, Jeffery Graves,
John Nygaard, and John Garton, decided to retreat from 1,500 feet up on the Nose route
on El Capitan, presumably because they had run out of water. A number of witnesses on
the ground and one on a nearby climb reported seeing the trio begin the process of
rappelling off the route. While no one witnessed the moment in which all three broke
free from their anchor, at least one climber heard the sound of “rip stop material brushing
against rock” as the climbers fell. Another witness at the base of El Capitan looked up
when he heard “what he thought to be stonefall.” Others described the sound of the
climbers breaking loose from the rock as a “roar” or a “rumble;” all reported hearing “no
cries” from the doomed climbers. Brent Nichelin had been standing at the base of the
Nose photographing the victims and another pair of climbers when “he looked up through
his camera’s 300mm [lens and] saw two people falling toward him.” Nichelin explained
to rangers that he watched in horror as “the people fell vertically and brushed the wall
several times as they fell.” Two climbers, Matthew Muchnick and Alan Nelson, heard
the impact while sorting gear at the base of El Capitan. They walked over to investigate
knowing “that something bad had happened.” The pair immediately went to rangers after
discovering the three climbers “all piled up on top of each other.” Muchnick and Nelson
reported to Ranger James Lee that three climbers had fallen from El Capitan and were
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“obviously dead.” John Dill, Butch Farabee, and a handful of YOSAR operators quickly
roped off the site and began their investigation.
The process of piecing together the causes of this tragedy revealed both the
sophistication of YOSAR’s investigatory capabilities and the NFS’s delicate liability in
maintaining safety standards in the park. Rangers and YOSAR officers spent several
hours taking pictures and collecting evidence at the accident scene. Strewn among the
climbers’ bodies, horrifically mangled from the impact of the 1,500 foot fall,
investigators found a number of objects including “cans and food articles, a knife, a cut
perlon sling, a shattered Timex watch,” and most interestingly, “half of a metal Dolt
hanger.” Originally designed and manufactured by William “Dolt” Fuerer, who
accompanied Warren Harding on the first ascent of the Nose in 1958, hangers were
crucial to the development of climbing as a safe, accessible form of recreation in the park.
After placing an expansion bolt in a hand-drilled hole in the rock face, a climber would
then attach the looped hanger to the bolt. A carabiner could then be attached to the
hanger, keeping the climber safely anchored to the wall. Though bolt hangers were
nearly invisible to untrained observers on the ground, by 1978, the rock faces of
Yosemite were covered with such devices. After examining the evidence found at the
scene, YOSAR investigators deduced that immediately before the fall, the three climbers
had clipped themselves and all of their gear into one single bolt, breaking a cardinal rule
of safe climbing to never rely on just one piece of protection as a primary anchor,
especially if the lives of the entire party hinged on it. Still, bolt hangers were designed to
withstand shock loads of thousands of pounds; and these particular bolts had been placed
less than one year earlier, most likely by climber Tom Rohrer, who had been establishing
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dozens of “rappel routes,” or series of vertically aligned bolt stations, all over the park in
the previous years. Even if the three climbers had indeed all clipped into only one bolt, it
should not have failed. So, why did the “bombproof’ hanger, usually the strongest link in
an anchor, break at this particular moment?’**
To answer this perplexing question, John Dill sent the broken hanger to a San
Francisco bay area metallurgist, Gerald Fritzke, who had read about the accident in the
local newspaper and volunteered to examine the evidence. In an analysis published in
O ff Belay magazine, Tim Setnicka explained that Fritzke had discovered preexisting
cracks in the broken hanger: “Tests confirmed that both legs of the bolt hanger had been
cracked and weakened before the total failure occurred,” Setnicka wrote: “Next with the
aid of a computer, Fritzke estimated that the cracked hanger could have broken with a
downward force of only 500 lbs.!” Setnicka suggested that the reasons for the weakened
hanger remained unknown. However, in a follow-up report Fritzke recognized that the
hanger had been treated, post-production, with a bonding alloy, a process that Tom
Rohrer had been known to use and which he assumed would increase the strength and
durability of the bolt. In fact, as Fritzke surmised, the chemical reaction produced by this
bonding process could cause the chromemoly steel from which the hanger was forged to
weaken and perhaps even crack. Interestingly, this worrisome conclusion remained
unproven and YOSAR never felt confident publishing the findings. While no further
accidents could be shown to have resulted from Rohrer’s modifications of bolt hangers.

Charles R. Farabee, Jr., “Search and Rescue Incident Report,” May 1978, YOSE SAR files, 1978;
C.L. Andress, “Supplementary Case Incident Record,” May 1978, YOSE SAR files, 1978; Tim Setnicka,
“A ‘Bombproof Anchor," O ff Belay 40 (August 1978): 15-16.
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the incident underscored the extent of the NFS’s discretionary authority to assume few
direct controls of climbing safety in the park?*^
In correspondence to YOSAR officials, family members of the deceased climbers
began to ask questions regarding the NFS’s responsibilities in maintaining a safe
climbing environment in Yosemite. John Carton’s brother wrote to John Dill inquiring
about the history of the cracked hanger, demanding to know, “what is being done to
prevent such an accident from occurring in the future?”’^® In a carefully crafted response.
Dill explained the limits of the NFS’s discretion in this regard: “In contrast to the
maintenance of our hiking trails,” Dill wrote, “the National Fark Service is not involved,
that is we don’t design, maintain, sanction, or endorse any climbing or rappelling route.”
He further explained that “the term ‘maintenance’” in regards to rock climbing “is
probably a misnomer, not being a part of the technical jargon of climbing.” Completely
independent of NFS controls, individual climbers. Dill specified, assumed responsibility
for making decisions to replace bolts and other fixed gear, or to warn other climbers of
possible dangers: “Commonly, a climber may simply replace a questionable bolt, piton,
etc., if he finds one as he happens to climb or rappel by. No one can or will guarantee
that a newly placed bolt or piton is absolutely safe.” For these reasons Dill maintained
that individual climbers had to prepare for intangibles on their own by taking safety
seriously and always using backup anchors.” '

^ Setnicka, “A ‘Bombproof Anchor,” 16; Conversation with John Dill, March 2007; Ghiglieri and
Farabee, Death in Yosemite, 302.
Mark A. Garton to John Dill, December 18, 1978, YOSAR office files.
John T. Dill to Mark A. Garton, undated, YOSAR office files.
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John Nygaard’s mother also began questioning why the NPS had not taken
responsibility for inspecting and repairing defective fixed climbing gear. In a letter to
Chief Ranger Bill Wendt, Mrs. Nygaard insisted that had the bolts been checked, her
son’s accident would not have happened. “This will not bring them back,” she wrote,
“the hurt is there and it seems to hurt more to know they could have been here today had
the equipment been in good condition.”^^^ Her phrasing suggested an attempt to establish
the legal liability of the National Park Service in her son’s accident. Chief Ranger Bill
Wendt responded by emphasizing each individual climber’s responsibility to take into
account the fallibility of fixed gear. “Since it is so difficult to know the structural
integrity of a bolt,” he argued, “the only safe policy assumes that any bolt may fail and
requires that additional gear be ready to take over instantly.” Indeed, the NPS had no
reasonable capabilities to guarantee a safe climbing environment. Wendt’s placement of
culpability on the individual climbers reflected administrators’ unwillingness, and
inability, to affect more direct preventative safety policies, especially since such actions
could open up the NPS to tort claims. In his letter to Mrs. Nygaard, Wendt clearly stated
the NPS’s discretionary position in this regard;

In the field, climbing equipment is not checked in any formal or official sense. The
National Park Service does not place equipment on the cliffs for the public to use...,
nor does it advertise or sanction any of the climbing or rappeling routes in Yosemite
National Park. These routes are developed solely by the climbing community, as they
are elsewhere. Climbers themselves place the anchors on climbs and rappel routes. An
anchor is “checked,” or should be, each time a climber comes to it. If he finds an
anchor of dubious quality (a subjective judgment all too frequently), he may or may not
replace it. The next climber has the same choice. His knowledge of equipment and
safe practices comes from his own experience, conversations with friends, instructors,
magazine articles and books.^^^

^ Mrs. O.V. Nygaard to Mr. Bill Wendt, January 22, 1979, YOSAR office files.
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Tim Setnicka elaborated on this need for professional SAR operations to encourage
individual responsibility on the part of wilderness users rather than establish convoluted
safety inspection programs or other difficult-to-manage precautionary measures. “The
best SAR event never occurs,” he wrote, “it is only heard as a story in the inn after an
epic on the walls or whitewater standing waves that eventually turned out fine without
injury... The optimal SAR team activity is sitting around the rescue cache playing
checkers.” Setnicka proposed a fifth requirement of effective search and rescue to
precede the four he presented in Wilderness Search and Rescue. In addition to the team’s
responsibility to “locate, reach, treat, and evacuate” the victim, professional SAR
operators - who in addition to being technically savvy rescuers were also to be highly
educated experts in safe, enjoyable wilderness recreation - should be adept at what
Setnicka called “Preventative Search and Rescue” or PSAR. Basing his analysis on his
experiences in Yosemite, Setnicka argued that “the use of PSAR to prevent and minimize
as many potentially dangerous situations as possible through education and training
should be one of the main objectives of SAR work.”^^"^ Rescuers in Yosemite had been
contributing analyses of rock climbing and other mountaineering-related accidents to the
AAC’s Accidents in North American Mountaineering (ANAM) since the late 1940s. Yet
while ANAM had become a widely read and highly respected educational resource for
serious wilderness enthusiasts, few casual visitors to the national parks had read or even
heard of the publication. Beginning in 1980, John Dill, in cooperation with a publishing

Charles W. Wendt to Mrs. O.V. Nygaard, undated, YOSAR otFice tiles.; This position was never
codified in policy but became the generally accepted practice over time as the NPS struggled to formulate a
more detailed climbing management policy. Due to legal issues and anticipated public relations disputes,
such a policy has yet to be officially approved in Yosemite.
^ Tim Setnicka, Wilderness Search and Rescue (Boston: Appalachian Mountain Club, 1980), 627.
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agent in San Francisco, began compiling reviews of accidents in Yosemite in a bi-annual
report to be easily available to all park visitors. However, due to time constraints and a
lack of funding, YOSAR discontinued the publication after only three issues.^^^ Tim
Setnicka recognized the scope of this communication problem in his description of the
average accident victim in Yosemite. Citing wilderness survival researchers Rick
LaValle and Gene Fear, Setnicka offered a telling portrait of the typical next-generation
wilderness enthusiast visiting Yosemite and other parks in this period:

The average SAR victim is a composite outdoorsperson, a combination of part climber,
fisherman, hunter, skier, camper, hiker all blended into one. He or she usually does not
practice any one sport particularly well, but joins in a multitude of activities to varying
degrees. Most wilderness users reside in densely populated areas, travel relatively far
for seasonal recreation, and have a reasonable amount of time and money to spend on
these pursuits. Usually too much emphasis is placed in material equipment advances
and the latest mechanical devices.^^^

Search and rescue, as an accommodative policy, also functioned as a front-line
administrative tool to preserve nature in the park, though only in accordance with the
recreational expectations of this particular demographic.
In an era in which travel in undeveloped areas involved engaging with wild nature
without changing it - an ethic the Sierra Club called “going light” or “walking softly in
the wilderness” - few wilderness users had the skills to survive independently if an
unexpected event cut short their desired wilderness experience. As historian James
Morton Turner explains, over the course of the twentieth century, the importance of

John Dill, Climbing Accidents at Yosemite: 1979 Summary (San Jose; Granite Press, 1979).
Editions also exist for 1980 and 1981 when the report was discontinued. Copies are available in the
Yosemite National Park Library.
^ Setnicka, Wilderness Search and Rescue, 629.
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“woodcraft” or survival skills involving hunting, gathering wood for fires, and building
shelters gave way to an ethic of detached contemplation in which the tools of wilderness
travel became increasingly specialized commercial products, available at often
exorbitantly high prices at specialty retailers?^’ Taking into account this increasingly
popular conception of wilderness as recreational space, the 1985 search and rescue plan
for Yosemite included a number of preventative SAR duties including “counseling the
victim, correcting sign inadequacies, changing district information/ registration
procedures, and conducting interpretive P-SAR programs.”^^* Still, these policies had
limitations and were often too little too late in educating over-ambitious wilderness users
who ventured into dangerous terrain.
Indeed, while the analyses offered by Dill, Wendt, and Setnicka were reasonable and
correct from an administrative perspective, the sheer numbers of recreational wilderness
users the NPS willingly accommodated could not be counted on to always follow safety
recommendations. The popular culture of wilderness recreation, which valued a
sensation of isolation and personalized risk in a natural setting without being completely
cut of from a sophisticated tourist infrastructure, positioned SAR among the most
necessary and pragmatic administrative duties of the modem NPS. Yet visitor protection
remained a reactive administrative responsibility to be performed after the fact as a
search, rescue, or recovery. The NPS’s discretionary liability for ensuring visitor safety
also remained reactive. Rock climbers or other wilderness users who partook in
dangerous activities assumed the immediate risk of that activity on their own. Protected

James Morton Turner, “From Woodcraft to ‘Leave no Trace:’ Wilderness, Consumerism, and
Environmentalism in Twentieth Century America,” Environmental History 7, no.3 (2002): 462-484.
^ NPS, Yosemite National Park Search and Rescue Plan, May 1986.
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by the discretionary function exception of the Tort Claims Act, administrators rightly
determined that the NPS could not reasonably perform extensive preventative safety
maintenance without inviting costly legal penalties if accidents persisted. Farabee and
Ghiglieri offer a characteristic NPS explanation of this paradox by attacking a notion that
“every possible location in the American West where someone might die accidentally
should be labeled with warning signs.” Even if this were feasible, the authors argue, the
issue of liability would remain. To extend visitor protection liability to such an
unreasonable length would not only compromise the NPS’s assumed responsibility to not
''change anything in wilderness,” such a policy would also remove the legal safeguards
provided by the discretionary function exception of the Tort Claims Act and open up
administrators to tort litigation since accidents and deaths would in all probability
continue to occur.^^^ As Farabee’s and Ghiglieri’s analysis suggests, a conspicuously
proactive safety infrastructure would be both impossible to maintain for the understaffed
and under-funded NPS, and undesirable for the expanding cohort of environmentally
enlightened but ill-prepared visitors seeking to experience the park “without handrails” in
Joseph Sax’s terms. Though YOSAR required an ever higher percentage of the park’s
limited annual budget in this period yet had little authority to directly prevent tragedies
caused by the poor judgment of inexperienced victims, free SAR remained the most
reliable and most cost effective means for the NPS to accommodate the expectations of
the park’s most influential constituencies.
This realization did not deter attempts to cut costs. In the mid-1980s, search and
rescue expenses in the national parks ratcheted up to previously unimagined numbers.

^ Ghilglieri and Farabee, Death in Yosemite, 575.
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Funding problems were especially acute in Yosemite where costs spiked from $155,443
in 1983 to $294,955 only one year later, an alarming ninety percent increase. Numbers of
rescues were also up considerably. YOSAR performed a record 168 missions in 1984, a
full fifty seven percent increase from the 110 incidents in 1983. Even more distressing
for administrators in Yosemite, the park’s total rescue bill for 1984 accounted for nearly
seventy percent of the total SAR costs for the entire Western Region.^”® Much of this
expense came from the use of helicopters from Lemoore Naval Air Station. While the
“Lemoore Angels” rescue team remained necessary for “its winching capabilities and
ability to access vertical walls,” Valley District Ranger Jim Reilly expressed confidence
in YOSAR’s efforts to adapt the smaller contract helicopter, stationed at Crane Flat, to
perform more specialized rescues. Crediting John Dill, Bob Reese, Steve Collum, Mead
Hargis, and Mike Durr with developing new helicopter rescue capabilities including “the
helicopter rappel program, the short haul program, and the rope throw equipment
exchange program,” Reilly believed that YOSAR could increase the efficiency and speed
of SAR missions while at the same time reducing costs. By 1987, YOSAR credited a
marked expense reduction of approximately $50,000 for fourteen more rescues than in
1986 to these adaptations to the park’s contract helicopter. Yet through the early 1990s,
these reductions proved less than significant if not illusory as SAR costs leapt again to
more than $420,000 by 1991, presumably due to increased numbers of “searches,
helicopter evacuations, and wall rescues” in that year.^®'

Jim Reilly to All Concerned, re: “SAR Statistics,” February 3, 1985, YOSAR office files.; Western
Regional Office, “Search and Rescue Summary - Western Region,” 1985, YOSAR office files.
Search and Rescue Officer to Chief Ranger, re: “Significant Incident Report,” February 6, 1988,
YOSAR office files.; YOSAR, “Search and Rescue Year-End Report - Calendar Year 1991,” YOSAR
office files.

173

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

As SAR costs rose, NPS officials system-wide began reexamining the possibility of
charging victims for simple helicopter evacuations. In a June 1981 decision prepared by
the office of the Controller General of the United States, legal advisers unearthed an
obscure amendment to the Department of Interior’s User Charge Statute which offered a
way of “recouping the cost of Federal activities which provide a special benefit to the
individual.” The decision established a legal precedent that would “allow the head of an
agency to charge the beneficiary for the value of the service rendered and help agency
activities to be self sustaining.”^*’^ Writing to the Regional Director of the western region
that prior to this decision “National Park Service policy did not conform with National
Park Service practice,” NPS Director Stanley Albright incorrectly assumed that
ambulance services were already being charged to evacuees. In many parks including
Grand Canyon and Sequoia-Kings Canyon this had indeed been the case; in these parks
the Controller’s decision had little effect other than legitimizing administrators’
established practice. In Yosemite where the distinction between an air ambulance
evacuation and a technical rescue remained vague, the superintendent’s office had
stopped billing helicopter evacuees in 1974, determining that the policy was unfeasible,
insensitive, and probably without legal grounds.^*^^
Administrators in Yosemite paid only passing attention to the Controller General’s
decision, in part because the funds collected through the User Charge Statute would have

The Controller General o f the United States, re: “Emergency Transportation o f Injured Visitor at
National Park,” June 3, 1981, YOSAR office files.
Stanley Albright to Regional Director, Western Region, re: “Emergency Transportation Charge
Policy,” September 24,1982, YOSAR office files; Robert J. Smith, Superintendent, Sequoia-Kings Canyon
to Regional Director, Western Region, re: “Emergency Transportation and Cost o f Injured Victim,”
September 28,1982, YOSAR office files; Richard W. Marko, Superintendent, Grand Canyon to Regional
Director, Western Region, re: “Request for Assistance,” October 20,1982, YOSAR office files; Farabee,
Death, Daring, and Disaster, 288.
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to be deposited into a service-wide treasury account and “would only be available
through appropriations.”^®'* Facing serious budget deficiencies, YOSAR officials hoped
to use any monies that could conceivably be collected from evacuees or their insurance
policies to pay for much needed training programs, rescue cache expansions, PSAR
programs, and wages for emergency hires. In a November 1983 memo to Jim Reilly,
Mike Durr argued that without these improvements YOSAR would be put in “a
dangerously reactionary posture.” If additional funding could not be secured, Durr feared
that YOSAR “will be forced deeper into the hole of unpreparedness.”^®^ In fact, earlier
that year Reilly had initiated a creative, under-the-table means to recover costs and
deposit them directly into the park’s own emergency fund. Instead of billing rescuees,
the park would “solicit donations from persons using the ambulance service and have the
proceeds go to the [Yosemite] Mountain Safety Fund.”^®^ Reilly prepared an
ingenuously suggestive letter to be released to victims evacuated by helicopter along with
a self addressed return envelope. The “donation” request read:

The ambulance service you received was provided by Yosemite National Park out of
the operating funds provided by the National Park Service. In these times of shrinking
budgets the Park Service is finding it increasingly difficult to provide funds for that
service. We need your help. If you received this service in any of the outlying areas
you would be billed a rate of approximately $85 for the call-out and $5 per mile
thereafter. We ask your help in offsetting these costs by making a tax deductible
donation to a non-profit rescue fund... Thank you for your contribution.^®^

304

Jim Reilly to All concerned, re: “Ambulance Service Fees,” January 6, 1983, YOSAR office files.

Mike Durr, Search and Rescue Officer to Chief Ranger, re: “Additional Search and Rescue Funding
for FY 84,” November 10,1983, YOSAR office files.
^ Jim Reilly to All Concerned, January 6, 1983.
' See attachment to Jim Reilly to Ranger Staff, re: “Ambulance Service,” January 4, 1983, YOSAR
office files.
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The donation program enabled YOSAR and the park’s medical clinic to afford
desperately needed supplies while avoiding the time-consuming burden of collections and
the sensitive legality of demanding repayment.
Such a policy did not go unchallenged. The Department of Interior caught wind of
this practice in 1994 during a system-wide audit of SAR and emergency medical services
(EMS) practices. Still, auditors were less concerned with how the national parks
recovered funds than what administrators did with collected monies and for which
services individual parks chose to bill victims. In the final survey report. Assistant
Inspector General Judy Harrison found that approximately $4.5 million in SAR and EMS
charges system-wide were not recovered in 1993 and that collections of $757,800 “were
inappropriately retained by park units.” The problem, according to Harrison, was that
while the Controller General had legitimized collections, the NPS had “not established
uniform procedures that ensure[d] the recovery of all appropriate costs associated with
providing emergency assistance to park visitors.”^®*
Still, the audit did not specifically define which expenses could be charged to the
victim and which could not. Policy had historically allowed parks to charge for medical
care received in park clinics and some ground ambulance services, yet the line between
EMS and SAR expenses remained unclear. Moreover, while Death Valley National
Monument, Sequoia-Kings Canyon National Park, and a number of smaller NPSmanaged parks had been depositing most of their recovered funds into “the proper U.S.
Treasury account;” Yosemite and Grand Canyon in particular had been recycling these
funds back into the parks’ individual operating budgets in order to pay for new equipment.

^ Judy Harrison, Assistant Inspector General for Audits, “Final Survey Report on Emergency Medical
and Search and Rescue Service, National Park Service,” June 10,1996, YOSAR office files.
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training programs, and other miscellaneous costs not adequately covered under
emergency appropriations. The Inspector General recommended in the initial report that
the NPS establish a uniform, system-wide policy for billing victims and for depositing
recovered funds into the designated treasury account.^®®
The Park Service responded in defense of its historical practice of not charging for
SAR events. The NPS Ranger Activities Office argued that the legality of cost recovery
only covered “special benefits to recipients beyond those accruing to the general public.”
To extend this definition to park visitors who became lost, stranded, injured, or killed
would “stretch reason” and compromise the mission of the modem NPS to provide
opportunities for wilderness recreation in the parks. Charging for SAR events beyond
simple medical services could also negate the protection from tort liability provided by
the discretionary function exception in the Tort Claims Act.^*® A joint statement agreed
upon by the 369 administrative units under NPS management stated: “If the NPS charges
a visitor a fee for SAR, then the government is receiving payment for a specific service to
be rendered and the activity is no longer a discretionary action. Charging fees will
certainly increase tort liability along with increasing the number of SARs by giving
people the false perceptions that rescue is automatic because they paid a fee.” Moreover,
if the NPS charged for rescues, accident victims may be reluctant to request a rescue in a
timely manner. If this occurred, costs for SAR could become even higher while instances

^ Ibid; The audit report found that Yosemite had not collected on SAR service o f approximately
$113,000 in 1993, though Harrison did not specify how the Inspector General determined the legal viability
o f collection on these bills. Harrison also calculated that Yosemite had successfixlly collected
approximately $285,100 in medical costs between 1991 and 1994, all but about 7.5% o f which was retained
by either YOSAR or the park’s medical clinic, or deposited in a general park operating fund.
Chief, Ranger Activities Division to Acting Inspector General for Audits, re: “Comments on Draft
Survey Report on Emergency Medical and Search and Rescue Services, National Park Service,” October
13, 1995, YOSAR office files.
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of serious injury or death would also likely rise. These arguments stalled Department of
Interior attempts to order parks to demand repayment for SAR operations and
universalize procedures.^" In 1996, the Inspector General determined that “given that
this is a sensitive area,” a final policy decision would await NPS “guidance on whether to
charge fees for search and rescue services.”^'^
NPS legal advisors and SAR operators took this opportunity to defend each individual
park’s discretion to provide free rescue - even with the high cost and potential to
encourage irresponsible recreational habits - as an integral component of national park
policy. In May of 1999, the Deputy Associate Solicitors for the Division of Conservation
and Wildlife and the Division of General Law released an exhaustive study of case law
outlining the delicate protection afforded to NPS SAR services under the discretionary
function exemption in the Tort Claims Act. Short of either constructing extensive safety
accommodations into backcountry areas or discontinuing EMS/SAR services altogether
and closing these areas, the report concluded that individual administrators should be
permitted to determine the limits of their liability to perform SAR functions based on
considerations indigenous to each respective park. Such a policy, the authors explained,
“would help ensure the consistency recommended by the Inspector General. At the same
time, allowing each park to select the model that best fits its needs provides the flexibility
necessary for an effective EMS/SAR program.”^

“SAR and EMS IG Comments,” attachment to “Comments on Draft Survey Report on Emergency
Medical and Search and Rescue Services.”
Harrison, “National Park Service Response and Office o f Inspector General Reply,” attachment to
Harrison, “Final Survey Report,” 10.
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These recommendations enabled administrators in Yosemite to adapt YOSAR to the
malleable constructions of nature and changing expectations of visitors into the twentyfirst century. As Farabee and Ghiglieri explain:

Most of the nearly four million people each year who drive or fly out of their way to
visit Yosemite do so not because they have been assured that it has been made as safe
as (or safer than) their local neighborhood park. Instead, they come to experience an
inspirational and unique chunk of wild scenery... Some people come here specifically
to push their own limits and to test themselves - to go up to “the edge.” Although a few
visitors may want to see the Park completely “danger-proofed,” most of us know it is
instead our job to safeguard ourselves by respecting its hazards.

Even with the assumption of risk implicit in modem ideas of wilderness recreation, a
technologically sophisticated search and rescue apparatus continued to be necessary in
Yosemite and other parks. Accidents persisted and few visitors to the national parks
could be expected to posses the diversity of skills necessary to help themselves when they
made mistakes, and even fewer park goers desired a wilderness experience entirely
disconnected from the safeguards of technological society. Visitor protection thus
remained a critical administrative responsibility; and while NPS policy determined that
administrators could feasibly charge rescuees as recipients of “special benefits.. .beyond
those received by the general public,” to do so would compromise the legal protections
and autonomy the NPS possessed in facilitating the faux wilderness experience desired
by the most active visitors to the national parks.^'^

Memorandum, Deputy Associate Solicitor, Division o f Conservation and Wildlife and Deputy
Associate Solicitor, Division o f General Law to Director, National Park Service, May 11,1999, YOSAR
office files.
Farabee and Ghigieri, Death in Yosemite, 577.
Memorandum, Deputy Associate Solicitor to Director, NPS, May 11, 1999.; Also see Mike Gautier,
et al.. Report to Congress: Analysis o f Cost Recovery fo r High Altitude Rescues on Mt. McKinley, Denali
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In the NPS’s initial reply to the Inspector General’s 1995 audit, the authors had
concluded that, in fact, rescuees did not receive a special benefit from the federal
government because the “SAR/EMS function is totally humanitarian in character, having
nothing to do with.. .commercialism.”^*® Yet NPS analysts, in espousing this
characteristic ambivalence to the role of consumer culture in informing nearly every
aspect of resource protection policy in the national parks, did not grasp the entire
significance of their determination to not charge victims for rescues. Indeed, the decision
represented far more than an altruistic effort to save lives, cut costs, protect the NPS from
tort claims, and avoid sluggish bureaucratic procedures; free search and rescue also
enabled the Park Service to manage vast undeveloped portions of the parks for wilderness
recreation. Only if the NPS continued to grant individual SAR units flexibility and
independence in their decision making capabilities could Yosemite and other iconic parks
remain free to limit conspicuous tourism development and yet still provide reasonably
safe conditions for the types of recreation preferred by park users in an age of heightened
ecological awareness. While no NPS policy decisions could ever be entirely free from
commercial influence, YOSAR’s wilderness handrails offered a pragmatic reconciliation
of the illusory preservation/use dichotomy that had long divided environmentalists, park
administrators, politicians, and nature lovers in the twentieth century movement to
preserve nature in Yosemite and the national parks.

National Park and Preserve, Alaska (Washington D.C.: National Park Service, 2001), i, ii, 2, 6-8.; and
Jackson, Expenses o f Search and Rescue Services in the National Parks, 134-136.
Ranger Activities Division to Acting Inspector General for Audits, re: “Comments on Draft Survey
Report,” October 13, 1995.
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CONCLUSION
To limit analysis of the national parks to a question of whether or not the National
Park Service advanced an appropriately ecological standard of preservation in the parks,
as environmental historians have traditionally done, is to gloss over the complex political,
cultural, and administrative imperatives shaping far more interesting debates over the
meaning of nature in post-industrial American society. The history of search and rescue
in Yosemite, as an administrative response to new ways of reconciling nature, technology,
and tourism in the age of environmentalism, provides a link to these often misunderstood
stories. The evolution of SAR, from a loosely defined, heroic duty of park rangers in the
early twentieth century to a technologically sophisticated, professional responsibility of a
specialized rescue force by the 1970s, also moves historical analysis of the national parks
beyond the much traveled terrain of automobiles and wilderness in the modem national
parks movement. The administrative decisions leading to the creation of YOSAR in the
late 1960s and early 1970s revealed the complicated ways in which consumers of
wilderness recreation reconciled nature, technology, and tourism once they left their cars
behind. Visitor protection became the most tangible administrative tool by which the
National Park Service could build positive relationships with an influential minority of
rock climbers and other wilderness users without compromising its long-standing
obligation to maintain the parks as democratic spaces set aside for the enjoyment of a
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diverse constituency of nature lovers, even those unfamiliar with the potential dangers of
risk-oriented, self-reliant wilderness recreation.
The professionalization of search and rescue in Yosemite reflected the changing
recreational preferences of touring Americans in the twentieth century. Beginning in
1916, Steven Mather and Horace Albright, the first directors of the National Park Service,
began working to transform the great parks of the American West from distant symbols
of monumental nature to sought-after tourist sites accessible to a broad demographic of
increasingly mobile middle class Americans. As more and more visitors vied for access
to the scenic qualities of the parks, a growing number of ambitious nature enthusiasts
began venturing out beyond the roads and other urban facilities that the NPS had
constructed to accommodate surging visitation. In Yosemite through the interwar years,
members of the Sierra Club began experimenting with rock climbing, backcountry
camping, ski-mountaineering, and other wilderness-oriented activities that emphasized
physical interaction with vast stretches of undeveloped terrain and a sensation of isolation
fi'om the increasingly congested, urban atmosphere of the Valley. As these potentially
dangerous forms of wilderness recreation became more popular through the 1930s and
especially in the postwar years, the Park Service was forced to pay closer attention to its
stipulated responsibility to provide for the safety o f visitors. The gradual implementation
of a formal search and rescue apparatus became the most pragmatic means for the NPS to
accommodate these new recreational demands while balancing them against auto-touring
and other more traditional park uses.
The decades following World War II brought unprecedented changes to American
society and to the culture of tourism in the national parks. As millions of newly affluent
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middle class Americans moved westward to the sprawling urban centers of California,
the Sunbelt, and the Pacifie Northwest, Yosemite and the great parks of the American
West became more accessible to more people than at any time in their history. With the
galvanization of the environmental movement following the Sierra Club’s fight to save
Dinosaur National Monument in the mid 1950s and the passing of the Wilderness Act in
1964, national park visitors brought with them an increasingly heightened, though often
inconsistent, awareness of ecology and the social values of wilderness preservation. This
new emphasis did not lessen the commercial appeal of the parks but only engendered
more diverse and sophisticated recreational preferences among touring Americans.
Specialty outdoor retailers including Patagonia, Recreational Equipment Incorporated,
Ski Hut, North Face, Eddie Bauer, and countless others sprouted up across the nation to
meet the needs of this growing number of wilderness lovers seeking access to the vast
undeveloped portions of their public lands. As iconic nature preserves, Yosemite and the
wilderness parks of the West attracted unprecedented legions of hikers, backpackers, rock
climbers, cross-country skiers, fishermen, rafters, and other consumers of strenuous
outdoor sports. Seeking solitude, self-reliance, and risk through immersion in wild nature,
the millions of neophyte wilderness enthusiasts flocking to the parks in this period
instilled the National Park Service with an urgent awareness of the need to develop a
capable, professional visitor protection infrastructure.
The administrative decisions leading to the creation of YOSAR in the late 1960s and
early 1970s reflected this need to ensure visitor safety; yet the process also underscored
the complex cultural, legal, and political imperatives the NPS faced in determining how
nature would be preserved in Yosemite and who would be permitted to experience it. In
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an era in which ecology began to inform land management philosophies, and popular
environmental culture increasingly valued experiencing “nature for its own sake,” the
NPS understandably prioritized recreational activities that required a landscape free from
obvious signs of human agency. To avoid the very real possibility that increased
numbers of backpackers, rock climbers, and other park users would “love the wilderness
to death,” the Park Service implemented a backcountry permit process while also
promoting the often repeated mantras of “going light,” or “walking softly in the
wilderness,” and later, “leave no trace.” Such policies encouraged visitors to engage with
nature in the park without changing it, an ethic that further increased the importance of
the outdoor recreation industry and the technologies it provided to park goers. The
culture of wilderness recreation evolved contingent to these innovations in technology
and other developments in the commercial marketplace.
As Joseph Sax pointed out, wilderness activities also carried a stigma of elitism.
Many park supporters viewed backpacking, ski mountaineering, and rock climbing in
particular as accessible only to the most physically fit, self-reliant, and ideologically
inclined park users. As an institution founded on democratic principles and the notion
that the wilderness experience in the nation’s parks should be accessible to a broad
demographic, the National Park Service had neither the will nor the capability to limit
participation in wilderness recreation based on the relative physical fitness or experience
level of individual visitors. At the same time, intense political pressure, represented most
clearly by the passing of the Wilderness Act in 1964 and the changing preferences of the
park-going public in the age of environmentalism, had precluded the modem NFS from
pursuing Mission 66-style expansions to its long-standing automobile-based tourist
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infrastructure. For administrators in Yosemite, democratizing wilderness recreation
hinged most concretely on the active maintenance of safety standards. Yet proactive
safety measures including additional roads, backcountry huts, conspicuous warning signs,
and metal railings at remote overlooks could also compromise the sensation of selfreliance and individualized risk that wilderness enthusiasts considered integral to the
national park experience. The NPS’s institutionalization of a technologically proficient,
and predominantly reactive, search and rescue service provided free of charge by the
federal government remained critical to managing Yosemite as a wilderness park without
alienating less experienced constituencies.
Though the presence of a free rescue service in Yosemite rendered the wilderness
experience accessible to a broader constituency, participants in wilderness-oriented
activities remained independently responsible for practicing good judgment, as
exemplified by the tragic death of three climbers on El Capitan in May of 1978. By
assuming the financial burden of rescue and establishing discretionary limits on its visitor
protection capabilities, the National Park Service could protect itself from tort claims
filed by accident victims. Despite the very real risk of bodily harm or violent death an
adventure into the vertical landscapes of Yosemite held, the NPS established few
restrictions limiting the autonomy of rock climbers, backpackers, hikers, fishermen,
skiers, and other user groups to push the boundaries of risk in their respective wilderness
encounters. The psychic assurance that YOSAR inspired, even with no guarantees, gave
even the most ill-prepared visitors the confidence to imagine that they could engage with
nature in Yosemite on its own terms. Administrators’ decision to provide free SAR
rather than restrict dangerous activities or expand development projects to accommodate

185

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

automobile-based tourism blurred the lines between preservation and use in national park
policy and empowered the generation of wilderness enthusiasts converging on Yosemite
beginning in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
Both the NPS and the majority of visitors embraced the wilderness experience this
SAR infrastructure facilitated not as a transcendent escape from modernity, but as a
recreational supplement to a postmodern lifestyle of leisure. Rock climbing, backpacking,
and other wilderness activities became desirable additions to the changing scope of
leisure in American culture. As a product of rising affluence and the emergence of
quality of life environmentalism in the early 1970s, the much sought-after wilderness
experience satisfied a popular impulse to come in contact with a simulacrum of wild
nature through recreation. Yet, as in nearly every aspect of middle class environmental
culture at this time, consumers of wilderness recreation desired the effect of the
wilderness experience without the negative consequences the experience could bring.
Search and rescue enabled this new generation of outdoor enthusiasts to not only have
their cake and eat it too; or in this ease, to preserve their wilderness and experience it too;
but also to be rescued from it in the event of an accident.
Rescue specialist Kenneth Andrasko, in his editorial introduction to Tim Setnicka’s
Wilderness Search and Rescue, described the basic assumption by which visitor
protection services in the national parks framed their operational imperatives: “Salvation
from death is a mainstay of the American Dream of the good life and perpetual youth,”
he wrote. “Since the mountains are no longer miserable or frightening but instead a place
for relaxing and a source of spiritual and physical rejuvenation, the possibility of rescue
from them is pretty much taken for granted. The Wilderness is considered a place for
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recreation, not trial.”^'^ In Andrasko’s pragmatic framework, search and rescue
performed a vital function in facilitating the wilderness experience in national parks.
Though a few extraordinarily dedicated individuals still desired to “perform superhuman
feats of will” in places where “travelers perish when they make mistakes,” Andrasko
acknowledged what many romantic wilderness celebrants were loathe to admit yet most
visitors knew intuitively: that the presence of a professional search and rescue service
was in most cases a pre-ordained requirement of a safe, enjoyable wilderness experience.
“Rescue is a strong affirmation of the bonds of society,” Andrasko stated in his
unwaveringly frank analysis of the postmodern wilderness experience, “it just takes the
form of something that needs to be done.”^**
As a professional rescuer, Andrasko understood that the idea of wilderness derived
directly from the culture of tourism that many preservationists sought to reject. The
ambivalence that Andrasko took as a given pervaded the preservationist tradition in the
national parks movement. Even the most stridently anti-populist advocates of the
wilderness ideal ultimately communicated their messages in recreational terms through
the familiar channels of consumer capitalism. In his 1968 bestseller Desert Solitaire,
Edward Abbey went so far as to demand that the National Park Service encourage
visitors to “get lost, sunburnt, stranded, drowned, eaten by bears, [and] buried alive under
avalanches,” since as he argued, “that is the right and privilege of any free American.”
Perhaps unintentionally, but not surprisingly. Abbey’s compelling polemic against
“industrial tourism” struck a sympathetic chord with a new generation of wilderness

Kenneth Andrasko, “Editor’s Note,” in Tim Setnicka, Wilderness Search and Rescue (Boston:
Appalachian Mountain Club, 1980), iii.
Ibid., iv.
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enthusiasts who rushed to encounter the parks first hand. Embracing Abbey’s distaste for
the “indolent millions bom on wheels and suckled on gasoline,” the growing number of
rucksack-toting wilderness lovers making their way to the parks in the 1970s sought what
Abbey called a “self propelled” wilderness experience either on foot, on skis, by mule, by
paddle, or hand-over-hand tied-in to climbing ropes. This influential user group did not
support a truly punitive wilderness ideal in which humans and their technologies were
excluded from preserved nature, but instead sought to assert a recreational hierarchy and
a freedom to risk life and limb in nature that seemed threatened by the Park Service’s
traditional mission to accommodate mass-tourism.^*®
In Yosemite, rock climbers, more so than any other user group, embodied this
ambivalent tension between consumerism and wilderness in the modem national parks
movement. The cohort of “climbing bums” carving a simple existence out of the dust,
pines, and boulders o f Camp 4 through the 1960s and early 1970s simultaneously
facilitated and resisted the transformation of their sport into a mainstream recreational
pursuit. The environmental ethie of “clean climbing” that Yvon Chouinard embraced as
the foundation of his business philosophy in the 1972 Chouinard Equipment Catalogue
had a dual effect on the culture of wildemess recreation. In one sense the catalogue, with
its dramatic photos of wild mountains and message of environmental sensitivity, tapped
into the romance of the wildemess experience that had captivated American tourists since
the late nineteenth century. Yet clean climbing also carried a set of elitist environmental

Edward Abbey, Dessert Solitaire: A Season in the Wildemess (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), 4856.
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standards that Chouinard hoped would limit an influx of neophytes, who he referred to as
“average Joes,” into the rock climbing brotherhood/^®
While administrators in Yosemite embraced the environmental message of elean
climbing, the contention that climbing could not be democratic seemed to counteract the
NPS’s mandate to provide for the enjoyment of the parks. To communicate the
environmental and technological imperatives of Yosemite climbing to inexperienced
visitors, administrators promoted the park as a world class climbing destination, opening
a mountaineering school in the Valley in 1969 and highlighting the park’s vast climbing
opportunities in promotional materials. While many elite climbers resented the NPS’s
endorsement of their sport, such programs had the effect of indoctrinating new climbers
into the philosophies that Choiunard and others had been promoting through their own
connections to the commercial marketplace. In this way, administrators negotiated a
fragile consensus with climbers over the transformation of their sport into a legitimate
wildemess experience in the nation’s premier park.
Yet the generation of wildemess enthusiasts converging on Yosemite in this period
could not be expected to fully educate themselves to the strict standards of safety and
responsibility in equipment use that elite climbers had honed after years of practice. Not
surprisingly, climbing accidents increased at an alarming rate through the 1970s and
1980s, comprising anywhere from twelve to twenty five percent of the park’s
approximately 150 annual SAR missions. The park’s ranger force struggled to keep pace
with the sophisticated, and often dangerous, rescue techniques that rock climbing

Yvon Chouinard, “Coonyard Mouths O f f A s c e n t 1, no. 6 (June 1972): 50; For elitism in clean
climbing also see Doug Robinson, “The Whole Natural Art o f Protection,” in Chouinard and Frost,
Chouinard Equipment Catalogue (Ventura: Chouinard Equipment Inc., 1972), 12, 25.
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mishaps required. In order to avoid dealing with an inordinate number of serious injuries
and violent deaths on Yosemite’s cliffs, park officials cultivated a working relationship
with the highly skilled contingent of climbing bums residing in Camp 4 through this
period. The creation of the rescue site in 1971 incorporated climbers into the park’s
maturing rescue apparatus and contributed to the formation of a distinct SAR culture in
Yosemite. For this select group of Camp 4 climbing bums, rock climbing and rescue
transformed from recreation to a professional responsibility. The creation of an internal
SAR force not only reflected the specialization of the NPS in this period, it also linked
the perennially antagonistic counterculture of Yosemite rock climbing to the pragmatic
administrative responsibilities of the Park Service.
The professionalization of SAR in Yosemite in the 1970s and 1980s, in addition to
underscoring the administrative challenges facing the modem NPS, also illuminated a
long-standing debate within environmental culture over the role of technology in
mediating the human relationship to nature. As the manufacturer of the best climbing
gear in the world and a leader in the development of environmental ethics in business,
Yvon Chouinard described this sliding scale as a “technological gradient” in which some
technologies “enslaved.. .post-industrial man” while others “set him free” by providing
opportunities to come in closer contact with wild nature.^^* Delineating appropriate
“style” in the application of technology informed not only the culture of rock climbing
and other wildemess-oriented activities, but also guided the technological imperative in
effective SAR. “We must control technology, not be enslaved to it,” wamed Tim
Setnicka in Wildemess Search and Rescue. “We should not let the helicopter separate us

Yvon Chouinard, Climbing Ice (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1978), 185-188.
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from the basic technique of movement in the wildemess: climbing, staying physically fit,
[and] preparing to survive the unanticipated bivouac.” Emphasizing Chouinard’s
technological gradient as the determining factor in professional SAR, Setnicka continued:
“The burden of style and ethics is always with us. Often the manner in which goals and
objectives are reached is the distinction between a professional performer or organization
and an ineffective one.”^^^
As the wildemess ideal continues to inform environmental culture and politics into
the twenty-first century, the manner in which these intersections between technology,
commercialism, and the human relationship to nature are negotiated in environmental
discourse persists as an ongoing stmggle for rescuers, consumers of outdoor recreation,
environmentalists, the National Park Service, and other interest groups. The boundaries
dictating the appropriate role of technology in mediating this relationship to nature
remain elusive and highly contingent to the ever-changing cultural preferences of outdoor
enthusiasts, as indicated by environmental historian John Heron’s recent analysis of the
role of cell phones and handheld Global Positioning Systems (GPS devices) in facilitating
wildemess travel. “For every voice touting the safety advantages of hiking with cell
phones,” Heron finds, “there is another that shouts cellular technology poses a danger to
the health and sanctity of westem nature.”^^^ This discussion of safety as an indicator of
a particular technology’s suitability to the wildemess experience underscores the vital
significance of SAR to understanding the meaning of nature and the value of the national
parks in American culture. As the wildemess handrails of Yosemite, the rangers, rock

Setnicka, Wilderness Search and Rescue, 630, 631.
John Heron, “The Call in the Wild: Nature, Technology, and Environmental Politics,” unpublished
manuscript.
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climbers, medical technicians, law enforcement officials, and military personnel
comprising the human element of YOSAR have played central roles in locating Leo
Marx’s “middle landscape” in the evolving reconciliation of nature, technology, and
tourism in the national parks movement.

192

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

MANUSCRIPT COLLECTIONS
Camp 4 Nomination Records, Yosemite National Park Library, California.
Law enforcement records, Yosemite National Park Central Files, Yosemite National Park,
California.
Mountain Climbing I957-I969 and 1970-1975, L3423-L48, Yosemite National Park
Central Files, Yosemite National Park, California.
Sierra Club Collection, Mountain Registers and Records, 1860-2005, BANC MSS 71/293,
Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, California.
Superintendents’ Reports 1920-1975, Yosemite National Park Library, California
YOSE SAR files, 1967-1998, El Portal, California.
Yosemite Search and Rescue (YOSAR) office files, Yosemite National Park, California
Wilderness Areas 1966-1971, L3423-L48, Yosemite National Park Central Files,
Yosemite National Park, California.
Wilderness Planning 1955-1976, L3423-L48, Yosemite National Park Central Files,
Yosemite National Park, California.

BOOKS, ARTICLES, AND GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
Abbey, Edward. Desert Solitaire: A Season in the Wilderness. New York: McGraw-Hill,
1968.
________ . The Monkey Wrench Gang. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1975.
Adams, Ansel, “Tenaya Tragedy,” Sierra Club Bulletin 43 (November 1958), 1-4.

193

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Albright, Horace M. and Frank J. Taylor, Oh, Ranger! National Park Service Centennial
Edition. Riverside: Chatham Press, 1972.
________ , and Marian Albright Schenk. Creating the National Park Service: The
Missing Years. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999.
Allenby, Braden. Reconstructing Earth: Technology and Environment in the Age o f
Humans. Washington D C.: Island Press, 2005.
Alsup, William. Missing in the Minarets: The Search fo r Walter A. Starr, Jr. El Portal:
The Yosemite Association, 2001.
Andrasko, Kenneth. “Editor’s Note,” in Setnicka, Wilderness Search and Rescue.
Bapis, Elaine M. and Thomas J. Harvey, eds. Imagining the Big Open: Nature, Identity,
and Play in the New West. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2003.
Barringer, Mark Daniel. Selling Yellowstone: Capitalism and the Construction o f the
Nature. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002.
Baudrillard, Jean. Simulacra and Simulation, translated by Shiela Faria Glazer. Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994.
Bingaman, John W. Guardians o f the Yosemite: A Story o f the First Rangers. Palm
Desert: Desert Printers, 1961.
Borghoff, Michael W. “O f Salamanders and Bongbongs,” Summit 8, no. 6 (June 1962):
12-15.
Bourdieu, Pierre. Distinction: A Social Critique o f the Judgment o f Taste. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1984.
Brady, James. “Open Letter to Yosemite Climbers,” Summit, 20 (March 1974): 1.
Braunstein, Peter and Michael William Doyle, eds. Imagine Nation: The American
Counterculture o f the 1960s and 1970s. New York: Routledge, 2002.
Bridwell, Jim. Climbing Adventures: A Climber’s Passion. Merri ville: ICS Books, 1992.
________ . “Bird’s Eye View,” Alpinist 18 (2007).
Brooks, David. Bobos in Paradise: the New Upper Class and How They Got There.
New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000.
Brower, David R., ed. The Sierra Club Handbook. San Francisco: Sierra Club Books,
1960.

194

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

“Far From the Maddening Mules: A Knapsacker’s Retrospect,” Sierra Club
Bulletin 20 (February 1935): 70-74.
Callicott, J. Baird and Michael P. Nelson, eds. The Great New Wilderness Debate.
Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1998.
Campbell, Colin. The Romantic Ethic and the Spirit o f Modern Consumerism. New
York: B. Blackwell, 1987.
Carr, Ethan. Wilderness by Design: Landscape Architecture and the National Park
Service. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998.
Catton, Theodore. National Park, City Playground: Mount Rainier in the Twentieth
Century. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006.
Chase, Alston. Playing God in Yellowstone: The Destruction o f America’s First National
Park. Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1986.
Chouinard, Yvon. Let My People Go Surfing: The Education o f a Reluctant Businessman.
New York: The Penguin Press, 2005.
________ , and Tom Frost. Chouinard Equipment Catalogue. Ventura: Chouinard
Equipment, Inc., 1972.
. Climbing Ice. San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1978.
. “Coonyard Mouths O îîf Ascent 1, no. 6 (June 1927): 50-52.
Clyde, Norman. Norman Clyde: Close Ups o f the High Sierra. (Bishop: Spotted Dog
Press, 1997.
Cohen, Lizabeth. A Consumer's Republic: The Politics o f Mass Consumption in Postwar
America. New York: Knopf, 2003.
Cohen, Michael. History o f the Sierra Club, 1892-1970. San Francisco: Sierra Club
Books, 1988.
Cole, Verne H. “Commentary, Search and Rescue,” The Fresno Bee (February 26,
1976): A19.
Coleman, Annie Gilbert. Ski Style: Sport and Culture in the Rockies. Lawrence:
University Press of Kansas, 2004.
Commoner, Barry. The Closing Circle: Nature, Man, and Technology. New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1971.

195

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Cronon, William, ed. Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature. New
York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1995.
________ . “The Trouble With Wilderness; or. Getting Back to the Wrong Nature.” In
Cronon, Uncommon Ground, 69-90.
Cross, Gary S. An All Consuming Century: Why Commercialism Won in Modern
America. New York: Columbia University Press, 200.
Demars, Stanford. The Tourist in Yosemite, 1855-1985. Salt Lake City: University of
Utah Press, 1991.
Denny, Glen. Yosemite in the Sixties. Valencia: Patagonia and T. Adler Books, 2007.
DeVoto, Bernard. “Let’s Close the National Parks,” Harper’s Magazine (October 1953):
49-52.
Dill, John. Climbing Accidents at Yosemite: 1979 Summary. San Jose: Granite Press,
1979.
Dilsaver, Larry M. America’s National Park System: The Critical Documents. Lanham:
Rowman and Littlefield, 1994.
Duane, Daniel. “Six Nights on the Dark Tower,” National Geographic Adventure 7
(February, 2005).
Erickson, Gary and Lois Lorentzen. Raising the Bar: Integrity and Passion in Life and
Business: The Story o f C lif Bar, Inc. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2004.
Farabee, Charles R. “Butch,” Jr. Death, Daring, and Disaster: Search and Rescue in the
National Parks, revised edition. Lanham: Taylor Trade Publishing, 2005.
________ . National Park Ranger: An American Icon. Lanham: Roberts Rinehart
Publishers, 2003.
Farmer, Jared. Glen Canyon Dammed: Inventing Lake Powell and the Canyon Country.
Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1999.
Flores, Dan. The Natural West: Environmental History in the Great Plains and Rocky
Mountains. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2001.
Foreman, Dave. Confessions o f an Eco-Warrior. New York: Harmony Books, 1991.
Foresta, Ronald A. America’s National Parks and their Keepers. Washington:
Resources for the Future, 1985.

196

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Fox, Stephen R. John Muir and His Legacy: The American Conservation Movement.
Boston: Little Brown, 1981.
Frank, Thomas. The Conquest o f Cool: Business Culture, Counterculture, and the Rise
o f Hip Consumerism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997.
Freemuth, John C. Islands Under Seige: National Parks and the Politics o f External
Threats. Lawrence: University of Kansas, 1991.
Friends of YOSAR. “El Capitan Rescues, 10-19-04 to 10-22-04.” Accessed online at
http://www.friendsofyosar.org/rescues/missions/10-19-04
Fromme, Michael. Regreening the National Parks. Tucson: University of Arizona Press,
1992.
Garcia, Ryan. “Danger in High Places,” Focus (April 1981): 33-36.
Gautier, Mike, et al. Report to Congress: Analysis o f Cost Recovery fo r High Altitude
Rescues on Mt. McKinley, Denali National Park and Preserve, Alaska. Washington
D C.: Department of the Interior, 2001.
Ghiglieri, Michael P. Over the Edge: Death in Grand Canyon. Flagstaff: Puma Press,
2001 .

________ . and Farabee, Charles R. “Butch,” Jr. O ff the Wall: Death in Yosemite.
Flagstaff: Puma Press, 2007.
Gos, Charles. Alpine Tragedy. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1948.
Gottleib, Robert. Forcing the Spring: The Transformation o f the American
Environmental Movement, revised and updated edition. Washington: Island Press,
2005.
Grubler, A. Technology and Global Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1998.
Gutfreund, Owen D. Twentieth-Century Sprawl: Highways and the Reshaping o f the
American Landscape. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.
Hall, Ansel F., ed. Handbook o f Yosemite National Park. New York: G.P. Putnam’s
Sons, 1921.
Hardin, Garrett. “The Tragedy of the Commons,” Science 162 (1968): 1243-1248.
Harding, Warren. Downward Bound: A Mad Guide to Rock Climbing. Edgewood Cliffs:
Prentice Hall, 1975.

197

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

“Reflections o f a Broken Down CVirNoQtf Ascent 1, no. 5 (July 1971): 32-35.

Harvey, Mark W.T. A Symbol o f Wilderness: Echo Park and the American
Conservation Movement. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1994.
. Wilderness Forever: Howard Zahniser and the Path to Wilderness. Seattle:
University of Washington Press, 2005;
Hawken, Paul. The Ecology o f Commerce: A Declaration o f Sustainability. New York:
Harper Business, 1993.
________ . with Amory Lovins and Hunter L. Lovins. Natural Capitalism: Creating the
Next Industrial Revolution. Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1999.
Hays, Samuel P. Conservation and the Gospel o f Efficiency: The Progressive
Conservation Movement, 1890-1920. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959.
________ . Beauty, Health, and Permanence: Environmental Politics in the United
States, 1955-19^5. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
Heath, Joseph and Potter, Andrew. Nation o f Rebels: Why Counterculture Became
Consumer Culture. New York: Harper Collins, 2004.
Heron, John. “The Call in the Wild: Nature, Technology, and Environmental Politics,”
unpublished manuscript.
Hirt, Paul. A Conspiracy o f Optimism: Management o f the National Forests since World
War Two. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994.
Ise, John. Our National Park Policy: A Critical History, reprint edition. New York:
Amo Press, 1979.
Jackson, Kenneth. The Suburbanization o f the United States. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1985.
Jackson, Krystal. Expenses o f Search and Rescue Service in the National Parks: An
Overview and Examination o f issues o f Charging Visitors. Masters Thesis: Central
Washington University, 2000.
Jacoby, Karl. Crimes Against Nature: Squatters, Poachers, Thieves, and the Hidden
History o f American Conservation. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001.
Johnson, Christopher E. “Bom With Steel Spoons in their Mouths: Sierra Club High
Trippers and Wildemess Use, 1930-1941,” Clio 14 (2004): 89-110.

198

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Jones, Chris. Climbing in North America. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976.
Kampion, Drew. Stoked! A History o f Surf Culture. Salt Lake City: G. Smith, 2003.
Kerouac, Jack. The Dharma Bums. New York: Viking Press, 1958.
Kirk, Andrew. “Machines of Loving Grace: Appropriate Technology, Environment, and
the Counterculture,” in Doyle and Braumstein, Imagine Nation, 353-378.
________ . “Appropriating Technology: The Whole Earth Catalogue and Counterculture
Environmental Politics,” Environmental History 6 (July 2001): 374-394.
. and Charles Palmer, ““When Nature Becomes Culture: The National Register
and Yosemite’s Camp 4, a Case Study,” The Western Historical Quarterly 37 (Winter,
2006): 497-506.
Kuralansky, Mark. 1968: The Year that Rocked the World. New York: Ballantine Books,
2003.
Lears, T. Jackson. Fables o f Abundance: A Cultural History o f Advertising in America.
New York: Basic Books, 1994.
Leopold, Aldo. A Sand County Almanac, and Sketches Here and There. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1949.
Levine, James R. “The Federal Tort Claims Act: A Proposal for Institutional Reform,”
Columbia Law Review 100 (October 2000): 1538-1571.
Lois, Jennifer. Heroic Efforts: The Emotional Culture o f Search and Rescue Volunteers.
New York: New York University Press, 2003.
Long, John. “Back Then,” Rock and Ice 46 (November/December 1991).
Louter, David. Windshield Wilderness: Cars, Roads, and Nature in Washington’s
National Parks. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006.
________ . “Application for the Placement of Camp 4 on the National Register of Historic
Places,” October 15, 2001. Yosemite National Park Library.
Madgic, Bob. Shattered Air: A True Account o f Catastrophe and Courage on Yosemite’s
HalfDovcvQ. Short Hills: Burford Books, 2005.
Mariner, Wastl. Mountain Rescue Techniques, first English language edition. Innsbruck:
Oesterreichischer Alpenverein, 1963.
Marx, Leo. The Machine in the Garden: Technology and the Pastoral Ideal in America.

199

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

New York: Oxford University Press, 1964.
McKibben, Bill. “Consuming Nature,” in Rosenblatt, Consuming Desires, 87-96.
Mitcham, Carl. Thinking Through Technology: The Path Between Engineering and
Philosophy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994.
Molella, Arthur and Joyce Bedi, eds. Inventing fo r the Environment. Cambridge: MIT
Press, 2003.
Nash, Roderick. Wilderness and the American Mind, 4* ed. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2001.
National Parks Centennial Commission. Preserving a Heritage: Final Report to the
President and Congress o f the National Parks Centennial Commission. Washington
D C.: National Park Service, 1973.
Nicholas, Liza with Elaine M. Bapis and Thomas J. Harvey, eds. Imagining the Big
Open : Nature,Identity, and Play in the New West. Salt Lake City: University of
Utah Press, 2003.
Nobel, D.F. The Religion o f Technology. New York: Alfred K. Knopf, 1998.
________ . America By Design: Science, Technology, and the Rise o f Corporate
Capitalism. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1977.
Nye, David E. American Technological Sublime. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994.
Oelschlaeger, Max. The Idea o f Wilderness from Prehistory to the Age o f Ecology. New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1991.
Olson, Robert and David Rejeski. Environmentalism and the Technologies o f Tomorrow:
Shaping the Next Industrial Revolution. Washington D C.: Island Press, 2005.
Outdoor Recreation Resources and Review Commission. Outdoor Recreation fo r
America. Washington D C.: Outdoor Recreation Resources and Review Commission,
1962.
Pomeroy, Earl. In Search o f the Golden West: The Tourist in Western America. New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1957.
Price, Jennifer. Flight Maps: Adventures with Nature in Modern America. New York:
Basic Books, 1999.
Reiger, John F. American Sportsmen and the Origins o f Conservation. 3^^^ ed. Corvallis:
Oregon State University Press, 2001.

200

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reisner, Marc. Cadillac Desert: The American West and Its Disappearing Water. New
York: Penguin Books, 1987.
Rettie, Dwight F. Our National Park System: Caring fo r America’s Greatest National
and Historic Treasures. Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1995.
Robbins, Royal. Basic Rockeraft. Glendale: La Siesta Press, 1971.
________ . “Nuts to You!” Summit 13 (May 1967): 2-7.
________ . “Yosemite Notes,” Summit 16 (November 1970): 33-34.
________ . “The El Capitan Climb,” Summit 16 (December 1970), 30-31.
Robinson, Doug. “The Whole Natural Art of Protection,” in Chouinard and Frost,
Chouinard Equipment Catalogue, 12, 25.
Robinson, Kim Stanley. Red Mars. New York: Bantam Books, 1993.
Rome, Adam. The Bulldozer in the Countryside: Suburban Sprawl and the Rise o f
American Environmentalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
________ . “‘Give Earth a Chance’: The Environmental Movement and the Sixties,”
Journal o f American History 92 (September 2003): 525-554.
Roper, Steve. Camp 4: Recollections o f a Yosemite Rockclimber. Seattle: The
Mountaineers, 1994.
________ , ed. Ordeal by Piton: Writings from the Golden Age o f Climbing. Stanford:
Stanford University Libraries, 2003.
, and Allen Steck, eds. The Best o f Ascent: Twenty Five Years o f the
Mountaineering Experience. San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1993.
Rosenblatt, Roger, ed. Consuming Desires: Consumption, Culture, and the Pursuit o f
Happiness. Washington D.C.: Island Press, 1999.
Rothman, Hal K. D evil’s Bargains: Tourism in the Twentieth-Century American West.
Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1996.
. Preserving Different Pasts: The American National Monuments. Chicago:
University of Illinois Press, 1989.
. The New Urban Park: Golden Gate National Recreation Area and Civic
Environmentalism. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004.

201

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

. Saving the Planet: The American Response to the Environment in the

Twentieth Century. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2000.
. Blazing Heritage: A History o f Wildland Fire in the National Parks. New
York: Oxford University Press, 2007.
Rowell, Galen, ed. The Vertical World o f Yosemite. Berkeley: Wildemess Press, 1979.
________ . “The South Face of Half Dome,” American Alpine Journal 17, no. 2, issue 45
(1971): 266-274.
. “An Elegy for Yosemite,” Climbing 7 (May/June 1971): 11-15, 26.
. “On Safety and Wildemess,” Sierra Magazine (November/ December 1977).
Runte, Alfred. National Parks: The American Experience, third edition. Lincoln: The
University of Nebraska Press, 1997.
________ . Yosemite: The Embattled Wildemess. Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press, 1990.
Safety Committee of the American Alpine Club. Mountaineering Safety. New York:
The American Alpine Club, 1948.
________ . Safety and the Climber. New York: The American Alpine Club, 1950.
_. Accidents in American Mountaineering. New York: The American Alpine
Club, 1952.
Sax, Joseph L. Mountains Without Handrails: Reflections on the National Parks. Ann
Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1980.
Scott, Doug. Big Wall Climbing: Development, Technique, and Aids. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1974.
Seabrook, John. Nobrow: The Culture o f Marketing, the Marketing o f Culture. New
York: Vintage Books, 2001.
Sellars, Richard West. Preserving Nature in the National Parks: A History. New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1997.
Setnicka, Tim J. Wilderness Search and Rescue. Boston: Appalachian Mountain Club,
1980.
_

. “Mountain

O ff Belay 37 (Febmary 1978): 6-8.

202

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

“A ‘Bombproof A n c\\o if O ff Belay 40 (August 1978): 15-16.
Shabecof, Philip. A Fierce Green Fire: The American Environmental Movement. New
York: Hill and Wang, 1993.
Shaffer, Maguerite S. See America First: Tourism and National Identity, 1880-1940.
Washington D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001.
Shankland, Robert. Steve Mather o f the National Parks. New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1951.
Spence, Mark D. Dispossessing the Wilderness: Indian Removal and the Making o f the
National Parks. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.
Steck, Allen P. “Ordeal by Piton,” Sierra Club Bulletin 36 (May 1951): 1-5.
Stein, Jeffrey K. and Joel A. Tarr, “At the Intersection of Histories: Technology and the
Environment,” Technology and Culture 39 (October 1998): 601-640.
Strauss, William and Neil Howe. Generations: The History o f America’s Future, 15842069. New York: William Morrow, 1991.
Susman, Warren. Culture as History: The Transformation o f American Society in the
Twentieth Century. Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2003.
Sutter, Paul. Driven Wild: How the Fight Against Automobiles Launched the Modern
Wildemess Movement. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002.
Svboda, Paul A. “Protecting Visitors to National Recreation Areas Under the Tort
Claims Act,” Columbia Law Review 84 (November 1984): 1792-1812.
Taylor, Joseph 111. “Mapping Adventure: A Historical Geography of Yosemite Climbing
Landscapes,” Jowrwa/ o f Historical Geography 32 (January, 2006): 190-219.
Thompson, Pete. “Tragedies in Yosemite Valley,” Summit 19 (June 1973): 1-4.
Trachtenberg, Alan. The Incorporation o f America: Culture and Society in the Gilded
Age. New York: Hill and Wang, 1982.
Turner, James Morton. The Promise o f Wildemess: A History o f Environmental Politics,
I964-I994. Dissertation: Princeton University, 2004.
________ . “From Woodcraft to ‘Leave no Trace:’ Wildemess, Consumerism, and
Environmentalism in Twentieth Century America,” Environmental History 7, no. 3
(2002): 462-484.

203

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Udall, Stewart L. The Quiet Crisis. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963.
Veblen, Thorstein. The Theory o f the Leisure Class: An Economic Study o f Institutions.
New York: The McMillan Company, 1912.
Wagar, John Alan. The Carrying Capacity o f Wild Lands fo r Recreation. Phd. Diss.:
University of Michigan, 1961.
Walling, Russ. “Death Valley Days,” Rock and Ice 46 (November and December, 1991):
48-54.
White, Richard. I t ’s Your Misfortune and None o f My Own: A New History o f the
American West. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.
________ . “Are You an Environmentalist or Do You Work for a Living,” in Cronon,
Uncommon Ground, 171-185.
________ . “Tempered Dreams,” in Molella and Bedi, Inventing fo r the Environment, 311 .

Whittlesey, Lee. Death in Yellowstone: Accidents and Foolhardiness in the First
National Park. Roberts Rinehart Publishers, 1995.
Worster, Donald. Nature’s Economy: A History o f Ecological Ideas. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1985.
Wrobel, David M. and Patrick T. Long. Seeing and Being Seen: Tourism in the
American West. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001.
Zakin, Susan. Coyotes and Town Dogs: Earth First! and the Environmental Movement.
Tuscon: University of Arizona Press, 1993.
Zinn, Howard. A People’s History o f the United States. New York: Harper Collins, 1980.

204

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

VITA
Graduate College
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Christopher Edward Johnson

Local Address:
551 Eiger Way #523
Henderson, NV 89014
Home Address:
15976 Eagle View Lane
Valley Center, CA 92082
Degrees:
Bachelor of Arts, History, 2003
California State University, Sacramento
Special Honors and Awards:
California State University History Department Scholarship, 2002
Robert and Anita Hulse Foundation Scholarship for Meritorious Graduate Student,
University of Nevada Las Vegas, 2007
Smith Fellowship, University of Washington, 2007
Publications:
“Bom With Steel Spoons in their Mouths: Sierra Club High Trippers and Wildemess
Use, 1930-1941,” Clio 14 (2004): 89-110.
Thesis Title: Wildemess Handrails: The Evolution of Search and Rescue in Yosemite
National Park
Thesis Examination Committee:
Chairperson. Dr. Andrew Kirk, Ph.D.
Committee Member, Dr, Elizabeth White Nelson, Ph.D.
Committee Member, Dr. Sue Fawn Chung, Ph.D.
Committee Member, Dr. Timothy Famham, Ph.D.

205

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

